


**The Dynamics of Francophone African Migration to  
Cape Town after 1994**

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**Dissertation Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Stellenbosch  
University**



**Supervisor: Pr. Simon B. Bekker**

**March 2008**

## **DECLARATION**

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously, in its entirety or in part, submitted it to any other university for a degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

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## **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate a group of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town during the decade following the end of the apartheid era. The focus of the thesis, however, is on the reasons why French-speaking Africans leave their countries of origin, the reasons for coming to South Africa, and finally the reasons why within South Africa, they decide to settle in Cape Town, with a particular accent put on the integration of these migrants into the local society. The thesis considers legal migrants, students, refugees and extra-legals as the four categories of migrants according to theoretical frameworks.

A brief overview of selected theories of international migration is considered to provide a framework for the Francophone African migration to Cape Town. The theoretical causes of Francophone African migration are viewed through both theories on the initiation of migration and theories of the perpetuation of migration. Apart from the theoretical synopsis, the data on which this study is based are derived from both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches. Alongside secondary sources, a series of interviews, based on categories of migrants and gender, were conducted in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pretoria in South Africa; as well as in Libreville in Gabon. In-depth interviews and focus-groups aimed at collecting information concerning the three main questions of the study.

The reasons for the departure of Francophone Africans from their countries of origin are complex and mainly depend on the categories of migrants. As far as legal migrants and students are concerned, economic, political, social and academic paralysis, career prospects and the desire to pursue studies are the main reasons. As for refugees and extra-legals, armed conflicts, environmental catastrophes, economic and social deterioration and social capital seem to be the main causes. Since 1994, South Africa has claimed a strong leadership role on the continent because of its economic and political strengths.

Educational infrastructure, the language factor and social capital are also reasons why migrants choose South Africa as a host country. The settlement in Cape Town depends on various factors, including the consideration of the city as first choice, safety concerns in other South African cities, the inability to settle in other cities, particularly Johannesburg, and social networks.

French language seems to be a common language identity linking various ethnic groups residing in Francophone Africa. However, once migrants have established themselves in Cape Town, their ethnic, religious or political identities prevail. The thesis analyses the settlement of migrants in Cape Town by pointing out the complexities of migrant life in a case study of each category considered.

## OPSOMMING

Hierdie tesis het ten doel om 'n groep Franssprekende Afrika migrante in Kaapstad, in die dekade wat direk op die einde van die apartheidsera gevolg het, te ondersoek. Die tesis fokus op die redes waarom Franssprekende Afrikane hulle land van oorsprong verlaat, die redes waarom hulle na Suid-Afrika kom en, laastens, die redes waarom hulle in Suid-Afrika besluit om in Kaapstad te bly –die klem is spesifiek op die integrasie van die migrante binne die plaaslike gemeenskap. Na aanleiding van die teoretiese raamwerke wat vir die studie oorweeg word, neem die tesis wettige migrante, studente, vlugteling en onwettige migrante as die vier kategorieë van migrante, in ag.

'n Bondige oorsig van uitgesoekte teorieë vir internasionale migrasie word as raamwerk vir die Franssprekende Afrikane se migrasie na Kaapstad oorweeg. Die teoretiese oorsake vir Franssprekende Afrikane se migrasie word deur beide die teorieë vir die inisiasie vir migrasie en die teorieë vir die bestendiging vir migrasie beoordeel. Naas die teoretiese sinopsis, word die data waarop hierdie studie gebaseer is, van beide kwalitatiewe en kwantitatiewe metodologiese benaderinge afgelei. Aanvullend tot die sekondêre bronne, is daar ook 'n reeks onderhoude, gebaseer op kategorieë van migrante en geslag, in Kaapstad, Johannesburg en Pretoria in Suid-Afrika asook in Libreville in Gabon, gevoer –in diepte onderhoude en fokusgroepe met die doel om inligting rakende die drie hoofkwessies van die studie in te win.

Die redes vir die emigrasie van Franssprekende Afrikane uit hulle oorsprongsland is kompleks en hang grotendeels saam met die kategorieë van migrante. Wat die wettige migrante en studente aanbetref is ekonomiese, politieke, sosiale en akademiese magteloosheid, loopbaan vooruitsigte en die begeerte vir die nastreef van studies, die hoofredes. Vir vlugteling en onwettige migrante blyk die hoofoorsake dié van gewapende konflik, natuurrampe, ekonomiese en sosiale agteruitgang en sosiale kapitaal te wees. Sedert 1994, het Suid-Afrika, weens haar ekonomiese en politieke vermoëns, 'n

sterk leierskapsrol op die kontinent uitgeoefen. Opvoedkundige infrastrukture, die taalkwessie en sosiale kapitaal is nog redes waarom migrante Suid-Afrika as gasheerland uitsonder. Vestiging in Kaapstad hang van verskeie redes af, insluitende die inagneming van die stad as eerste keuse, veiligheidsaspekte in ander Suid-Afrikaanse stede en die onvermoë om in ander stede gevestig te word. Die klem in hierdie verband rus veral op Johannesburg en sosiale netwerke.

Frans as taal skyn 'n algemene identiteit te wees wat verskeie etniese groepe in Franssprekende Afrika met mekaar verbind. Tog, is dit hulle etniese, godsdienstige en politieke identiteit wat handhaaf word sodra migrante hulself in Kaapstad gevestig het. Die tesis analiseer ook die vestiging van migrante in Kaapstad deur die kompleksiteite binne die leeftydsmigrasie van 'n gevallestudie vir elke kategorie in ag te neem.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

There are number of people who have contributed to the motivation for and the production of this thesis, without whose influence, this work would never have been materialised. However, I will only mention people and institutions without whose sustained support, guidance and encouragement, this thesis would never been completed. I would like to record my indebtedness to my supervisor, Prof. Simon Bekker for his guidance, support and patience, which had no limits.

I owe a special thanks to IFAS (French Institute of South Africa) for granting me a generous fund for research, in particular to Aurelia Kabwe-Segatti, the Research Director.

It would being unfair if I fail to give thanks to my parents, my friends and my relatives who have always been there throughout my studies, steadfast in their support and encouragement.

## DEDICATION

*Dedicated to the memory of my father Ndagui Rene (1935-2004) and my old brother Ndagui Jean Victor (1961-1983)*



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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ACCT: Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique  
AEF: Afrique Equatoriale Française  
AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
AIMS: African Institute of Mathematics and Science  
AOF: Afrique Occidentale Française  
ANC: African National Congress  
AFDL: Alliance des Forces de Libération du Zaïre  
AU: African Union  
CAR: Central African Republic  
CBD: Central Business District  
CDE: Centre for Development and Enterprises  
CFA: Communauté Financière Africaine  
CHE: Council of Higher Education  
CMA: Cape Town Metropolitan Area  
COSATU: Congress of South African Trade Unions  
DFA: Department of Foreign Affairs  
DDR: Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration  
DHA: Department of Home Affairs  
DoE: Department of Education  
DNA: Deoxyribonucleic Acid  
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo  
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States  
FAZ: Forces Armées Zaïroises  
EU: European Union  
FPR: Front Patriotique Rwandais

FLN: Front de Libération National  
 GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
 GCIM: Global Commission on International Migration  
 GEAR: Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme  
 HDI: Human Development Indicator  
 HDP: Human Poverty Indicator  
 HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus  
 ID: Identity Document  
 IMF: International Monetary Fund  
 INED: Institut National des Etudes Démographiques  
 IOM: International Organisation for Migration  
 IRO: International Refugee Organisation  
 MAP: Millenium African Plan  
 MDR: Mouvement Démocratique Chrétien  
 MLC: Mouvement de Libération du Congo  
 MPC: Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire  
 MPLA: Movement for the Liberation of Angola  
 MPR: Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution  
 NAI: New African Initiative  
 NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development  
 NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations  
 NIC: Natal Indian Congress  
 NMMU: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University  
 OAU: Organisation of African Union  
 ONI: Office National de l'Immigration  
 PCT: Parti Congolais du Travail  
 PDC: Parti Démocratique Chrétien  
 PDCI-RDA: Parti Démocratique de Cote d'Ivoire-Rassemblement Démocratique  
 Africain  
 PDG: Parti Démocratique Guineen  
 PDG: Parti Démocratique Gabonais

PICS: International Scientific Co-operation Programme  
RCD: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie  
RDP: Reconstruction and Development Programme  
RDR: Rassemblement des Républicains  
RDPC: Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais  
SAA: South African Airways  
SABC: South African Broadcasting Corporation  
SACP: South African Communist Party  
SADC: Southern African Development Community  
SAMP: South African Migration Project  
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme  
STASSA: Statistics South Africa  
UCT: University of Cape Town  
UPRONA: Parti de l'Union et de Progrès National  
UN: United Nations  
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme  
UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola  
UNRRA: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration  
UWC: University of Western Cape  
VOC: Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie  
WASAT: West African Semi-Arid Tropics

# **Chapter One**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background of the study**

Migration is not a new process. It has been central to the formation of societies all over the world. The occupation and development of land began when people started moving from one area to settle in another; but with the implementation of the notion of the state and the concept of boundaries this movement was identified as ‘international’. Basically, migration refers to a move by an individual or household from one geographical area to another. At the international level, migration takes place across borders. Other criteria, such as space, distance and reasons for leaving should be taken into consideration, as a single definition of migration cannot be applied in all contexts (Mafukidze, 2006: 104).

The movement of people crossing international boundaries has increased considerably since the end of World War II. The number of migrants has grown from 75 million to 120 million between 1965 and 2000 (Stalker, 2000: 6). The expansion of the global economy has resulted in the increased movement of people, which has become more rapid and their destinations more diversified through tremendous developments in transport and communication. Since 1980, the number of migrants has doubled worldwide to reach approximately 200 million people. This is comparable to the population of Brazil. These movements are occurring within regions as well as from one continent to another (CGIM, 2005: 1).

Africa is viewed as a continent with considerable migration, including emigration and immigration. The increase of the number of African migrants has grown from 9.4 million to 16.3 million between 1960 and 2000 (Oucho, 2006: 132). The legacy of colonialism influenced the destinations of African migrants for many years, because the economic, political, administrative and linguistic ties, as well as transportation facilities, caused the migration streams from former colonies to be mainly directed to the colonial powers. Therefore, French-speaking Africans went mostly to France or Belgium, those from English-speaking countries went to England and, to a lesser

extent, the USA, while Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking Africans went to Spain and Portugal respectively. However, with the influence of globalisation, African migrants have new patterns and have diversified their destinations. Nowadays, it is not a surprise to find strong communities of Senegalese in the South of Italy or Nigerians in Germany, for instance.

The main characteristics of migration in Africa include a spectrum ranging from forced migration to the departure of highly skilled people. Alicea & Toro-Morn (2004: xxv), for instance, point to the increase of refugees in Africa. In 1980, only six countries located in the eastern and central parts of the continent had to be concerned about refugees. In 1985, there were three million refugees throughout Africa. By 1995, 6.8 million refugees were concentrated in 13 states. Illegal immigration is another main pattern of migration in Africa. This undocumented migration includes trafficking and smuggling people, especially women and children. Women and girls are recruited through networks of agents and exploited as sex workers, while children are used as domestic servants in informal sectors, on plantations and often as soldiers on battlefields. The proportion of women among international migrants in Africa is significant. By 2000 it was estimated that 46.7% of the 16 million international migrants in Africa were women (Zlotnik, 2004). The departure of highly qualified people and students is also a pattern in African migration. Thousands of qualified Africans are running away from the continent because it cannot offer them social and professional security. This brain drain is increased by the need for a highly skilled labour force in developed countries. Mangolini and Revel (2002) estimate that brain drain accounts for a third of African skilled migrants due in particular to the increase of 2% in the expatriation of sub-Saharan students annually since 1990. It represents 14% of the world foreign student population.

Although the patterns of international African migration have changed as far as the volume of migrants and the destinations are concerned, the bulk of African migration continues to occur within the continent (Castels & Miller, 1998: 125). Indeed, with 53 independent states, the flows of people crossing the borders of African countries are more significant in terms of volume. South Africa has become one of the main destinations on the African continent. The flows to South Africa have not only



increased since the demise of apartheid, but the origin has also diversified (Akokpari, 2002; Castels & Miller, 1998; Cross *et al*, 2006; Crush, 2003; Stalker, 2000).

Since 1994, apart from labourers recruited in neighbouring countries to work on farms and mines, South Africa has witnessed the arrival of thousands of people from other African countries and it is unlikely that this influx will cease any time soon. The arrival of those thousands of people has raised some concerns within South African legislative and academic circles. South African migration policy has encountered criticism because it is viewed as repulsive (Crush, 2003; Hill, 1998). Seemingly, the legislation has shifted from a racial policy to a xenophobic one. The migration policy is in fact still considered a legacy of apartheid legislation. The Aliens Control Act of 1991 has indeed served as a benchmark for the migration legislation tools of the new democratic South Africa, although some amendments have been made to adjust South African migration policy according to international frameworks and in response to developments within the country.

## **1.2 Why the Francophone African label?**

After World War II, Europe wanted to maintain tight relations with Africa in order to build a front force to the USA and the Soviet Union (Mazrui, 2004: 54). The Eurafrica project later on gave birth to developments such as the Lomé Conventions. France, however, built strong relationships with her former colonies by creating in 1970 an intergovernmental organisation for cooperation the *Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique* (Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation), better known as ACCT. Its members also included some Asian and European countries. After various reforms, the agency became *l'Agence Intergouvernementale de la Francophonie* (Intergovernmental Agency of Francophonie) in 1985, before becoming in 1998, *l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* (Francophone International Organisation), also called OIF. Francophonie refers therefore to the community of people and countries using the French language.

Francophone African countries are mostly former French colonies. Bouillon and Morris (2001: 19) point out that Francophone African countries are members of the OIF and that their governments have adopted French as the official language, whilst their populations regularly use French for daily communication. However, one should

question whether a country being a member of the OIF is sufficient to consider it Francophone. In fact, countries like Equatorial Guinea, Egypt and Cape Verde are members of the OIF but in these countries Spanish, Arabic and Portuguese are respectively the official languages, and the majority of the population does not use French on a daily basis. In these countries, certain elite groups speak French although the countries are not former French colonies. Their belonging to the OIF is merely a political, economic and cultural ambition to expand France and the Francophone community on the continent. These cases are quite different from Morocco and Tunisia, which are former French colonies although Arabic, along with French is the official language. Another important example to mention is Algeria, a former French colony that uses French with Arabic as an official language but which is not a member of the OIF

The use of French in twenty-six African countries as the *lingua franca* in government offices, judiciaries, legislatures or academia labels those countries as Francophone. As pointed out by Mazrui (2004: 6), this categorisation is enhanced by the degree and the nature of the lingo-cultural dependence of their societies. The scale of dependence on the French language links those African countries and their various identities. How prominent French is when people from those countries migrate, is however an important question.

The expansion of French language from Europe to Africa is characterised by the official use of this language in the administrative or academic circles. With this regard, there are more French-speaking countries in Africa, while Europe has the larger number of French-speaking individuals (Mazrui, 2004: 54). The proportion of the populations identifying themselves through their local languages rather than French is higher in Francophone African countries. In addition, the expansion of Americanisation, the computer revolution, the internet and globalisation, all using English as the main language, has contributed to the decline of French influence on the African continent. The Arabization in North Africa; the policy of Zairianization adopted by Mobutu in Zaire in the 1970s which promoted regional languages such as Lingala, Kikongo and Kiswahili; the rise of English in the Great Lakes region since the 1990s; and the deep-rooted local languages in West Africa have also diminished French influence.

Because thousands of ethnic groups exist in Francophone Africa, French seems to be the common language identity that links various peoples and communities. Colonial and post-colonial inheritances have been the major factors contributing to this common linguistic identity. Consequently, people coming from Francophone African countries may have a social bond, a sense of shared values and communal identity (Garuba, 2001: 8) because of French, despite having different ethnic backgrounds.

This study selected Francophone African migrants as the research sample. How far this common linguistic identity remains during the migration processes is one of the questions addressed during research.

South Africa has become a popular destination for Francophone Africans despite the language barrier and other problems related to their integration. For Francophone Africans, South Africa is a new destination for two main reasons. The first reason is the opening of the country's borders to the world after the end of apartheid. The second reason is that South Africa represents an alternative to some traditional destinations such as France and to a lesser extent Belgium or other African countries with relative better economic opportunities, like Cote d'Ivoire or Gabon. The arrival of Francophone African migrants has also introduced new sociological and cultural features that are sources of curiosity in South Africa. The language certainly contributes most to Francophone Africans feeling more like strangers in their new environment than do migrants coming from English-speaking countries, such as for instance, Nigeria, Ghana or Zambia.

### **1.3 The questions of the study**

The overall purpose of this study is to provide insights into south-south migration, especially between African countries. This study investigates a group of Francophone African migrants currently residing in Cape Town with three main questions providing a framework for the research. The first question aims to establish the reasons why Francophone Africans decide to leave their countries of origin. The second concerns their choice of South Africa and the last relates to their choice of Cape Town rather than another South African city. The last question furthermore opens up an opportunity to gain insights into the lives of Francophone migrants in Cape Town.

## **1.4 Categories of migrants considered for the study**

The three main questions have influenced the choice of the categories of the migrants considered for this study. To categorise migrants is an advantage in analysing the reasons for departure, the choice of destination and the complexities of integration and life in the local society. Four categories of migrants are considered for this study according to the theoretical framework. In the first place, legally employed migrants and migrants seeking to improve their educational and professional qualifications probably represent the majority of migrants who have succeeded in obtaining permission to enter South Africa. These migrants have most probably left their countries voluntarily for essentially economic reasons. On the other hand, refugees and extra-legal migrants, the other two categories, have most likely been forced to leave their countries of origin for various reasons. The four categories of migrants considered for this study are listed as follows:

### **1.4.1 Legal migrants**

As defined by the IOM (2004: 20), a legal migrant refers to any foreigner who has entered the country on a legal basis and remains within the country in accordance to his/her right of entry. In order to give a better insight of the lives of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town, I have sub-divided legal migrants into two categories. On the one hand, there are legal migrant workers who occupy a remunerated position in a private or public company. There are professionals such as doctors, lecturers, accountants or administrative assistants. On the other hand, some legal economic migrants are self-employed and many run their own businesses, especially in the informal sector. They are considered as documented migrant workers and they and/or the members of their families are authorised to enter, stay and engage in a remunerated activity in South Africa.

### **1.4.2 Students**

Although the *International Law of Migration* (IOM, 2004) does not list students as migrants, I treat students as a category of migrants in this study for two main reasons. Firstly, the South African Immigration Act of 2002 acknowledges as migrants, anyone who chooses to spend many years in the country. Secondly, according to one of the patterns of African migration, some students decide to remain in South Africa after completing their studies and therefore become part of the brain drain.

Considering students in this study is also acknowledging one of the origins of legal migrants in South Africa. The DHA defines international students as non-South African persons admitted into South Africa for the specific purpose of following courses of study in an accredited institution of higher education (Ramphele, 1999: 8).

Only students registered at the four state universities in Western Cape have been considered in this study.

### **1.4.3 Refugees**

The United Nations High Commission defines a refugee as:

a person who, owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (IOM, 2004: 53).

### **1.4.4 Extra-legals**

Extra-legals are undocumented or illegal migrants. The *International Migration Law* defines an extra-legal migrant as follows (IOM, 2004: 67):

an alien who enters or stays in a country without the appropriate documentation. This include, among others: one (a) who has no legal documentation to enter a country but manages to enter clandestinely, (b) who enters using fraudulent documentation, (c) who, after entering using legal documentation, has stayed beyond the time authorized or otherwise violated the terms of entry and remained without authorization.

Asylum seekers (people who have applied for the refugees status and whose decisions are still pending), also fall under this category.

## **1.5 Brief overview of research**

The methodological approach of this study is both descriptive and quantitative. This study is based on secondary material, in-depth interviews and focus groups.

Interviews were held in Cape Town, Pretoria and Johannesburg in South Africa, and in Libreville in Gabon, while focus groups were conducted in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pretoria. The Johannesburg and Pretoria interviews were used to draw some comparisons between the two Gauteng cities and Cape Town, and also to understand why some migrants are not interested in settling in Cape Town. The purpose of conducting interviews in Gabon was to capture the stories and perceptions of migrants living in that country in order to establish whether they intend to migrate to South Africa and what their expectations are before their arrival in the country. The choice of Gabon is also justified because it is a major destination for Francophone African migrants. Focus group interviews were initiated in order to obtain information which reveals and clarifies a diversity of opinions. Case studies were also undertaken to analyse the progression of migration experiences.

The interviews were conducted in French and English. The respondents were found through the snowball technique. Different backgrounds, gender, professions, ages, marital status and nationalities were taken into consideration.

In addition, in order to give a guesstimate of the number of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town, the method described in the appendix was developed and applied.

## **1.6 Overview of migration literature in South Africa**

Many studies on migration to South Africa have been done on the periods before and after 1994. Two main research issues dominated before the 1994 period. The first was the history of European migration to South Africa and the second was labour migration. Among these studies, Brownell (1977) isolates the British component of both immigration to and emigration from South Africa based on arrivals from and departures to English speaking countries. Bradlow (1978) describes the evolution and problems of European immigration into the Union of South Africa. Martin (1986) points to networks used by Mauritians to leave their country, to settle and integrate into South African society. Mauritian arrival was explicitly a white migration.

Concerning labour migration, Jooma (1991) focuses on the legislative, economic and socio-economic obstacles to entering the country, and on strategies used to stabilise

migrancy in the mining industry. Allen (1992) explains the necessity, the regions of origin and laws made to bring mine workers to South Africa before the end of the apartheid era. New labour contracts were introduced to these ends. Tshitereke (1998) studies the debate around labour migrant systems before and after the end of apartheid. Mc Donald (2000) gives an historical overview of migration to as well as within the Southern African region. He addresses the issues of xenophobia, economic migration within the region and the development of efficient migration policies. The importance of the work done by James (1992) should also be noticed as it focuses on the mine labour during the last two decades of the apartheid era (1970-1990). The sociological history focuses on social change of African labour in mines as a result of the split of state institutions and conflict between the mining groups in the 1980s and 1990s. The author points out the recruiting channels of African manpower in the neighbouring countries, as well as in the former homelands. Urban workers as an alternative are also taken into account due to the change of patterns from traditional sources. The author also discusses the ascendance of African labour through processes of unionisation, the struggle over the mine compounds and the suppression of the Color Bar system.

Labour migration after 1994 is also analysed. Crush and James (1995) study the complexity of removing and restructuring the visible and the invisible boundaries of mine migrancy and the hardship they represent. The post-1994 era has also brought into sharp focus the legal position of migrants. Hill (1998) emphasises migration policy development and situates these within the context of regional and international migration trends. Minaar and Hough (1996) address illegal immigrants, their origins and their positive and negative contributions to South Africa. Crush (1998) clarifies the link between immigration and human rights through the Aliens Control Act and the subsequent provisions for immigration. Majodina (2001) provides a useful framework for examining the case of forced migrants and the refugee policy in Southern Africa region. Three documents used as main references for this study focus on Francophone migrants and on Cape Town as a destination for migrants. The first is a paper prepared by Boaden (2002: 3) on migration in the Western Cape and serves as “a pilot study which should be followed up by more comprehensive investigation where more hard data is collected and the viewpoint of foreigners is obtained directly.” The second document is about Francophone migration to South Africa

during the 1990s (Bouillon & Morris, 2001), in which the authors have concentrated on Johannesburg. The book focuses on the motives behind the departure of African migrants from their countries of origin and it describes the economic activities of migrants, particularly the street sellers in Johannesburg. The third document is by Olaleye (2000), who explains African migrants' motivations for choosing Cape Town.

The South African Migration Project also provides a range of books and articles on migratory movements in the Southern African region. Without being exhaustive, some works can be pointed out, including Crush & Williams (2001) on gender, Crush and McDonald (2002) on brain drain, Waller (2006) on xenophobia, Cohen (2003) on health or Crush and Frayne (2007) on migration and development. Some of these works are undertaken in collaboration with other centres of research.

### **1.7 The outline of the chapters**

The study broadly fits into six chapters that describe the journey of Francophone African migrants from their respective countries to Cape Town. Following from the introduction (Chapter 1), which sets out the research questions and identifies the categories of migrants considered, the chapters are organised as follows:

Chapter 2 focuses on the historical and geographical context of Francophone African migration. Starting from the early movements of people and a description of Francophone Africa, the chapter looks at the traditional destinations of Francophone African migrants on both the European and African continents. It then places the evolution of the patterns of Francophone African migration in the context of globalisation and considers the consequent search for alternatives to the traditional destinations. These new destinations include South Africa. The chapter furthermore outlines the evolution of migration policy and the discourse on migration in South Africa.

Chapter 3 describes the evolution of the theoretical analysis: an overview of the theories of international migration which includes theories on the initiation of migration and on the perpetuation of migration. Finally the chapter addresses the methodology used for this study.



Chapter 4 posits the push and pull factors that affect Francophone African migrants. The chapter presents the political, economic, socio-cultural, academic and environmental situations in Francophone Africa that cause the departure of millions of people. The choice of South Africa as destination conforms to numerous criteria, including the historical links of some countries with South Africa, as well as the political, economic and academic position that the country occupies on the continent. The chapter highlights social capital as the other reason for the arrival of migrants.

Chapter 5 focuses on Francophone African migrants' choice of Cape Town, their modes of arrival and their living conditions in Cape Town. The chapter also tries to locate the arrival of Francophone Africans within the historical flows of migrants to Cape Town, which is regarded as a cosmopolitan city. The chapter also considers the settlement of migrants and social capital to explain the complexities of Francophone African migrants' lives in Cape Town.

Chapter 6 outlines four migrants' experiences with a case study from each category. The illustration of the four categories is designed to analyse the complexities of the life histories of migrants from their departure from their countries of origin to their arrival and settlement in the realities of Cape Town, including the overlapping of categories.

The conclusion answers the research questions raised in the introduction to this study. Lastly, the appendix guesstimates the number of Francophone African in Cape Town in 2004/2005.

## **Chapter Two**

### **HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter aims to define Francophone Africa according to its historical formation and its geographical conception. It intends to understand migration “within the context of the political and historical evolution of African societies” (Aina & Baker, 1995: 89).

The first section considers the historical context, summarising the early migrations in the regions that are now Francophone Africa, with the Bantu migration and the slave trade as the two main massive population movements during the pre-colonial era. In the second section, the historical context justifies the argument that Francophone Africa is a legacy of colonialism, starting with the making of Francophone Africa and followed by the implementation of the colonial state and the description of the actual Francophone Africa.

The third section of the chapter describes the traditional destinations of Francophone African migration represented by France in Europe, and Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon within the African continent. Throughout that section, particular attention is paid to restrictive measures taken by these countries to curb immigration. Finally, the chapter ends by considering new trends in Francophone African migration into the globalised context, which have pushed Francophone African migrants to view South Africa as a new destination. As such, some patterns of migration in the country, the evolution of South African migration policy, the discourse on migration in South Africa and a presentation of South Africa as a country of emigration are explored.

#### **2.2 Early migrations**

Significant movements of populations in Africa have accompanied the history of the continent through the centuries. The large scale of people’s displacement had many causes, including the search for better lands. Two of the most important mass

migrations in Africa before the arrival of Europeans settlers were mainly linked with ecological problems. For example the Peul people in West Africa moved downwards due to the progression of the Sahara desert. Even in the tropical rain forest of Central Africa, the nature of soil, rainfall patterns, the topography and the availability of supplementary food resources could cause the departure of entire villages (Ogot, 2003: 25).

One of the reasons for the tremendous advancement of Bantu people<sup>1</sup> from the Central Africa region to the tip of the southern part of the continent could be linked to the scarcity of resources available to the increasing populations inhabiting the region adjacent to Cameroon and Nigeria. According to Burns, Collins and Ching (1994: 95), the Bantu migration started during the second millennium BC and spread over the Equatorial forest to end up in the southern tip of the continent. The Bantu migration spread in two main directions. Firstly, a stream of people seemed to walk horizontally along the Equator towards the east to the Great Lakes region. Then, the movement went southward, ending in the southern part of the continent. Secondly, another group travelled through the rain forest to the south through what is now Angola and so on. According to Fage (1995: 28), the movements of the second group of Bantu people through the rainfall were “more slower and more piecemeal” in comparison to the advance of the first group, because of the savannah in the Eastern part of the continent. Consequently, the Bantu people were already in what is now the KwaZulu-Natal region in South Africa by 500 CE (Beck, 2000: 16). The establishment of powerful kingdoms or chiefdoms, such as the kingdoms of the Kongo in Central Africa or the Zulu in Southern Africa, was the consequence of those early large-scale migrations.

The African continent has witnessed one of the most painful forced migrations in the history of humanity. The discovery of the Americas exacerbated the terrible fate suffered by the African continent. The arrival of Christopher Columbus in the “New World” in 1492 was followed by the exploitation of its virgin lands and mineral

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<sup>1</sup> Bantu is a linguistic classification of languages used by most of the African populations living in of the Southern part of the continent. These different languages are believed to have the same root, for instance the word *ntu*, which broadly means human being in singular and becomes *bantu* in plural (Fage, 1995: 21). The Bantu languages present many similarities between themselves which explains their common origin and the spread of Bantu people throughout the Southern part of Africa.

resources. Africa was considered the supplier of slave labour for these exploitations and Europe became interested in Africa for the sake of America.

The history of forced migration in Africa was however a reality before the arrival of European explorers. The institution of slavery was well established in African society because victorious chiefs often took prisoners of war as slaves. However, the status of slaves in African society was quite different to that under the slave trade, as evident from Rotberg's description of the African context (1965: 135):

...they (slaves) were free to marry, till their own fields, move freely within the tribal dominion, and live relatively normal lives among peoples possessing institutions ... Indigenous society assimilated slaves and allowed them to rise to positions of power and influence.

Slavery in Africa however changed when sub-Saharan societies began to trade with Arabic people. Among the trade products, slaves were included who were sold into the Middle East, Asia and the southern part of Europe. Nevertheless, slaves were not the main products of the trans-Sahara trade because "a horse was worth fifteen or twenty Africans" (Rotberg, 1965: 134). It was the colonisation of America that made slaves the main feature in the triangular intercontinental trade. The trans-Atlantic slave trade was singular not only because of its characteristic aspect of forced migration over three centuries, but also because of "its sheer size, its geographical extent and its economics" (Ogot, 2003: 39).

One could argue that the slave trade was unintentionally brought to America by the Portuguese who used Africans to work on the plantations of the Canaries and Ferdinand Po islands, and as servants in Lisbon and other Portuguese cities. The idea of importing Africans to work in America was pursued when the indigenous inhabitants of the "New World" died by the thousands under the appalling working conditions and new illnesses brought by Europeans. Initially monopolised by Spain, the slave trade attracted all European colonial powers such as Great Britain, Holland and France because it was a lucrative economic activity. The exploitation of America was firstly based on precious metals, before the share of agricultural products such as tobacco, rum, and particularly sugar, increased. The trans-Atlantic trade was

organised around “shipping goods from Africa and the Americas, slaves from Africa to the Americas and agricultural products and precious metals from the Americas to Western Europe” (Ogot, 2003: 45).

The exact number of slaves from Africa remains unknown because there are not exact records of the number of slaves who were taken to America and to a lesser extent Europe. The records at the different destinations do not take into account the number of slaves killed during the trip across the Atlantic Ocean or during the capture process. The records at the ports of arrival differ from one source to another. According to Coquery-Vidrovitch (1988: 19), 11.7 millions Africans were deported to America between 1450 and 1900. The same source indicates that three and half million Africans were traded as slaves in the trans-Saharan trade. The compilations of the number of slaves made up by Avanten, and considered by Ogot (2003: 43), mention that 22 million Africans were deported to America, North Africa, Asia and Europe between 1500 and 1890. Rotberg (1965: 152) puts the figures higher when he concludes that “25 million African slaves were deported to America before 1888. This number excludes 10 million Africans who died during the voyage to America another 10 million who were exported to Asia and the Arab world.”

The arrival of Europeans and the colonisation of the continent destroyed the previous patterns of African migrations. People’s movements were dictated by the expectations of the colonial rulers. Even after the independence of African countries, the patterns of African migration in general, and Francophone African migration in particular, were determined by the legacy of colonialism and its aftermath, decolonisation.

### **2.3 Description of Francophone Africa**

Francophone Africa is a heterogeneous group of countries of which the most important shared characteristic is their use of French as an administrative, corporative and academic language. Francophone Africa was brought into existence with the European conquest. This historical overview thus aims to give a broader understanding of the group of countries studied by looking at the making of Francophone Africa and the colonial state. It furthermore outlines the construction and evolution of African countries with reference to the arrival of explorers and concluding with the Berlin Conference.

### **2.3.1 The making of Francophone Africa**

According to Manning (1988: 8), Francophone Africa was the outcome of the fatherhood of Europe and the motherhood of the African continent. The expansion of European colonial desires gave birth to a new civilisation in some parts of the African continent. After the first period of exploration that lasted almost four centuries and reached every corner of the continent, the competition was intense for the conquest of as much territory as possible to provide raw materials that the European industry desperately needed. Soon the spheres of influence controlled by each European colonial power were likely to collide. Freund (1998: 82) gives an example of the competition for the acquisition of territories in Africa. The penetration of the Italian explorer Savorgnan de Brazza on behalf of France from the Gabonese coast threatened Belgian interests in Congo. Brazza signed a treaty with a paramount local chief, which led to the creation, among other realisations, of Brazzaville, the capital of Congo. French expansion was set to cross the Congo River. According to Fieldhouse (1982: 304) these sporadic expansions of the French colonial possessions were unplanned and the possessions did not have unity of character or function at the beginning. Thus, “the characteristic pattern of the scramble began to emerge” (Fieldhouse, 1982: 304). At the time, Britain, France and to a lesser extent Portugal were the major European colonial powers. But the colonial enterprise was a concern of all the major dominant powers in Europe. Even Germany, which became involved in the colonial enterprise later, succeeded in establishing its domination in Togo, Cameroon, South-West Africa and Tanganyika (Freund, 1998: 84).

For the interest of all colonial powers, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck invited 14 colonial states, including the United States of America, to settle a political and therefore economic partition of Africa during the conference held in Berlin from 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885. This decision about the scramble for Africa was to distinguish and establish clearly the spheres of influence of each of the colonial powers over their protectorates and colonies in Africa. The outcome of the negotiations was the drawing of the boundaries of territories in a room in Germany far from Africa without taking into consideration the realities of the myriad of traditional monarchies, chiefdoms and various other types of political and social organisations in Africa. However, one should ask whether it was indeed possible at that time for European diplomats and statesmen to even concede that they might have counterparts

in Africa; whose populations they considered as not fully human and requiring their civilizing influence. Indeed, many Europeans viewed Africa as follows (Manning, 1988: 24):

Some colonisers saw themselves as saviours of their fellow humans in Africa. They offered spiritual salvation through Christianity, or social salvation through Western education and capitalist enterprise. Other Europeans saw themselves as superior beings. They passed judgment on African civilisation and found it to be morally inferior, economically backward, and incapable of achieving equality with Western civilisation. Most Europeans in the late nineteenth century spoke of Africans as children and therefore as people without maturity and without history.

The Berlin Conference, as shown by Fieldhouse (1982: 213), attempted to clarify future claims on the continent. A turning point for European colonial expansion, it was agreed that claims on the coastal territories required effective occupations. The result later enforced by treaties and armed conquests was that Britain and France took the most important slices of the cake in the scramble for Africa because of the leading role they played in the nineteenth century expansion and partition at the Berlin Conference. As far as France is concerned, its expansion on the continent was defined by its intention “for military, financial and jingoistic reasons, to build a continuous block of territory from Algeria to the Congo and eastwards across the Sudan the French equivalent of Rhodes’ Cape to Cairo dream” (Fieldhouse, 1982: 223). Its dominance was acknowledged over most of West Africa, particularly from Mauritania westward to Chad and from Algeria in the north to Ivory Coast in the south, including the actual Morocco, Senegal, Guinea, Burkina-Faso, Benin and Niger. France was also rewarded with other territories in the central part of the continent: Cameroon, Gabon, Congo and the Central African Republic. France thus extended its colonial possession by two millions square miles (Meredith, 2005: 2). The Belgians acquired a vast territory that became the Congo and which was at first the private property of King Leopold II. Among other decisions taken during the conference, the participants came to an agreement that the Niger and the Congo Rivers were free for shipping traffic and an international prohibition of the slave trade was signed.

The demarcation of the spheres of colonial powers on the continent was one of the first major upheavals in the change of the destiny of Africa and its inhabitants. As described by Meredith (2005:1), people were grouped into areas defined by geometric lines, lines of latitude and longitude and other straight lines or arcs of circles. Consequently, the Bakongo, for instance, were partitioned between the French Congo, the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese colony of Angola. Thus, populations with different histories, cultures, languages and beliefs were forced to live in the same territories and people with the same background were separated. Sharing the same area also forced those populations to accommodate the characteristics of the colonial power, including the language. Indeed, as described in Mafukidze (2006: 109), the successive periods of occupation and colonisation introduced and enhanced European languages and strengthened relations between colonial powers and their colonies, resulting in today's African countries being linked to each other on the one hand and to the colonial power on the other. This is expressed by Lusophone, Anglophone or Francophone connections.



**Map 1: Colonial Africa**



Source: [www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org)

### 2.3.2 The colonial state

After the acknowledgement of its acquisitions, France grouped those territories into two vast federations in West and Central Africa called AOF (*Afrique Occidentale Française*, French Western Africa) and AEF (*Afrique Equatoriale Française*, French Equatorial Africa). The two federations were ruled into the same type of organisation. As shown by Fieldhouse (1982: 306), the French colonial administration was liberal in theory, but centralised and authoritarian in practise. The administrative concepts were the outcome of the merger of French political experience and the legal legacy. Colonial administrative policies were dictated by the principles of liberty of the enlightenment period and the centralised and autocratic administration of the *Ancien Regime* whilst at the same time being subject to the legal tools of the Roman law and the Napoleonic codes. The colonial administration showed the impress of precise legal thinking and passion for symmetry, with the intention to apply uniform administrative patterns to diverse colonial possessions.

The French Republic was one and indivisible in theory. Colonies were therefore integrated parts of the republic. This integration of colonies within the Metropolis was defined through three models (Fieldhouse, 1982: 308). The first model was *assimilation*, which Roberts (cited by Fieldhouse, 1982: 308) defines as “that system which tends to efface all differences between the colonies and the motherland, and which views the colonies simply as a prolongation of the mother-country beyond the seas.” It was viewed as a full adoption by the colonies of the Metropolis’s ways of government, laws and culture. *Assujetissement* was the second model, which highlighted a genuine subordination of colonies, inherited from the *Ancien Regime*. However, its implementation failed and the colonial administration shifted later on to *association*, the third model. Through the last model, colonies were still seen as inferior, but were supposed to retain something of their identity and were to be administrated rationally. It was a question of modelling colonies following the French example, with a clear intention of incorporating them at a later stage into the Metropolis. The implementation of the administrative policies drew a line between the Metropolis and the colonies, with a highly concentrated centre of power in France and diverse and poor colonial peripheries with no real autonomy. After several developments, the colonies were run under the tutelage of a full Colonial Ministry created in 1894 (Fieldhouse, 1982: 310).

As far as economy is concerned, from 1898 the exploitation of the colonies was mandated to private companies through a concessionary system, within which private companies were given the monopoly of the exploitation of raw materials and trade for a certain number of years (Manning, 1988: 47). In return, the companies paid taxes and were asked to build infrastructure such as ports, roads or railways in order to facilitate the exportation of the resources exploited. If the private companies did well by fulfilling the first part of their mandate, the second part was, however, far from being accomplished. Most of those companies were individual or familial affairs which did not have the necessary resources to fulfil the requirements. Manning (1988: 47) points out that concessionary companies such as the Upper Congo Company and the Upper Ogowe Company in the actual Congo and Gabon respectively succeeded in making profits through a system of pillage. The indigenous population paid heavily for these shortcomings by being forced to work under inhuman conditions wherever their services were required.

As pointed out by Rossantaga-Rignault (2000: 18), one of the features of the economic and demographic underdevelopment of the actual Francophone African countries is due to that exploitation of indigenous populations. With the decline of the rubber trade in the 1920s, the concessionary system came to an end and was abandoned when the government started making higher revenues with competitive commerce. Private merchants increased the revenues and the volume of exportation. As described by Manning (1988: 48), the private merchants were mainly immigrants from Lebanon, Syria, Greece and Portugal, who settled in small towns and almost monopolised wholesale and retail commerce. They constituted an intermediary class between French administrators and the indigenous populations. The government also implemented a new system to exploit the colonies through forced cultivation, also known as the *système de l'indigénat*.

Following the failure of the concessionaires companies, the *système de l'indigénat* was in place from 1910 to 1946. The system was a segregationist partition of the colonial society into two groups. The first group was French citizens. They were white people and a small African elite which was granted citizenship. The second group was made up of the indigenous populations who enjoyed few rights or none at all, and who were subject to many constraints and obligations. The indigenous

population was ruled by both the traditional justice and the colonial administration, but the abuses were similar to those of the period of concessionaires companies. The three main pillars required from the indigenous population of the *système de l'indégénat* were free services, forced work and the poll tax.

France took complete advantage of that immense labour and military force, even though not qualified and specialised, when thousand of Africans from the colonies fought for France during World War II and the first wars of colonial liberation as in Indochina. On their return from the worldwide conflict, the soldiers were among those who demanded changes to the situation of the indigenous population. The answer of the colonial power was to organise a conference in Brazzaville in 1944, during which the Metropolis simply explained the new form of organisation which would bring a kind of political life to the colonies without really transforming the fate of the populations. The African colonies were gathered into an organisation called *Union Française*, which saw the creation of assemblies to which African representatives were designated through elections. It was from that political elite that France chose leaders of African countries when they became independent, and the colonial power accommodated the colonial states in the conversion to the newly African independent states.

The achievement of independence by Francophone African countries, mainly in 1960, did not mean severing relations with the colonial power. Instead, after 1960 the French colonial enterprise continued under a different guise better known as neo-colonialism. Throughout both the colonial and post-colonial periods, French African possessions that later became Francophone African countries have served as providers of labour. However, other types of migration, including illegal migration, developed along with labour migration.

#### **2.4 Some traditional destinations of Francophone African migration**

For many years, the flow of African migration in general and the Francophone African one in particular has been determined by the types of relations existing between the sending and receiving countries. The movement of people has been sustained by the links between the former rulers and their colonies. Consequently, it appears as no surprise that English-speaking Africans from countries such as Nigeria,

Ghana, or Kenya mostly move to the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent to the United States of America. Similarly, people from Angola or Equatorial Guinea prefer to go to Portugal and Spain respectively. Likewise, Francophone Africans have considered France to be their first choice destination outside the continent, which has been reinforced by political, economic, linguistic and transportation links between France and its former colonies. In the beginning, the massive arrivals of Africans in France could be justified by the labour needs of the Metropolis.

Over the years, Francophone African migration has also been directed towards countries on the continent that have enjoyed relative economic stability. Two countries in particular, Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa and Gabon in the central part of the continent, have distinguished themselves from others, particularly in the number of foreigners in comparison to the total population.

#### **2.4.1 Francophone African migration to France**

This section gives an overview of the successive Francophone African migrations to France. The western and northern parts of the continent are analysed as the two main provider regions. This section also outlines the evolution of coercive measures taken by France and the European Union to curb immigration, especially from Africa.

##### **2.4.1.1 The migration of North Africans to France**

The history of migration in modern France is determined by three main factors: “slow growth, the pattern and the timing of industrialization, and political changes associated with the rise of republicanism and colonialism” (Hollifield, 1994: 145), which saw France being labelled as a country of immigrants, particularly between 1890 and 1940. One could argue that the geographic proximity of the Northern African region and France over the years facilitated the migration of Northern Africans to France, but it is difficult to pinpoint when the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea started. However, the French colonial adventure in North Africa and its implementation in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia definitely increased the flows. The streams of large-scale North African migration to France started in the nineteenth century with the arrival of Algerians after the release of the first order authorising Algerians to enter in France in May 1876, following their participation in

the Franco-German war. But it was during the twentieth century that the numbers increased.

In 1912, there were some 5 000 Algerians in Marseilles and some 7 000 Moroccans in Bordeaux (Dumont, Durand & Mariner 2002). Before World War I, there were some 30 000 North Africans in France. The bulk of the early Algerian migrants to France were from the Kabylia region in the north of the country where people from a network of several villages habitually went to work on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. During World War I, more migrants were required to compensate for the shortage of the labour force in the Metropolis and some migrants were even enrolled by force in army. A total of 132 000 North Africans found themselves in France, either as factory workers to replace French nationals who went to fight in the war or to become soldiers themselves. After the war many of those migrants decided to settle in France, especially in port cities, such as Le Havre, Marseilles, Bordeaux and Dunkerque, and in some industrial regions where there were more jobs.

However, with the economic crisis which followed the conflict, the North African migrants were among the first victims as their standard of living dropped dramatically. As a result, the number of migrants returning to their regions of origin was more than the number of the migrants arriving in France. French authorities also intensified the control of the North Africans entering the country. The departures from and returns to the Maghreb region of thousands of North Africans were slowed down but not completely stopped by the Second World War, before being reactivated when the conflict ended.

After the conflict and its aftermath of reconstruction, more North Africans arrived in France. The Northern Francophone African migration was enhanced by the differences in wages and standard of living between the two regions. The Northern Francophone migration to France was also determined by the economic growth, or the *Trente Glorieuses* (a thirty glorious years from the end of the Second World war to the beginning of the 1970s characterised by economic growth and low unemployment), in all Western European and North American countries. These countries not only needed to increase their labour force to sustain the economic growth, but were also seen as favourite destinations for thousands of people who

wanted to benefit from the success of that economic growth. The third reason for the vast increase in the number of North Francophone Africans arriving in the Metropolis was the desire expressed by French authorities to boost the population of the country following the enormous loss of life during the war (Hollifield, 1999: 60). Like other Western countries involved in the Second World War, France was in desperate need of a massive and cheap labour force. The country launched the policy of “migration of recruitment”. This general trend in most of Western European countries was viewed as a temporary measure because European policy-makers did not question the capability of their countries “to regulate migration inflows nor did they foresee the possibility that foreign workers would stay” (Garson, 1992: 81). The state therefore set up the *Office National d’ Immigration* (National Immigration Office, ONI) in charge of implementing annual recruitment plans and administrating these recruitments. Despite the open door policy towards workers who were willing to integrate into French society, the newcomers were in reality still not considered fully a part of the host society and were labelled as *travailleurs immigrants ou permanents* (immigrants permanents or workers) (Hollifield, 1999: 61).

The Northern African colonial possessions were regarded as the main region for the supply of a massive labour force able to solve the three issues underlying the launch of the policy of “migration of recruitment”. Algeria was the main provider, as pointed out by Boubakri (2004) - in the 1950s, more than 90% of Northern Francophone African migrants in France were Algerians. Contrary to the first period of massive departures of Algerians to France in the early 1900s when migrants were from the Kabylia region, from 1947 onwards the regions of departure from Algeria as well as the destinations in France were more diversified. Migrants also came from regions like the departments of Oran in the west, Constantine in the east and the southern regions of the colony. Migrants settled in the northern part of France, while the settlement in the industrial areas was reinforced. Overall, the Northern Francophone African migrants were working class and mostly involved in sectors such as construction, building, hydroelectricity or the automobile industries.

With the end of the Algerian colonial war and the country's independence in 1962<sup>2</sup> which followed the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 migration between the new Northern Francophone African countries and the former Metropolis was regulated through agreements concluded between the French government and its Moroccan and Tunisian counterparts in 1963, and with the Algerian government a year later. The ONI even opened offices in Casablanca and Tunis to coordinate the recruitment of migrant workers.

From the end of the Second World War the number of Northern Francophone African migrants to France has never ceased to increase. For instance, the number of arrivals of Algerians to France, according to the ONI, increased from 74 000 between 1947 and 1953 to 211 000 between 1954 and 1962, whilst the numbers of returns to Maghreb decreased from 561 000 to 350 000 between those two years (Dumont, Durand & Mariner, 2002). Another source (Castels & Miller, 1998: 73) reveals that in 1970 the tally of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians living in France was 600 000, 140 000 and 90 000 respectively.

The economic stringency due to the oil crisis, at the beginning of the 1970s, gave the French authorities, like elsewhere in Western European countries, an opportunity to stop the policy of labour recruitment. From that point, immigration was portrayed in official statements as a liability, not an asset, and immigrants became guests rather than settlers (Hollifield, 1994: 155). The decision, however, did not stop the migration of Northern Africans to France, even though it was undertaken outside the agreement framework concluded between the sending countries and France. From that point on, Northern Francophone African migration entered into a new era dominated by three new features: regular migration for reunification of families, seasonal migration of workers and irregular migration.

After the end of the Algerian war, French authorities allowed the arrival of the relatives of Algerians workers in order to put them into a familial context or to have

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<sup>2</sup> With the signature of the Evian Agreements, which ended the civil war in Algeria and brought independence for the country, the status of Algerians like for other citizens from former French colonies did not change, as they were able to move freely between France and their countries of origin. According to Hollifield (1994: 155) this status of Africans, along with high demand of labour as well as goods and services were the major reasons behind the sustainability of the flows of Africans to France during the *Trente Glorieuses*.




the possibility to start one. With the end of the *Trente Glorieuses*, the number of women and children in the flow of migrants increased considerably. Approximately an annual average of 12 400 Moroccans moved to France between 1972 and 1990 in the context of familial reunification (Cagiano de Azevedo, 1994). North Africans encouraged this type of migration because the workers were able to benefit from familial allocations, which in some cases were more important than their salaries. However, the arrival of workers' relatives brought about another aspect of familial migration. Many fake marriages were arranged to allow unauthorised people to move to France. This lucrative activity extended to migrants claiming that children from other families were theirs to help them further their studies or find a job in France.

As the number of regular migrants decreased, following the decision taken by the French authorities, seasonal and temporal movements of workers were required in some sectors of the economy such as agriculture and construction. According to Cagiano de Azevedo (1994), an annual average of 12 600 Moroccans migrated seasonally to France between 1972 and 1981 before the average dropped to 4 000 in the 1990s.

Irregular migration was also intensified with the decline of the regular flow of the labour force. Irregular movements to France started in the 1920s when French employers in the Metropolis recruited, with the benediction of administrative officials, Algerian workers outside the regulated channels. In the 1970s, irregular, cheap and docile workers were needed to sustain black market in France. Irregular flow increased with the degradation of the standard of living in the sending countries.

**Figure 1: Evolution of Northern Francophone African migrants to France, 1994-2002**



*Source:* <http://www.ined.fr/population-en-chiffres/france.htm>

The massive North Francophone African migration to France finds its roots into the French colonial enterprise. The requirements of a cheap labour force obliged the colonial state to recruit from its possessions. Along with the northern part of the continent, Western Africa became the second main region to supply workers to the Metropolis.

#### **2.4.1.2 The migration of sub-Saharan Africans to France**

South of the Sahara recruitment of labour force mainly occurred in the western part of the continent, particularly in the region of the three frontiers, better known as the Valley of the Senegalese River. However, recruitments from the Valley of the Senegalese River were less important than from Northern Africa in terms of numbers.

The region straddles three countries between Mali, Senegal and Mauritania and the Senegalese River crosses it. A feature of the region is its ethnic, cultural and economic homogeneity.

The *Madingues* and the *Haal Poular* are the main ethnic family groups. These major ethnic groups are dominated by the *Soninké* for the *Madingues* and the *Toucouleurs* for the *Haal Poular*. These communities are essentially traditionalists and rely heavily on their environment because the economic and educative infrastructures of the three countries are poorly developed in the region (Lanly, 1998). Therefore, the populations are strongly linked to their local and traditional societies, in which the position into the social stratum is mainly defined according to the age, sex and importance of the family of origin. The society is patriarchal and hierarchical. At the top, there is a chief who is assisted in his duties by a council of notables to harmonise the social life and to serve as a link between the administrative authorities and the populations. The descendants of the founders of the village are those who make up the nobility. The other groups of the social hierarchy are the caste of professions, such as the smiths and *griots* (poets, praise singers and/or musicians). Women and young people are situated below the above groups. At the bottom of the social hierarchy, there are slaves.

Economic activities are based on agriculture and stock breeding, which are practised on two types of land. There are clanic lands mainly located in the arable areas close to the river. These clanic lands are under the authority of the chief of the village. There are also free lands where individual initiatives are conducted. However, these economic activities are put under serious threat due to the ecological disadvantages of that Sahel region.<sup>3</sup>

Like the Northern African region, large-scale Western African migration to France is characterised by two periods. The first period started after the Second World War with the massive recruitments of a cheap labour force. The second period is the era of restrictive measures, following the drop in economic growth at the beginning of the

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<sup>3</sup> Sahel literally means border of the Sahara Desert, which advances year after year and reduces the arable lands. Apart from the advancement of the desert, the region also suffers from poor quality of arable lands and droughts brought by the Senegalese River. This obliges people to move in search of better lands.

1970s. The different movements of people from the Valley of the Senegalese River had at first been from rural area to another rural area.

The departures from the Valley of the Senegalese River started before the colonial period mainly because of trading exchanges. However, it was during the colonial era that the flows increased considerably, particularly under the influence of the penetration of the monetary economy with its constraints, including the payment of taxes. Traditional social and economic life was then destroyed, because the population was obliged to look for remunerated jobs, for instance on the extensive colonial plantations of cash crops, in order to get money and to pay taxes, particularly the pressurised *impôt de capitation* (head taxes). In the beginning, those movements were seasonal and regional, and they were mainly directed to the peanut plantations in Senegal. Those short-term labour flows were known as *navetanat* (Garson, 1992: 82). In the 1950s, the peanut sector entered into a crisis which has not been resolved since. The seasonal migrants were among the first to suffer the consequences of that crisis when the recruitments diminished. This left the migrants no choice but to look for jobs elsewhere because they had to pay taxes and satisfy other needs, such as medical expenses, educational fees and marriage requirements.

At the same time, moving outside the Valley had become a way to change their position in the traditional hierarchy, especially for those at the bottom of the stratum. For socially disadvantaged groups such as young people, women and slaves, migrating meant acquiring goods, money and guaranteed respect in society. France's policy of recruiting a labour force at the end of the Second World War gave an opportunity to many Western Africans to find jobs in the Metropolis and to change their social status in their regions of origin. It is during that epoch that Senegal started its process of being categorised as a country of emigration (Fall, 2003: 4).

During the Second World War thousands of people from the region and other parts of the French African colonial empire were enrolled into the French army and they were known as *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (the Senegalese Rifles). At the end of the conflict, many of those *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* decided to settle in France. Migrant communities then established networks between the host and the receiving regions. Further arrivals from the Senegalese Valley used these networks to move to France.

As described by Lanly (1998), many of these first migrant communities were made up of *Soninké*. Many of them settled in Paris and in other cities such as Rouen and Le Havre where they were used as dustmen.

Over the years social capital has grown to become a formidable network within which not only people, but also money, information and goods have been transferred from the host regions to the area of origin with which migrants have kept strong ties. Departures are made possible through channels that start with the selection of candidates, followed by the arrival of migrants in France, who in turn send back goods, money and information for the development of their regions of origin and for further departures.

Daum (1995: 16) points out that the selection of candidates in villages for departure sometimes occurs without the family's knowledge of the chosen candidates. The *Soninké* for instance have developed a social capital called *noria* (Lanly, 1998). Within that network, migration occurs according to the community objectives. Indeed, migration is a continual activity that the family controls because its entire survival depends on it. The family ensures that a younger brother replaces a migrant who returns home, even sometimes by taking the same job in the host region. From the amount of money that the migrant sends back home, a part is kept to prepare the journey of his/her substitute. Therefore, it is guaranteed that the migrant will evolve within the network and will behave according to the family's objectives by fulfilling his/her responsibilities towards the family. The family's control over the migrant is facilitated by the social conditions of living in France where in many cities migrants are grouped in specific areas called *foyers des travailleurs* (workers heart); where the family often has a representative. In some *foyers des travailleurs*, a replica of the traditional hierarchy has been established.

With the end of migrations of recruitment at the start of the 1970s, the zones of departure of the sub-Saharan migration were diversified and the movements became more spontaneous and irregular. Apart from the valley of the Senegalese River, which did not cease to provide candidates for migration, other regions also increased their number of migrants and strongly challenged the Valley of the Senegalese River in numbers. Fall (2003: 1) shows that the south of Mali and the centre-west of Senegal

were involved, as were as regions like the Côte d'Ivoire in Western Africa, Cameroon, Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Central Africa. In some of these regions, the methods of departure differed from those used in the Valley of the Senegalese River.

According to Fall (2003: 5), migrants sometimes use the informal sector as a way to move abroad. One of the illustrations of this new form of organisation can be seen in Senegal. The Sandaga market has become a platform for the movements abroad of people along with goods and money. Sandaga is the one of largest markets in Dakar, the Senegalese capital. The market has kept its original identity as one of the best places for food and textile trading. Over the last decade of the twentieth century, the market grew to become one of the most prosperous places in Dakar. Sandaga has also become the best place for selling electronic appliances and other imported goods bought in America, Asia and Europe and resold in Dakar. Most of the successful traders at the Sandaga market are from the Baol region. The expressions *baol baol* or *modou modou* have been associated with the traders. These expressions are also associated with the candidates for migration. Those traders and potential migrants keep close ties with Baol their region of origin, particularly with its capital Touba. The city is also the spiritual capital of the Mourides Brotherhood, which has thousands of Africans members abroad.


The profits generated around the world by the Mourides are sent back to Touba, which has become one of the fastest growing cities in the country. The Mourides have managed to use their worldwide contacts in the service of local development. They are entrepreneurial people who have succeeded in establishing a worldwide trading network with the Sandaga market as one of the cores of the distribution of goods. The Mourides are well established from New York to Hong Kong, from Marseilles to Sicily. Their success in recent years is a consequence of their ability to import goods with the help of their global network, which are then sold at the Sandaga market at prices that are lower than at other markets in the city, country or region.

Many of the sellers at the Sandaga market work within a well-structured organisation which coordinates activities in the market and facilitates the departure of some sellers abroad if they fulfil the requirements. However, the Sandaga market is only an

element of the whole organisation of the Mourides Brotherhood, which is highly regarded as one of the key factors in Western African migration. The movement has successfully shifted its activity from the dominance of the peanut trade during the colonial era and the early years following independence to a worldwide network sustained by money, trade and migration by using religion as the key factor (Bouillon & Morris, 2001: 51).

Along with labour, trade and irregular migrations, France has also hosted thousands of African students and political exiles. During the colonial period, African students went to the Metropolis because there were no tertiary institutions in the colonial territories. Independence was followed by the opening of universities in most of the newly independent countries. The continued departure of African students was justified by the needs for postgraduate degrees. Over the years, the flows of African students had merely become a way to escape the paralysis of tertiary education in most Francophone African countries. As far as political exiles are concerned, they escaped from dictatorial regimes encountered in most African countries, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, and found refuge in France where they were able to freely express their opinions.

**Figure 2: Evolution of some sub-Saharan Francophone African migrants to France, 1994-2002**



Source: <http://www.ined.fr/population-en-chiffres/france.htm>

The evolution of the numbers and the nature of Francophone African migrants to France has been determined by various migration policies that have changed from an open door attitude towards a migrant labour force to more restrictive measures as dictated by the overall economic situation.

#### **2.4.1.3 Mechanisms of control of immigration in France and Europe**

With the end of the migrations of recruitment, Africans encountered many obstacles to entering France. The status of undocumented migrants already living in France is yet another concern in that country, referred to as the regularisation of the so-called *sans-papiers* (without papers). The *sans-papiers* are a heterogeneous group of foreigners in France composed of over-stayers, rejected asylum seekers and undocumented entrants. They do not have legal status and consequently they do not



benefit from education social services support, despite the fact that some of them have been in the country for many years and some have been paying taxes. Along with the regularisation of the *sans-papiers*, migration in France is also characterised by the integration of those who have been granted French citizenship. In France, citizenship is supposed to guarantee equality, fraternity and liberty, as inscribed by the French Republic. Within that concept, all citizens are assimilated and therefore become merely French, which is more than simply being French citizens because they abandon their previous cultures and traditions to endorse the French civilisation. But, it appears that French citizens of foreign origin do not actually have the same advantages and equal treatment that French nationals have.

The policy towards migration has become one of the main issues on the political agenda of successive governments in France since labour recruitment migration stopped. Basically, the common opinion is that by stopping immigration to France in particular and to Western countries in general, the problem of unemployment will be resolved because of the number of jobs available in each country. The reason for stopping immigration to France from Africa in particular could be regarded as one of the solutions to the xenophobic and racial tendencies among the French public (Hollifield, 1999: 62). The mechanisms of immigration to France have been consolidated since 1974 with the end of the migrations of recruitment. Prior to 1974, an African was allowed to enter into France with an identification document and a medical certificate. By 1975, residence and work documents were required before being able to enter. The need for residence permits and visas followed thereafter in 1981 and 1985 respectively (Fall, 2003: 6-7). These measures have been enforced by a number of laws from time to time as events and the discourse on immigration shifted. The following laws and measures are among other decisions taken to illustrate the policy on immigration in France over the years:

1978: A mechanism of voluntary and forced returns is set up for the foreign labour force. North Africans are particularly concerned about the measure.

1980: “Bonnet Law” to prevent clandestine immigration. Conditions to enter France become stricter: an unofficial entry is considered reason for expulsion.

1984: Creation of the card of residence. A clear connection is made between the right of residence and an obligation of occupying a job.

1986: “Pasqua Law” diminished the types of foreigners eligible for the card of residence.

1991: Restrictive measures for granting the certificate of residence, a prerequisite for foreigners entering France.

1992: Reform of the code of nationality, particularly the prolongation by two years as the time necessary for a foreigner to acquire French citizenship following his/her marriage to a French national. In addition, children of Algerians born before 1962 do not automatically acquire French citizenship.

1992: “Pasqua Law”: The card of residence is refused or withdrawn from polygamous foreigners and their spouses. In certain cases, the measure is applied to refugees.

1994: A specific office for controlling immigration and to combat clandestine employment is set up. It is called DICCILEC.

-1996: “Debré Law” reinforced the judicial detention of undocumented foreigners; it also reinforced the power of the judiciary police at the borders and the power of mayors to confer certificates of residence. The law also outlined the regularisation of the *sans-papiers*.

1998: A decree is published and sent to the prefects for organising the return of the non-regularised *sans-papiers*.

The integration of France into the European Union obliged the country to harmonise its migration policy with some countries on the European continent. The creation of the European Union was justified by the possibility of implementing an area where the free movements of goods, services, capital and people could be a reality. Yet, in the 1980s, a debate arose about whether the “free movement of people” should apply to European Union nationals only, with the possibility of each member country keeping its internal border checks, or whether it should apply to everyone, with a

single external border serving as check. During those years, European Union nationals could travel from one country to another by showing their passport or ID documents, with few countries requiring a valid visa (Gellatt, 2005). The hurdles represented by border posts throughout the Union disrupted traffic and trade, causing delays and costs to both businesses and visitors.

The failure to come to an agreement pushed some countries to create a territory without internal borders. On 14 June 1985, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the Schengen Convention aboard the ship *Princesse Marie-Astrid* on the Moselle River near the town of Schengen in Luxembourg. The convention was signed to make way for the creation of the Schengen area or Schengenland, abolishing border checkpoints within this area for the nationals of the countries concerned and co-ordinating external borders controls.

In 1995, the Schengen Treaty, signed on 19 June 1990, came into effect with the implementation of the Schengen Agreement. Previously ratified by some countries of the Union, such as Italy on 27 November 1990, Portugal and Spain on 25 June 1992, Greece on 6 November 1992 and Austria on 28 April 1995, the treaty created a single external border and immigration control was conducted according to common rules. Border checks between countries involved in the process were removed (Massey and Taylor, 2004: 288). Meanwhile, the conditions for entering into the Schengenland for a short stay (not exceeding three months) were standardised by the establishment of a uniform Schengen visa. The signatories also agreed to share information through the Schengen Information System on police cooperation and judicial matters related to immigration to combat cross-border drug related crime.

As pointed out by Bourdouvalis (1997: 272), the Schengen Agreement is one of the first results of the intra-EU policy dialogue on the harmonisation of immigration controls in Europe. The Schengen Agreement enables persons with valid documents entry into the Union via a specific country according to his/her type of visa (transit or stay). The potential immigrants must not be considered a threat to public policy, national security or international relations of signatory countries. Moreover, potential migrants must prove that they have sufficient means of subsistence to support themselves during their stay and to return to their countries of origin once their

sojourn ends. They must also justify the purpose of their visit as well as the conditions of the stay. Finally, migrants must have travel insurance that covers any expenses for repatriation or emergency medical treatment occurring during their stay.

The inclusion of more members and the emergence of new challenges obliged the European Union to update its administrative tools concerning the movements of people into the Union, which could be considered as Schengen II and Schengen III (Gelatt, 2005). A guideline was released in 2001 as the Schengen Information System II, with more data, including fingerprints and photographs. The guideline, which could be operational by 2007, is viewed as a step forward for a better provision of information to officials such as customs, police or border officials. Furthermore, France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria agreed in May 2005 to more cooperation to combat and prevent terrorism and crime, including combating illegal migration. The signatories intend to share national databanks to store DNA information, fingerprints and vehicle identification for known or suspected criminals. The aims are to establish immigration liaison officers to advise countries on any new information in the field of illegal immigration and offer advice on recognising fraudulent documents. It also requires joint action on the repatriation of illegal migrants, including joint expulsion flights.

#### **2.4.2 The migration of Francophone Africans on the continent**

While the flows of Francophone Africans to France increased over the years since the implementation of policies of labour force recruitment by the French authorities, the horizontal migration between Francophone African countries has also been significant (Castels and Miller, 1998: 125). Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon have distinguished themselves as the main hosts of African migrants in both Western and Central Africa respectively (Black, 2004; Stalker, 1994; The United Nations, 2004). Senegalese, who represent one of the largest groups of migrants on the continent, were the most numerous Francophone Africans (100 000 and 15 000 in 1998) in Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon respectively (Fall, 2003: 15). The two "Eldorados" (Fall, 2003: 9) have attracted migrants because of their relatively strong economic performance during the two and half decades since the 1970s, but the patterns of migration in those countries were already established by the colonial enterprise.

#### 2.4.2.1 Francophone African migration to Côte d'Ivoire

Although Côte d'Ivoire was a quite remarkable success story some years ago, especially compared to other countries in the region, it finds itself in a precarious economic and social situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. From the date of its independence on 7 August 1960, Côte d'Ivoire was ruled under a single-party system, the PDCI-RDA<sup>4</sup> led by Felix Houphouët-Boigny. He died three years after the multipartite system was reintroduced in the country in 1990. To his credit, Houphouët-Boigny, although the leader of a dictatorial regime, is remembered as a preacher of peace on the continent and the driving force behind the economic success of Côte d'Ivoire, also called the *miracle ivoirien* (Ivorian miracle) (Nugent, 2004: 186). The Ivorian economy is based on the production and the exportation of coffee and cocoa, the country is the largest producer of cocoa in the world.

His successor, Henri Konan Bédié plunged the country into a political, social and religious crisis after the implementation of the concept of *Ivoirité*, a nationalist notion that pretends to claim the Ivorian national identity. In reality, the concept was introduced into the Ivorian legislation to keep his political rival, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, out of the race for the presidency. Ouattara is suspected of having Burkinabè origins. Since then, the country has been divided into two parts, with the North suspected of backing Ouattara, who in return is accused of supporting the rebellion financially (Lamin, 2005: 16). Neither the takeover of General Robert Guéinor nor Laurent Gbagbo's presidency after a controversial election ended the crisis. Instead, several rebel groups under the name *Forces Nouvelles* (New Forces)<sup>5</sup> have perpetuated the partition of the country after the failure of a *coup d'état* in 2000 (Nugent, 2004: 479). The South is under the authority of the central government and the North under the influence of the rebels that the Gbagbo government suspects of

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<sup>4</sup> PDCI stands for *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire). Originally, the party was part of an unofficial group of African parties under the African Democratic Rally (RDA). One of the aims of the RDA was the total political and economic independence of Africa. The PDCI considered itself the representative of the RDA in Côte d'Ivoire.

<sup>5</sup> New Forces is a political and military alliance of three groups. These groups are the *Mouvement Patriotique de Cote d'Ivoire* - MPCI - (Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire), the *Mouvement de la Justice et de la Paix* – MJP (Movement for Justice and Peace) and the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* – MPIGO (Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West). These movements have decided to harmonise their forces to combat the Gbagbo's regime although their different political and military agendas. The MPCI is mostly made up of soldiers and politicians who claimed to have been discriminated under the Gbagbo's regime. One of them, Guillaume Soro, is the political figure of the New Forces. The two other movements are mostly based in the north-western part of the country.

being backed by Burkina Faso. The political and social crisis has further weakened the country's economy which had started to show signs of decline in the middle of the 1980s.

As a result, thousands of African migrants have escaped from Côte d'Ivoire, fearing persecution because they are blamed for the crisis. More than other migrants, the Burkinabè are the most targeted. The return of the Burkinabè to their country of origin has thus changed the patterns of migration to Côte d'Ivoire established during the colonial period.

As pointed out by Adepaju (2005: 1), West Africa was historically viewed as an economic unit within which the trade of goods and services, as well as the movement of people, flowed freely. However, colonial regimes launched recruitments drives, contract and forced labour legislation, and agreements that controlled the movement of the regional labour force from the WASAT<sup>6</sup> to build roads and work in mines and plantations, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.

The flows of thousands of Burkinabè migrants to Côte d'Ivoire over the years have been one of the major patterns of migration in West Africa (Smith & Todaro, 2003: 94). Konseiga (2005) provides excellent insights into the history of the Voltaic<sup>7</sup> migration to Côte d'Ivoire. Originally, in the first half of the twentieth century, Voltaic migrants preferred to go to Ghana because working conditions and wages were better there than in Côte d'Ivoire. Besides, the Voltaic wanted to escape the restrictive French colonial policies and to work in Ghana, which was under British rule. Plantations in Côte d'Ivoire were experiencing serious labour shortages. After the French colonial administration took full control of the colony of Upper Volta, it accelerated and regulated the flows of workers to Côte d'Ivoire. In reality, Upper Volta was a supplier of workers for cash crop plantations in Côte d'Ivoire due to the failure to implement developmental economic infrastructures and policies in that colony. Some of the Voltaic migrants came from rural areas, and wages they received

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<sup>6</sup> WASAT is an abbreviation for Western African Semi-Arid Tropics, a group of countries which were the main suppliers of labour force in the region. These countries are Mali, Niger and Upper Volta.

<sup>7</sup> Upper Volta was the former name of the actual Burkina Faso. The country changed the name on 4 August 1984, following the "revolution" which brought Thomas Sankara to power. For those historic reasons, I use the Upper Volta for events that occurred before 4 August 1984.

allowed them to support families back home. For the Ivorian plantation owners, the exploitation of cash crops was based on the combination of land, capital and labour. These aspects of production were kept as low as possible to be competitive. An annual average of 59 731 Voltaics went to work in the Ivorian plantations between 1969 and 1973. The average was 56 203 between 1988 and 1993 (Konseiga, 2005).

Côte d'Ivoire has taken the leadership in hosting migrants among Francophone African countries in West Africa, with Burkina Faso nationals representing half of the three-and-half million of those migrants (Konseiga, 2005). *Ivoirité* has revealed the porosity of the Ivorian frontiers and the density of the immigrant population. Since the economic crisis, foreigners have become scapegoats. In response, the government took measures to restrict labour migration and combat unauthorised entries. Expulsion has been viewed as the ideal weapon to control illegal migration. In addition, the government implemented the sojourn card in 1992 to boost control inside the Ivorian territory. The renewal of the sojourn card cost 5 000 CFA franc before the rule of President Laurent Gbagbo. His government increased the price to 15 000 CFA franc<sup>8</sup>. The economic crisis and *Ivoirité* have washed away the reputed hospitality of Côte d'Ivoire and have turned the country into a xenophobic place. Furthermore, not only do many migrants no longer consider Côte d'Ivoire a first destination, but emigration has escalated because many Ivorians want to escape the political paralysis and the economic crisis.

#### **2.4.2.2 Francophone African migration to Gabon**

According to the United Nations (2004: 57), Gabon hosted more than 100 000 international migrants in the 1990s. In comparison with Côte d'Ivoire, the volume of foreigners in Gabon is insignificant. However, that number is considerable for such a small population, which is approximately 1 000 000 inhabitants. The country has therefore the highest percentage of migrants, from both the central African region and the African continent (UN-HABITAT, 2004: 92). Gabon has attracted foreigners because of a combination of several factors. On the one hand, Gabon stands out as one of the wealthiest countries in Central Africa because of its diverse national resources, including oil, manganese and timber. On the other hand, the country had

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<sup>8</sup> R1 is approximatly equivalent to 80 CFA franc.

the highest GDP *per capita* of the region from mid-1970 to the first half of the 1990s, before being overtaken by Equatorial Guinea.

The small population has always been a major inconvenience for the economy of the country. Pambou-Loueya (2003) shows that Gabon has imported workers since the arrival of the European settlers in the fifteenth century. Senegalese, for instance, were brought by the settlers to increase the insufficient labour force, but massive labour force importation started with timber exploitation. The shortage of workers was again pointed out after the Second World War when the colonial administration launched construction projects. 12 662 Senegalese, Cameroonians, Liberians and Nigerians were brought in by the colonial administration. Along with the labour force, the colonial authorities also agreed to the arrival of fishermen from Dahomey (now known as Benin), Togo and Ghana to supply foods to the working sites. The arrival of these foreigners brought out two characteristics in the Gabonese migration scheme. Firstly, migrants were grouped into specific areas and their population boosted by the arrivals of more migrants. Secondly, during that period the categorisation of some jobs started which led to the arrival of more foreigners over the years because Gabonese nationals were reluctant to take over these foreign-labeled jobs. For instance, of the 3 500 fishermen registered in Libreville in 1996, 80% were foreigners (Pambou-Loueya, 2003: 335).

It was however the exploitation of oil and mines that augmented the streams of migration to Gabon. The government expressed its ambition to realise social and economic infrastructures following the abundant entries of *petro-dollars* from the beginning of the 1970s. Gabon then called for African solidarity to satisfy its massive labour force requirements. Consequently, bilateral agreements were signed with countries such as Senegal, Togo, Benin and Congo. The Gabonese embassy in the Senegalese capital, Dakar, for instance was in charge of recruiting workers, according to the agreement signed by the two governments in 1982 (Fall, 2003: 28). Since 1974, many other migrants have arrived outside the framework of the agreements. In fact, foreigners represented 25% of the officially registered workers during the 1993 census. Of these foreign workers, 94.2% were Africans (Pambou-Loueya, 2003: 339).



In the history of migration in Gabon, 1986 is a fundamental turning point. During that year, the country was hit by an economic crisis never before experienced in its history. The state, the country's primary employer, was obliged to close down several companies while others went bankrupt. Suddenly, unemployment became a real challenge for the government. Although the population remains small, the number of able Gabonese nationals seeking work has grown over the years. The unemployment rate amongst the active population for instance rose from 17.9% in 1993 to 21% in 1997. In response, the government launched the concept of 'Gabonisation'. In reality, it was a drive to nationalise the labour force by restricting the access of foreigners to the labour market.

Fall (2003: 31) identifies the difficulties encountered by Senegalese teachers in Gabon following the application of "Gabonisation". In order to discourage non-national teachers, the Gabonese government implemented measures that included length of service as a consideration in the payment of medical expenses or paying for the extradition of corpses, the payment of pension or delays in the payment of the salaries. In the academic private sector, employment law has largely been ignored in the case of foreigner teachers. As it was the case in Cote d'Ivoire, "Gabonisation" was accompanied by the government's policy of expulsion as the solution to illegal immigration. Foreigners were regarded as the main cause for feelings of insecurity that erupted as a major social concern since the beginning of the economic crisis.

Legislation strengthened these restrictive measures. On 18 June 1986, two pieces of legislation were adopted that redefined the modes of entry into the country. On 31 July of the same year, another piece of legislation recommended an administrative authorisation for both entry and exit, apart from a visa. In 1994, another piece of legislation required foreigners who were already in the country to legalise their status and to pay residence fees, which had been increased. More than 55 000 foreigners were expelled from the country because they failed to fulfill the requirements (Zlotnik, 2003).

## **2.5 The search for new destinations**

The search for new destinations is not a new issue. Francophone Africans have always migrated to other regions than France, Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon. However, the

importance of the diversification of destinations has grown since the traditional destinations have implemented restrictive measures to combat immigration. In this section, the growing phenomenon of illegal immigration is considered within the globalised context. It also traces the evolution of migration policy and the discourse of migration to South Africa, viewed as a new destination for Francophone African migration.

### **2.5.1 Francophone African migration into the globalised concept**

Francophone African migration nowadays fits into the general context of African migration. In 1993, Russell (quoted by Adepoju, 2004: 68) predicted that the number of 35 million Africans living outside their own countries would increase. This number is far higher than the United Nations's tally of 16 million international African migrants in 2000 (Zlotnik, 2004). The differences in the numbers reveal how difficult it is to measure the impact of emigration from African countries and to establish exactly how many migrants move within the continent and towards other parts of the world due to lack of real statistics.

This lack of information can be explained by the fact that many movements happen outside the official channels. Numbers realised by censuses often do not include a large portion of foreigners in many countries because many of those foreigners are illegals. Besides, changes of residence and daily cross-boundary movement especially by foot or car are not fully taken into account. This is because of the arbitrary boundaries of African countries, which had divided the same ethnic groups into two or more countries. For those populations, crossings the administrative limits does not necessarily mean migrating from one country to another, but moving inside the same ethnic group area. In sum, African migration data are often over or under estimated according to the wishes of governments. Zlotnik (2003) sums up the complexity of gathering data in Africa as follows:

Out of 56 countries in Africa, 19 have either no information allowing the estimation of the international migrants stock or at most one census with data than can serve as a basis for assessing the impact of international migration over the second half of the twentieth century.

One of the patterns of migration in Africa is the problem of forced migrants. Africa is seen as a continent of refugees. Due to the multiplicity of conflicts, millions of people have to leave their homes and countries to seek shelter elsewhere. According to Alicea and Toro-Morn (2004: xxv), in 1980, refugees were the concern of only six countries located in eastern and central parts of the continent. In 1985, there were three million refugees throughout Africa. By 1995, 6.8 million refugees were concentrated in 13 states. Although the number had decreased to 3.6 million by 2000, Africa is still second to Asia as the continent with the most refugees worldwide second to Asia (Zlotnik, 2003).

Illegal immigration is another pattern of migration in Africa. In South Africa, shortly after the demise of apartheid, 91 000 illegal immigrants were deported (Adepoju, 2004: 71). Paradoxically, the more countries reinforce their legislation on migration, the more people's movements become clandestine and spontaneous. Many Africans do not hesitate to risk their lives to attempt to find a refuge with better economic opportunities. Every year, people die in the Mediterranean Sea leaving Northern Africa to go to Europe. Part of this undocumented form of migration is the trafficking and smuggling of people, especially women and children, who are recruited through networks of agents. Women and girls are exploited as sex workers and children used as domestic servants in informal sectors and on plantations, and often become soldiers.

Nowadays the proportion of women crossing borders among international migrants in Africa has increased tremendously. By 2000, it was estimated that 46.7% of the 16 million international migrants in Africa were female (Zlotnik, 2004). Some join spouses who had gone before, but a growing number of women migrate alone or with their children. The possibilities of high wages outside their countries push women to consider themselves as possible sources of income for themselves and their families. In certain cases, the male partner stays at home with the children. However, migrant women still vulnerable because they could find themselves within the channels of sex exploitation.

One of the main concerns about African migration is the departure of highly qualified people and students. Thousands of qualified Africans are escaping from the continent

because it does not offer them social and professional security, such as a stable career. This brain drain is increased by the need for a highly skilled labour force expressed by developed countries. It is estimated that brain drain currently represents a third of African skilled migrants (Mangolini & Revel, 2002). It has been estimated that to compensate for these losses the continent had to recruit skilled labour from Western countries at a price of four billion dollars annually (Tanner, 2005: 3). Generally, many Africans express the desire to stay in receiving countries where they study because they already have strong ties and networks that will help them to enter the job market. There has been an approximate increase of 2% in the expatriation of students from sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 (Mangolini & Revel, 2002).

Migration from Francophone African countries fits the pattern of global movements of people according to the causes, forms and destinations of migration. The restrictive measures taken by the traditional countries of destinations (France, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon) have limited the number of labour migrants legally entering those countries without, however, succeeding in decreasing the number of migrants in the host countries. Apart from the increase in international migration, Francophone African migration has diversified its destinations. Although France remained the favourite destination of Senegalese in 1995, for instance, their number was also significant in countries like Italy (32 953 migrants), Germany (26 000) and Spain (6 657). Among those migrants, the number of poorly educated people has increased, with ensuing difficulties.

Within the globalised context, trade barriers are a feature, and, in order to be competitive worldwide, developed countries have adapted their legislation to the actual context. Developed countries have opted for the recruitment of highly educated and professional workers from poor countries to compensate for both an ageing population and local skills shortages in sectors such as education, health or technology. At the beginning of this millennium, European countries face a dilemma: after many years of restrictive measures on migration, confronted with demographic changes and socioeconomic pressure like shortage of a labour force in some sectors, many countries have realised the necessity of recruiting highly skilled migrants to satisfy the growing demands particularly in new technologies. However, the success

of these economies, based on new technologies, has also attracted other types of migrants, such as the undocumented.

Maghreb has gained more prominence in African migration compared to Europe since the “old continent” strengthened its migration policies. The Northern African countries have increasingly become a key stopover on the road to Europe for thousands of Africans, especially those who cannot reach Europe legally. Illegal movements from Maghreb are not new. Sub-Saharan Africans have just expanded existing illegal streams linking the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea, which is likely to be seen as a space separating two different regions. On the one side, there is a prosperous and wealthy Europe, which sees its population getting older mainly because of low fertility levels. Europe will therefore need a larger labour force to face the shortages, but it has made a tremendous effort to combat illegal entries. On the other side, there is Maghreb, where poor and unstable economic, social and political conditions push its populations to look for a better life in Europe or elsewhere in North America or Asia. Behind Maghreb, there is also sub-Saharan Africa, which is even poorer and more unstable, with the exception of South Africa and to a lesser extent Botswana and Mauritius.

Maghreb is characterised as a region of out - and in - migration. Countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Morocco have people crossing borders within the region. It has been estimated that Libya alone hosts two-and-half millions foreigners, including 200 000 Moroccans, 60 000 Tunisians and some 30 000 Algerians. Tunisia had over a period of fifteen years (1986-2000) received an annual average of 77 300 people, with North Africans contributing six out of seven of this average (Boubakri, 2004). The Northern African out-migration in Europe is also important, considering that of the four million African migrants in Europe 80% are from Maghreb (Letourneux & Zemmouri, 2005).

Moreover, Maghreb is a transit region for sub-Saharan African migration. Boubakri (2004) singles out the main reasons for the region’s re-emergence as a major stopover for sub-Saharan Africans. Firstly, a combination of factors has seen Libya attracting migrants from many regions, including the sub-Sahara. During the years of embargo (1992-2000) against Libya, the country enhanced its ties with sub-Saharan countries

through pan-African policies. Apart from being one of the major actors in the creation of the African Union, Libya has been active in substantial development aid towards sub-Saharan African countries. Besides, Libya has found itself involved in regional organisations, especially the “Group of Sahel and Sahara states”. The free movement of people within the region appears to be one of the characteristics of the organisation. As a result, and coupled with the fact that the country is an oil producer, Libya is a home to between one and one-and-half million Sub-Saharan Africans (Boubakri, 2004).

Secondly, Boubakri highlights the development of Saharan Sahalian towns, such as Tamanrasset and Djenet in Algeria, Sebha and Al-Awaynat in Libya, Gao in Mali and Agadès in Niger. The flows of goods, services and people between the two parts of the desert have helped these towns to become more integrated with structures like regional organisations. Meanwhile, the towns play a vital role in migration between sub-Saharan Africa, Maghreb and Europe as people have established well-developed networks for organising the departures of migrants.

Thirdly, for many years Maghreb citizens have enjoyed crossing the borders of countries in the region without restrictive measures. For instance, North Africans and nationals from some Sahalian countries can enter Tunisia without a visa as tourists for a short period. After their legal stay, many remain in the country after obtaining employment or they stay for a while before crossing to Europe. This has led to intensive movement of people within the region. The reputation of the region as a transit area has been confirmed with the arrivals of sub-Saharan Africans (Boubakri, 2004).

Finally, geographical proximity is likely to be viewed as an ultimate and crucial factor in the choosing of Maghreb as the main departure and transit region from Africa. The proximity to Tunisia, Libya and Italy on the one side and Morocco and Spain on the other side has turned the Straits of Sicily and Gibraltar into ‘bridges’ particularly for illegal crossings.


It therefore evident that Maghreb is a pivotal region for Francophone African migrants in the global context, especially if one considers illegal migration to Europe.

Among the candidates for ‘crossing’, are Maghreb nationals, and legal sub-Saharan Africans living in Northern African countries. Although they have legal status in North Africa, many do not hesitate to risk their lives by attempting the sea crossing, during which thousand of people lose their lives. Some are arrested and the luckiest ones reach Europe. Boubakri (2004) shows that 40 000 illegal crossers were caught between 1998 and 2003. The same source estimates that only one illegal migrant out of five is apprehended.

However, the sea crossing is only the second highest risk for many illegal Sub-Saharan Africans. The highest risk is crossing the Sahara Desert. This long journey often starts when migrants from Western and Central African countries converge particularly in Agadès in Niger. Then, they follow an itinerary through the desert that takes them through Bilma and Sebha before arriving in Libya. Another main route leads from Agadès to Adrar, Djanet and Tamanrasset in Algeria before reaching Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. From Morocco to Libya, migrants find themselves in camps, which are the last stopover before the “crossing”. Migrants expect to reach Spain via the Strait of Gibraltar. They can also defy the 150 kilometres separating the Italian Islands of Lampedusa, Linosa and Sicily from Tunisia and Libya. Approximately, the journey can last more than a year, from their departure from their countries of origin to the last stopover in North Africa. Migrants sometimes save up to 2 000 Euros to make the trip, which makes them vulnerable to gangsters, who attack them especially on the borders between Niger, Mali and Algeria, which migrants call *La Maison du Diable* (The House of the Devil), according to Soudan (2005).

Illegal African migrants have also used the Canaries Islands as a stopover to enter Europe in recent years. This is mainly because of the intensification of controls on the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea.

**Map 2: Trans-Saharan migration routes**



**Source:** [www.migrationinformation.org](http://www.migrationinformation.org)



The issue of illegal crossings from North Africa to Europe has become a political concern, with the governments of Southern Europe countries putting tremendous pressure on their North African counterparts to deal with the problem. Italy, for instance, has refused to be “the parish of Europe”, whilst Libya, according to its president, Colonel Gaddafi, does not accept being “the coastal watch-dog of Europe” (Letourneux & Zemmouri, 2005).

In response, the Maghrebian countries have opted for mutual agreement policies. Morocco, for instance, has concluded repatriation decisions with sub-Saharan countries such as Mali and Senegal. By bus, trucks and rarely planes, illegal migrants caught in Morocco are expelled by force and left at the point where they entered the country. Consequently, thousands of sub-Saharan Africans get lost in the desert. Northern African and European countries, especially Spain and Italy also cooperate to combat illegal migration. The signing of cooperative agreements obliges the African countries concerned to share the task of policing their international marine borders with the European countries of destination. Consequently, Italy is collaborating with Tunisia and Libya, while Spain is doing the same with Morocco. The cooperation includes the production of legal instruments to punish those guilty of organising and participating in illegal migration, the training of coastal surveillance staff (coast guard and naval forces), provision of electronic equipment and logistical support for the maritime security forces as well as joint patrols in Northern African countries’ waters.

It appears clearly that for European countries, the solution to illegal migration from Africa is to be protected by “a ring of so-called third countries whose job is to act as a buffer between Africa and Europe, by monitoring exit points to Europe” (Boubakri, 2004).

### **2.5.2 The evolution of South African migration policy**

Throughout the existence of South Africa as a state, its migration policy has been conceptualised with the aim to select immigrants according to criteria such as race, nationality or religious belief. The country has implemented the “two-gate policy” (Kabwe-Segatti, 2006: 173), which has regulated the entry of millions of people, satisfying the criteria stated by different acts through the years, and preventing specific migrants from entering the country.

### **2.5.2.1 Towards the Aliens Control Act**

Crush and Peberdy (1998) provide a detailed historical overview of migration policy in South Africa. The merger of the Cape and Natal colonies, the two Boer republics and several Black chiefdoms in 1910 provided the opportunity for the new national entity to deal with migration from a common basis. It was a question of controlling the movement of people within the Union on the one hand and, on the other hand, regulating departures from and entries into the country. The Union took into account the immigration concerns of each province, but the basis of the national policy found its roots in the Cape Immigration Act (No 30) of 1906, which required any immigrant to be able to write out an application form in any European language. Natal was concerned about Indian immigration, the Orange Free State wanted to increase the number of the white population and the Transvaal wanted to reduce the number of the Black population (Klotz, 1997). The country reinforced its ties with Britain by putting its new policy within the British Empire context. Unsurprisingly, British immigration was encouraged. The Prime Minister, Louis Botha, soon after the Union, initiated a massive white immigration, especially from Britain (Brownell, 1977: 13). The government even passed the Land Settlement Act in 1912 in order to authorise white settlers to appropriate land suitable for settlement purposes.

It took three years for the Union to draw up the first uniform immigration policy, called the Immigration Regulations Act of 1913. From the government's point of view, immigrants referred to white people willing to enter into South Africa. The Act almost allowed whites free access, especially those from Western and Northern Europe able to write and read European languages. Thus, the Act fulfilled the Cape and the Orange Free State's wishes. The Act also did not allow the entry of persons such as prostitutes, those undesirable for political reasons or with criminal records and those not suitable for the economic interests of the Union. According to the concern of the Transvaal, the Act limited the movements of Black people between the provinces, denying them *de facto* the status of citizens. Moreover, the Act did not consider African mine and farm workers coming from further afield because they were not allowed entry as permanent residents. As far as Natal's preoccupation was concerned, the growing Indian population, especially traders, was viewed as a threat. Since the Union could select immigrants according to its requirements, Indians were considered "prohibited persons" soon after the implementation of the Act.

Crush and Peberdy (1998: 21) point out that this first national legislative tool was drawn up explicitly to keep the non-white population outside of the legal framework and served as a platform for subsequent immigration acts, which started with the amendments to the Immigration Regulation Act of 1913.

Crush and Peberdy (1998: 22) argue that following a campaign of protest, led by Mahatma Gandhi and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) against many regulations, including the Immigration Regulation Act, which prevented Indians from moving between provinces and trading freely, the Indian Relief Act was introduced in 1914. It merely withdrew the head tax imposed on Indians and allowed the families of Indian residents in South Africa to enter the country. However, the Act did not remove the restrictions on Indians movement within the country.

According to Crush and Peberdy (1998: 23), other amendments followed, especially in 1927 and 1931. The 1927 amendment granted the title of “domicile” to people who had been permanent residents in the Union for three years. In 1931, the amendment authorised the entry of some categories of illiterate Europeans, such as artisans and domestic workers. The South African immigration policy underwent other developments soon after World War I, when thousands of Eastern Europeans from countries such as Poland and Russia arrived in South Africa. Many of those new arrivals were Jewish. Thus, in addition to the Indians, the South African government now felt threatened by what they considered the Jewish peril. In order to curb the flows of Jews the government used Clause 4(1) (a) of the Immigration Regulation Act of 1913 that effectively kept non-whites from entering the country.

The continued arrivals of Jews led to the government taking a further step in its discriminatory immigration policy with the introduction of the Immigration Quota Act in 1930. Based on the belief that Jews were different from the inhabitants of South Africa (Crush, 1998: 24), the entry to the Union depended on the country of origin, the country of birth and a valid passport; all of these had to be approved by a selection board. A annual quota of immigrants (50 in the beginning) was allocated to those coming from countries considered ‘unscheduled’ while the number was unlimited for people coming from the ‘scheduled’ countries. The criterion used to decide whether a country was ‘scheduled’ or ‘unscheduled’ was the country of birth and not the

citizenship of the immigrant. The government wanted to make sure that Jewish citizens from the scheduled countries did not enter South Africa. The government also obliged immigrants to have a valid passport to enter the country because after the war many immigrants from Eastern European countries did not have original identity documents (Crush & Peberdy, 2001: 25).

Crush and Peberdy (2001: 25) point out that the Immigration Quota Act was followed by the Immigration Amendment Act of 1937, which mainly focused on Black immigrants. Mine workers could be recruited further afield for a specific period, but, were not granted the right of claiming a 'domicile' in South Africa. The Act further entrenched the powers of immigration officers, who could arrest any person they believed to be illegal without a warrant.

The South African migration policy implemented by the government following the Union was the sum of the immigration laws of the former colonies (Cape and Natal) and the two Boer republics. In essence, it was a policy set up to favour the entry of Whites, with the exception of Jews who were seen as a threat. The migration policy also denied Indians the right of free movement within the country and did not allow Black migrant workers the right to acquire the status of citizenship. When the National Party came to power in 1948, further laws were enacted to facilitate White immigration, whilst at the same time trying to reduce the flow of English-speaking people.

Before coming to power, the National Party had already launched a campaign of protest, accusing the United Party of encouraging immigration of English-speaking people in order to boost its electorate. Soon after its victory, the National Party welcomed immigrants from Germany and Holland especially (Crush & Peberdy, 1998: 29). The previous immigration acts were once again amended in 1953 by reinforcing the powers of the minister in charge. He was, for instance, able to launch a deportation procedure against any person who was considered an 'undesirable inhabitant' for the interests of the Union. In 1960, anyone wanting to enter South Africa had to have a valid visa or an authorisation.

Two other pieces of legislation were set up at the time. The Population Registration Amendment Act and the Admission of Persons to the Union Regulation Amendment Act were introduced in 1950 and 1961 respectively. Because of the Population Regulation Act, people were obliged to carry an ID document clearly showing their place of birth and their race - the population was divided into four categories (Whites, Blacks, Indians and Coloured). The objective of the Act was to better control population movement inside the country. According to Crush and Peberdy (1998: 30), the regulation that migrants should carry their passports at all times, especially in Johannesburg, is a legacy of that Act. The Admission of Persons to the Union Regulation Amendment Act of 1961 was implemented to stop the flow of Black people between South Africa and its neighbouring countries. In 1960, with the first consequences of the apartheid policy (such as the declaration of the state of emergency and the treason trials), Black Africans were not keen to come to South Africa and hundreds of Whites left the country. The government therefore launched another immigration policy by opening the doors to skilled Whites from Europe, but with some restrictions for less-skilled Catholics coming especially from the southern part of Europe. On the other hand, Whites from recently independent southern African countries found a home in South Africa.

In 1961, when South Africa became a republic, South African citizenship was withdrawn from those who had dual nationality because of the implementation of the Commonwealth Relations Act.

During the following years, the powers of the state to control immigration were consolidated with legal tools like the Admission of Persons to and the Departure from the Republic Regulation Act of 1969, which allowed the minister to expel any foreigner considered unsuitable for the national interests. The Aliens Amendment Act of 1978 made it a criminal offence to employ, enter business with or harbour an alien who did not have the permit to work in the country. The Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act of 1984 furthermore denied South African citizenship to Black inhabitants of the 'independent homelands' the South African citizenship. Immigration of skilled Black people from African countries became possible when the word "European" was removed from section 4(3) (b) of the Act.

Crush and Peberdy (1998: 33) point out that a number of important developments in the South African migration policy occurred in 1984 and 1986 before the implementation of the Aliens Control Act of 1991. The Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act of 1984 was merely another coercive measure to control immigrants within the country. Among the amendments made, the Act stated that it was unlawful for South Africa nationals to employ or/and to accommodate immigrants without valid permits. In 1986, another amendment “removed the definition of European from section 4(3) (b) of the act which had required all immigrants to be assimilable with the white population” (Crush & Peberdy, 1998: 33). As a consequence, Black Africans could officially migrate to South Africa. However, that immigration was mainly limited to the homelands, which were desperately in need of skilled workers. This amendment was the legal tool that allowed the first wave of Francophone African migrants into South Africa, particularly into former homelands.

#### **2.5.2.2 The Aliens Control Act of 1991**

The Aliens Control Act of 1991, also known as [Act No. 96 of 1991] was the latest legal tool formulated by the apartheid administration. The Act was made with the intention “to provide for the control of the admission of persons to, their residence in, and their departure from, and for matters connected therewith.” The Act firstly gives an insight into some definitions, for instance the meaning of alien, which refers to “a person who is not a South Africa citizen.” The act states that the Department of Home Affairs is in charge of the administration of immigration and the duties of its officers, and in section 5, the act highlights the admission to the Republic through specific ports of entry. Those ports of entry are defined as:

- (a) any place on the coast of the Republic;
- (b) any place in the Republic at or near any of the borders thereof; or
- (c) any airport in the Republic.

The Act also recommends to immigrants to present themselves to an immigration officer at these different ports of entry with a valid passport and a visa issued by the Department of Home Affairs. In sections 25 and 26, The Aliens Control Act of 1991 highlights the character of residence of immigrants in South Africa.

An Immigrants Selection Board, with a central committee in Pretoria and one regional committee for each of the provinces, has the powers, functions and duties conferred upon, entrusted to or imposed it by or under this Act (Section 24). The Immigrants Selection Board, according to the Act, can issue to a suitable alien the following permits describe in section 26:

- (a) a work permit, issued to any alien who applies to be temporarily employed or to temporarily manage or conduct any business in the Republic;
- (b) a business permit, issued to any alien who applies to enter the Republic for business matters;
- (c) a study permit, issued to any alien who applies to enter the Republic to be enrolled in primary, secondary and tertiary institutions;
- (d) a work seeker's permit, issued to any alien who applies to enter the Republic to be temporally employed or to temporarily manage or conduct any business; and
- (e) a medical permit, issued to any alien who applies for the purposes of medical treatment.

However, any prohibited person will not be granted a residence permit in South Africa. Section 39 of the Act states nine criteria to identify a prohibited person:

- (a) any person who is likely to become a public charge, by reason of infirmity or because he/she does not have enough means to support himself/herself as well as his/her dependants;
- (b) any person who, according to the Minister of Home Affairs, is an undesirable inhabitant for the Republic;
- (c) any person who lives or has lived directly or indirectly on the earnings of prostitution or procures or has procured persons for immoral purposes;
- (d) any person who has been convicted in any country of contravention of a law relating to exchange control and who is undesirable according to the Minister of Home Affairs;
- (e) any mentally ill person, or any person with communicable, visual disabilities, or someone having hearing problems;
- (f) any person with any contagious and communicable disease;

- (g) any person who has been removed from the Republic by warrant under any law;
- (h) any person who has been removed from the Republic under a warrant in terms of section 45, 46, or 47 of this Act; and
- (i) any person who in terms of any other provision of this Act is a prohibited person.

Section 43 of the Act allows a fine, imprisonment or removal from the Republic any person found within the country after having been refused entry, removed from or ordered to leave the Republic.

The Aliens Control Act of 1991 has been considered the main piece of legislation sustaining the migration policy in South Africa from 1991 onwards. Even with the implementation of democracy in South Africa, the migration policy is still considered a legacy of the apartheid legislation (Crush & Williams, 2001; Kabwe-Segatti, 2006). A clear and urgent need to revise South African legislation and policy on international migration became evident with the implementation of the democratic process that the country embarked on in the mid-1990s, particularly with the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. However, the Aliens Control Act of 1991 remains prominent in new legislation concerning international migration, as “the defining feature of recently reformulated immigration legislation has been the maintenance of an essential continuity with the policies of the previous regime” (Hill & Kotzé, 1997: 14).

### **2.5.2.3 The Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995**

Soon after the ANC government came to power, an investigation revealed that the Aliens Control Act of 1991 was unable to address illegal immigration in South Africa (Hill & Kotzé, 1997: 14). The investigation also indicated that citizens of approximately 90 countries were excluded by South African visa requirements. However, some shortcomings were observed, especially the delivery system of visas, obtaining permanent resident status and the number of illegal migrants staying beyond the expiration of their temporary visitation times.

The Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995 (Act No 76 of 1995) firstly dealt with the definitions of the previous Act. Among these definitions, an “alien” was



considered a non-South African citizen or an inhabitant of the former homelands in Section 1. The Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995 was designed, according to Kabwe-Segatti (2006: 180), to be “a protectionist approach to employment and subsidised education, selection according to qualifications and the amplifications of measures against undocumented migrants.” Among the major changes introduced by the 1995 amendment, Kabwe-Segatti (2006: 180) points to the following three. Firstly, it was not possible to change the purpose of stay if the alien was already inside the Republic. Secondly, to decrease the expenditures of the Department of Home Affairs as far as repatriation of illegal migrants was concerned. Lastly, to change time of detention procedures of illegal migrants.

Hill and Kotzé, (1997: 15) summarise the amendment of 1995 as follows:

- General measures designed to strengthen the capacity of the judicial system and the Department of Home Affairs to act against illegal aliens in the country.
- Provision for five categories of temporary residence permits: visitor's permit, work permit, study permit, work-seeker's permit and medical permit. The purpose of any temporary residence permit may not be altered - only the conditions and period of validity.
- The issuing of work and study related immigration permits is restricted to points outside the country.
- The restriction of the Minister's prerogative to grant exemptions from the provisions of the Aliens Control Act.
- The inclusion of a clause (Section 32(e)) that specifically empowers the Minister to take steps “to ensure proper exploitation of the local labour market before a work permit or work-seeker's permit is issued.

In spite of the modifications brought by the Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995, South African legislation on international migration was still perceived by many critics as a failure by not being able to transform the legislation of the previous era. In order to tackle the issue, the Minister of the Department of Home Affairs appointed a task team, which was also charged to analyse the international migration patterns and make recommendations to update the policy.

#### **2.5.2.4 The Draft Green Paper on International Migration**

The Draft Green Paper on International Migration was proposed to the Minister and then published in the government gazette on 13 May 1997 by the Department of Home Affairs for general information and comments from interested parties. The Draft Green Paper on International Migration posits three types of foreigners entering South Africa: *immigrants* who are willing to settle permanently in the country, *refugees* who are escaping from their country of origin and seeking asylum in South Africa and *migrants* who are in the country illegally. In general principles, the document recommends a planned system according to the country's national interest. A future national policy on migration should take into account four objectives:

- (a) to enhance the country's integration into, and competitiveness within the global economy;
- (b) to further the process of regional integration and development within SADC;
- (c) to generate macro-economic growth and employment opportunities in the formal and informal sectors, as outlined in GEAR framework;
- and (d) to provide improved living standards for our people (Section 1. 1. 2).

The Draft Green Paper on International Migration claims that the country needs a policy that can attract skilled workers, easily put private companies on the global skills market and facilitate the accessibility of the country to entrepreneurs and investors. However, such a policy should be drawn up within the constitutional framework, according to international standards and ranking sub-regional cooperation foremost. It should also have a designed and implemented strategic plan based on:

- an evaluation of the present and future needs of the country's labour force;
- annual immigration and migration targets and quotas;
- a reconsideration of immigrant selection and control; and
- an improved and controlled temporary access for SADC workers and highly skilled migrants from other regions (Section 1. 5. 2).

The Draft Green Paper on International Migration in Section 2. 5 also recommends the modernisation of the immigration and migration policy by:

(a) the design and implementation of a market-related point system as a screening and admissions framework for individuals who wish to immigrate to South Africa; and

(b) special, well-managed legal avenues of entry for SADC citizens who seek to enter South Africa on a temporary basis in four areas: (i) unskilled or semi-skilled workers who are legitimately in demand by South African employers, using an annual, flexible, quota system; (ii) small traders, by issuing a special trade permit; (iii) students, by easing access and administrative convenience; and (iv) cross-border family visitation, by the use of special border passes.

As far as undocumented migrants are concerned, the document advises the creation of principles for a well-developed jurisprudence regarding the enforcement of a genuine application of the new migration regime. These principles emphasise that (1) enforcement must be rights-based, (2) the enforcement must put its attention on illegal immigrants, and (3) the enforcement must empower government bodies to: (a) expose the fraudulent use of documents, (b) better control ports of entry, and (c) strategically supervise traditional ports of entry of illegal immigrants (Section 3. 1. 2).

The Draft Green Paper on International Migration focuses on the situation of refugees in Section 4. It encourages separate legislation on refugee protection in line with the 1951 Geneva Convention of the United Nations and the OAU Convention of 1969 that is more “rights-regarding, solution-oriented, with the sharing of the burden across all SADC member states.” However, this legislation should emphasise a temporary sojourn of refugees (Section 4. 2. 1).

Lastly, the authors of the document suggest that the Department of Home Affairs should be named the *Department of Citizenship and Immigration Services (DCIS)*. The change of the name of the department will be accompanied by a genuine transformation of its structures, the grant of sufficient human and financial resources able to deal with the challenges of the new policy and a better cooperation among departments concerned with migration. The achievements and objectives of the implementation of the migration policy will be presented to parliament annually.

Crush and Williams (2001: 5) point out some recommendations made by the Draft Paper. The document acknowledges the need for South Africa to develop an immigration policy based on national self-interest and territorial integrity. It also recommends taking into consideration the opportunities and challenges presented by globalisation. Therefore, it is wise to encourage forms of migration and immigration that South Africa could benefit from. The last concern of the four preliminary considerations and principles of the Draft Paper is to be aware of regional issues and needs. The Draft Paper on International Migration also points out the increase of illegal migration flow into the country, which is regarded as a cause of social ills.

With the arrival of thousands of Africans after 1994, particularly illegal immigrants and refugees, South Africa's government adopted restrictive measures such as arrests, detention and deportation. The methods used by police to arrest illegal immigrants, often according to the darkness of the skin, have been met severe criticism. Most arrested immigrants are sent to the Lindela Centre before being deported (Harris, 2001).

#### **2.5.2.5 The Refugees Act of 1998**

The Refugees Act of 1998 became effective in 2000. The Act was aimed at updating South African policy with international legal tools relating to refugees. The Act was set up to provide a legal framework for refugees, from the step of seeking asylum to integration into society, and included issues such as respect for their rights and their obligations.

The Act in Section 2 defines a refugee as any person who:

- (a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.

The definition also extends to internally displaced people and views a refugee as any person who:

(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either part or the whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refugee elsewhere.

The Act also lists the categories of persons excluded from refugee status and those who can lose their refugee status. As far as the first category is concerned, the Act refuses to consider as a refugee any person who has committed a crime against peace or a crime against humanity; a person who has committed a non-political crime, but punishable by South African law; any person guilty against the objects and principles of international organisations such as the United Nations or the Organisation of African Unity; and any person who is already under the protection of another country (Section 4). As far as the second category is concerned, a refugee can lose his or her status if he or she is no longer persecuted in his or her country of his or her nationality, if he or she has lost his or her nationality, if he or she becomes a South African citizen or a citizen of a country other than the country of his or her nationality, or if the causes of his or her departure come to an end (Section 5).

The administration of the Act is under the authority of the Minister of Home Affairs, who can delegate any power granted or duty imposed by the Act to any officer within the department. At the root level, as many Refugee Reception Offices can be opened throughout the country as are required (Section 8). Refugee Reception Offices are under the supervision and the regulation of the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs. This latter organisation can also formulate and implement procedures for the granting of asylum, work in collaboration with the representatives of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), revise and monitor decisions taken by Refugee Status Determination Officers relating to unfounded applications, and the Act guarantees the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs the right to determine the conditions under which an asylum seeker permit can be issued as far as studying and working in South Africa are concerned (Section 11). The Refugee Reception Offices, among other duties, issue to applicant asylum seekers permits that

the holders must renew from time to time. However, the Act makes room for a Refugee Appeal Board to hear and determine any question of law and any appeal concerning the interpretation of the Act (Section 14).

The Act delineates refugee's rights and obligations. As far as the rights are concerned, a refugee is formally recognised by a written document of his or her refugee status, which guarantees him or her full legal protection. After five continuous years of residence in South Africa the refugee may apply for an immigrant permit. He or she can also seek employment and receive the same health services and education that South African citizens have (Section 27). The Act ensures refugees an identity document which must have:

- (a) an identity number of the holder compiled in the prescribed manner;
- (b) the holder's surname, full forenames, gender, date of birth and place of country where he or she was born;
- (c) the country of which the holder is a citizen, if any;
- (d) a recent photograph of the holder; and
- (e) the holder's fingerprints or other prints, taken and displayed in the prescribed manner (Section 30).

In Section 31, the Act also recognises the right of refugees to apply for travel documents. Refugees are obliged to respect South African laws. For national security reasons or disturbance of public order, a refugee can be removed from the Republic.

#### **2.5.2.6 The Draft White Paper on International Migration**

After the release of the Draft Green Paper on International Migration, individuals and organisations commented on the document. The Department of Home Affairs then appointed another task team to consider these comments and to draw up a Draft White Paper on International Migration which was released and approved by the Cabinet on 31 March 1999.

The task team identified some of the problems relating to the effectiveness of the Aliens Control Act of 1991 and the Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995 from public input and other comments. It was acknowledged that the existing policies were

not able to prevent the flows of illegal immigrants into the country. It was a concern that the prevention and redress of illegal immigration should be a priority in the new policy, but it was acknowledged that officers in charge of policing illegal immigrants are few and that the granting of permanent residence was still based on apartheid criteria (Section 6.3). Furthermore, the arrival of illegal immigrants has a negative impact on South African society as a whole. Illegal immigrants compete with both South African citizens and other residents of the country for scarce resources, scarce public services and job opportunities. Illegal immigrants were also implicated in criminal activities and corruption of state institutions in their quest for the required documents.

The Draft White Paper recognises that it is important to formulate policies enabling South Africa to benefit from the worldwide movement of people with skills, expertise, resources, entrepreneurship and capital within the context of globalisation and who are able to fulfil the country's objectives of reconstruction, development and nation-building (Section 4.1). The document also argues that such policies must accord with the interests of domestic communities. Therefore, the consideration of affirmative action in immigration could easily be understood by local communities as permission for employers to go abroad to look for what South Africans lack in terms of skills and expertise. The affirmative action in immigration policy should first consider citizens of the country and members of the Southern African Development Community, then the rest of Africa and lastly the rest of the world (Section 4.4). This strategy is viewed as one of the keys for a successful implementation of the macro-economic plan, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR). The Draft White Paper on International Migration advises that South Africa should:

- attract foreign investments, especially as fixed capital investments or employment producing enterprises;
- assist the tourist industry, in respect of which South Africa has a competitive world advantage;
- facilitate international trade and commerce;
- recognise the informal sector and allow some controlled cross border movement of traders who benefit it; and
- attract foreign skills and entrepreneurial energies (Section 5.2).

The Draft White Paper on International Migration argues that a formulation of a new policy should be undertaken within the constitutional framework and that the government must be the cornerstone of the migration system, which “should enable Government to retain control on who enters the country and the conditions and length of his or her stay” (Section 6.4.1). Government should start by preventing illegal immigration by reducing both “pull factors” and “push factors” in South Africa and the countries of origin of illegal immigrants. The reduction of “pull factors” could be done by the enforcement of labour law to regulate migration flows and the “push factors” can be reduced based on bilateral and multilateral discussions, and international cooperation with other African countries. Government also should secure borders to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country, with the case of the border between the United States of America and Mexico taken as an example, and remove those already in the country through deportation. However, deportation should be viewed as the ultimate act of the process which starts with “law enforcement, monitoring, investigations, detention and adjudication.”

The Draft White Paper on International Migration admits that a new policy should consider “a bottom-up approach”, which takes into account community needs and puts them into a general formulation of a national policy. According to the document, the following priorities should be considered:

- ensuring that illegal aliens do not take available job opportunities away from community members and do not compete with them for scarce services;
- ensuring that illegal aliens do not become public charges or become involved in criminal activities;
- ensuring that education is provided at community level to avoid any form of xenophobia by making communities understand the tragedy of illegal immigration while cooperating with law enforcement authorities;
- ensuring the resettlement of refugees and ensuring that they are not confused with illegal immigrants;
- ensuring that communities, industries or businesses which need to acquire the skills or contribution of foreign workers can do so without administrative delays or problems; and



- ensuring a community-based production of data and information necessary to determine the need for quotas of foreign labour” (Section 6.5).

A new shape of structures is also proposed. An Immigration Service (IS) at the community or regional level, with the participation of the public in commenting on procedures set for immigration law is highlighted. It is required that the IS enforces immigration laws within communities and cooperates with policy by considering the communities’ interests regarding the threat of illegal immigrants and some related issues such as crime, integration of immigrants into local communities and xenophobia. An Immigration Review Board is set to advise and monitor the Immigration Service, especially regarding rule-making.

As far as criteria for admission are concerned, the authors of the Draft White Paper on International Migration believe a clear distinction of criteria to distinguish prohibited persons should be made. This will lead to another distinction of temporary residence permits, which will be issued to people wanting to stay in South Africa for more than three months. The ten temporary residence permits are student permits, work permits, exceptional skill or extraordinary qualifications permits, diplomatic corps and foreign authority permits, exchange permits, treaty person permits, investor and self employed person permits, crewperson permits, relative’s permit and medical treatment permits.

In the Section 8.2, the document proposes a list of persons who should be considered as prohibited:

- people carrying infectious disease;
- people with a record of criminal offences;
- any person against whom a warrant has been issued by any country linked with South Africa by diplomatic ties and relating to genocide, murder, drug trafficking or money laundering;
- people judicially considered incompetent;
- people previously deported from South Africa and for whom the application is still to be rehabilitated by Immigration Service;
- members of criminal or terrorism organisations; and

- members of associations promoting racial beliefs or social violence.

The Draft White Paper then emphasises the financial management of migration by “reducing the social cost of immigration, enhancing policing at the community level, and better internal administrative procedures which should free existing financial and administrative capacity” (Section 12.2).

#### **2.5.2.7 The Immigration Act of 2002**

The release of the Immigration Act of 2002 was viewed as an update of the previous acts and incorporation of recommendations regarding immigration policy in South Africa. However, the Act gives the impression of perpetuating the legacy of the two-gate policy system (Kabwe-Segatti, 2006: 183). On the one hand, the Act reiterates the attraction of skilled migrants whilst at the same time protecting the country from the flows of thousands of unskilled and illegal migrants. On the other hand, South Africa presents itself as the economic power on the continent, consequently attracting thousands of migrants. The Immigration Act was released on 31 May 2002 and aimed “to provide for the regulation of admission of persons to, their residence in, and their departure from the Republic; and for matters connected therewith.”

The Act takes into consideration the propositions made by the Draft White Paper on International Migration, including the support of a culture of human-rights at government and civil society levels, facilitating of temporary permits, and the fight against illegal immigration and xenophobia. It encourages the creation of a synergy between the governmental bodies related to immigration or the promotion of economic growth, from which local communities will benefit and which could attract foreign investors, skilled human resources and businessmen, indispensable to the development of the country (Section 2.1). The Act recommends that the Department of Home Affairs reaches these objectives by cooperating with the South African Police Service, South African Revenue Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs. In order to achieve these objectives, the Act also urges the Department of Home Affairs to make public its financial records concerning immigration and to modernise its administration within its structures and the relations with the public (Section 2.2). The cooperation between the Department of Home Affairs and other bodies is effected by the appointment of the members of the Immigration Advisory

Board, which includes representatives from various entities. The function of the board is to counsel the Minister of Home Affairs about the formulation and the implementation of the immigration policy.

The Act mentions the conditions under which temporary and permanent resident permits can be delivered. As far as permanent resident permits are concerned,

- (1) Upon admission, a foreigner may enter and sojourn in the Republic only if in possession of a temporary residence.
- (2) Subject to this Act, upon application and upon prescribed examination at the port of entry, one of the temporary residences ... may be issued to a foreigner.
- (3) If issued outside the Republic, a temporary residence is deemed to be of force and effect only after an admission.
- (4) A temporary residence is to be issued on condition that the holder is not or does not become a prohibited or an undesirable person.
- (5) For good cause, as prescribed, the Department may attach reasonable individual terms and conditions to a temporary residence.
- (6) Subject to this Act, a foreigner may change his or her status while in the Republic” (Section 10).

The Act then distinguishes between the different types of residence permits issued by the Department:

The visitor’s permit is issued to any foreigner holding a visa and who could provide financial or other guarantees for his or departure. The visitor’s permit lasts three months and can be renewed, as long as the holder provides financial resources for his or her departure and has proved to visit the Republic for academic sabbaticals, voluntary or charitable activities, research or other prescribed activities and cases. The holder of a visitor’s permit is not susceptible of conducting work in the Republic.

The diplomatic permit can also be delivered by the Department of Foreign Affairs to an ambassador, a minister, a career diplomat or a consular officer of a foreign country or to a representative of an international organisation recognized by the Republic. The

other potential receivers of the diplomatic permit are the immediate relatives and attendants, servants or personal employees of the diplomats listed above. The holder of the diplomatic permit may combine a separated issued work permit if they may conduct work in the Republic.

The study permit is issued to any foreigner who wants to study in the Republic of South Africa for a period longer than three months. However, the potential holder of the study permit must provide guarantees of paying tuition fees as well as guarantees that he or she could support himself or herself during his or her stay in the Republic. The holder of the study permit is not required to work, unless it is a part-time work for a period not longer than the prescribed period or a temporary or full time work during the academic vacation periods if the holder attends a higher education institution. In some cases, the holder of the study permit can also work as practical training in a field related to his or her study.

The treaty permit is held by a foreigner conducting activities in the country based on international agreements that South Africa is a party to. Apart from the Department of Home Affairs, the treaty permit can be issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs or another organ of the state responsible for the implementation of the treaty.

The business permit is received by a foreigner wanting to establish or invest in a business so that he or she can be employed. The permit is also issued to his or her members of family.

The crew permit is allocated to a foreigner who is a member of the crew of a ship by the Department of Home Affairs to a holder whose movement is restricted to particular areas and he/she is not allowed to work.

The medical treatment permit is issued by the Department of Home Affairs to any foreigner willing to get medical treatment in the Republic for a period no longer than three months. The holder of the medical treatment permit is forbidden to work in the Republic.

The Department of Home Affairs also may deliver the relative's permit to any foreign member of immediate family of a citizen or a resident in the Republic. However, the resident or the citizen should prove that he/she has the means to support the relative during his/her sojourn. The relative's permit does not give the right to work.

The Department of Home Affairs issues four different categories of work permits, namely the quota work permit, the general work permit, an exceptional skills work permit and the intra-company transfer work permit. The first category is applied to any foreigner satisfying the quota determined annually by the Minister in consultation with the Ministers of Labour and Trade and Industry. The second category is allocated to any foreigner if his/her employer proves that the applicant does not fall within the first category of the work permit and if the employer has been unable to employ a person with similar qualifications in the Republic. The third category is issued to any foreigner with exceptional or qualifications. Lastly, a foreigner can be granted an intra-company transfer work permit for a period no longer than two years to work for a branch of an international company in the Republic.

The retired person permit is granted by the Department of Home Affairs for a period exceeding three months to any foreigner willing to retire in the Republic. However, such foreigner must provide evidence of a pension or irrevocable annuity or retirement account or a minimum prescribed net worth. The holder of a retired person permit may work in the Republic under some circumstances determined by the Department of Home Affairs.

The corporate permit is granted to a corporate applicant to employ a determined number of foreigners by the Department of Home Affairs in consultation with the Ministers of Labour and Trade and Industry.

The exchange permit is granted to a foreigner participating in a cultural, economic and social programme or to a foreigner under the age of 25, to conduct a work for no longer than a year.

As far as temporary residence is concerned, in addition to these different categories of permits, The Department of Home Affairs may issue an asylum permit, cross-border pass and transit visa to an asylum seeker under the Refugee Act, to any foreigner from

neighbouring country who does not have a passport but a prescribed identity document issued by the Department of Home Affairs, or a foreigner traveling to another country and who is using the facilities of different ports of entry of the Republic.

## **2.6 The discourse on migration in South Africa**

The general elections in April 1994 were synonymous with the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the beginning of a new era for the country. The country's readmission to the international scene resulted in many different exchanges, including the flow of people. Apart from the labourers recruited in neighbouring countries to work on farms and mines in South Africa, the country also witnessed migration from other African countries further afield. Since 1994, thousands of Africans have arrived in South Africa and it is unlikely that this influx will cease any time soon.

The South African government has been criticised for its management of the migration issue. Criticism has come from both human rights groups and scholars. The government has chosen to control and exclude immigrants rather than manage the problem by giving opportunities (Crush, 2003). Police brutality as method of arrest and the deportation system have especially been pointed out. A holding centre known as Lindela Centre through which many migrants pass prior to their deportation has also been the focus of major human rights investigations and complaints.

Xenophobia is one of the main issues related to migration in South Africa. The general hostility towards foreigners has taken many forms. Among these are public violence and vigilantism, political statements and media publications (Harris, 2001). Hostility has linked foreigners to social problems like unemployment, crime, poverty and the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS. The origins of xenophobia could be broadly explained through research and historical events, which show that a majority group in a bad economic position feels threatened by a minority group, especially immigrants (Shindondola, 2001: 9). Called *amakwerekwere* or *amagongogo* by local Africans, foreign Africans have been harassed in one form or another. This dramatic and painful hostility cannot be better illustrated than by the following story (Vale, 2003: 86):

In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on a train: one, a Mozambican, was thrown out while the other two, both Senegalese citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed on the roof trying to escape the crowd. This violence was inflicted by members of a crowd who were returning from a rally in the country's administrative capital, Pretoria.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

The characteristics of Francophone African migration have been determined by colonisation and its legacy. France as the former colonial power had been considered as one of the destinations for millions of Africans from French-speaking countries. Over the years the shapes and features of Francophone African migration have changed. On the continent, Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire have also received Francophone Africans. The flows of migrants in Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire are parts of large-scale movements of Africans moving within the continent (GCIM, 2005: 5; The United Nations, 2004: 55; Castles & Miller, 1998: 125). These trends occur in other parts of the developing world, where "south-south" migration is prominent. In this context, the flows of Africans to South Africa have tremendously increased since 1994. For Francophone Africans, South Africa therefore represents a new alternative destination in response to push factors in their countries of origin.

In the light of the three main questions underpinning this study, the following hypotheses emerge from the historical review above:

1. The departure of Francophone Africans from their regions of origin is a consequence of political, economic, social and academic turmoil.
2. Their choice to come to South Africa is a consequence of their inability to migrate to traditional destinations such as France, Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon.
3. The choice of South Africa is also based on its economic, political and academic similarities to developed countries.
4. The settlement of Francophone African migrants in specific cities within South Africa follows the spread of a social network nationwide.

This historical review has also highlighted:

1. The labour market context
2. the higher education context
3. Conditions favouring forced migration  
on the African/South African divide.

The four categories of migrants to be used below (introduced in Chapter 1) relate directly to these three factors:

- Legal migrants relate to labour market differences between sending areas and South Africa
- Students as migrants relate to the higher education context, and
- both refugees and extra-legals relate to forced migration.



## Chapter Three

# THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### 3. 1 Introduction

The three main questions of the study have led to four hypotheses and a four-way categorisation of migrants, as spelled out in the previous chapter on the historical context of Francophone migration. This chapter will complement the historical and the geographical analysis with an overview of theories relating to the complex processes of migration.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines an overview of the evolution of the theoretical analysis of the causes of migration before the following two sections focus on “explaining and integrating the leading contemporary theories of international migration” (Massey *et al.*, 1993: 432). The causes of migration are often viewed through economic considerations. As argued by Kok *et al.* (2003: 13), migration is also related to issues such as development and that the causes of this phenomenon should therefore not be seen as purely economic. According to Massey *et al.* (1993) or Schroot (cited by Jennissen, 2004: 32), the study of the causes of migration could be undertaken with reference to theories on the initiation of migration. These theories are presented in the second section. The third section explores theories of the perpetuation of migration. Lastly, the chapter describes the methodology used for this thesis.

### 3. 2 An overview of the evolution of the theoretical analysis

A massive body of literature has already been generated by the need for theoretical frameworks to understand population mobility (Castels & Miller, 1998; Keely, Kritz & Tomasi, 1981; Kok *et al.*, 2003; Richmond, 1994; Solomon, 2001). Ravenstein, who wrote *The Laws of Migration* in the nineteenth century, is considered as one of the pioneers of the theoretical analysis of migration (Castels & Miller, 1998; Jansen, 1970, Kok, *et al.*, 2003). Ravenstein’s early theoretical approaches were broadly

based on statistical laws and have had a substantial influence on the subsequent analyses of economists, demographers and sociologists<sup>9</sup>. Kok *et al*, ( 2003: 12) mention other contributions to the analysis of migration, including William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* published in the late 1920s and Peter Rossi's book on urban migration published in 1950, *Why Families Move*. These early analyses of migration contribute significantly to the diverse schools of thought that aim to explain migration.

Migration analysis was often studied through the equilibrium approach and the structural historical approach (DeFay, 1998). The equilibrium approach emphasises economic factors and explains the reasons for migrating as a decision made by individual migrants after a careful consideration of different factors in both sending and receiving regions. In addition, according to the equilibrium approach, migration occurs within a free labour market where migrants are mobile and they move from regions of economic scarcity to regions of economic abundance. These moves take place within a free market regulated by the state properly managing the pull factors in order to increase competitiveness.

The structural-historical approach is mainly based on the model of a Marxist political economy. Cheap, docile and exploitable migrants are pulled into the capitalist economy due in particular to the drive for increased profits. The desire to keep labour costs as low as possible push capitalists to bring in pliable, inexpensive and unskilled

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<sup>9</sup> Jansen (1970: 10) summarises the seven "laws" that theorists of migration have since considered the basis of analysis. Ravenstein's 'laws' are described as follows:

1. (...) the great body of our migrants only proceed a short distance and that there takes place consequently a universal shifting or displacement of the population, which produces "currents of migration" setting in the direction of the great centres of commerce and industry which absorb the migrants..
2. The process of absorption (limited in range, but universal throughout the country) go in the following manner: the inhabitants of a country immediately surrounding a town of rapid growth, flock into it; the gaps thus left by the rural population are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, until the attractive force of one of our rapidly growing cities makes its influence felt, step by step, to the most remote corner of the Kingdom. Migrants enumerated in certain centres of absorption will consequently grow less with the distance proportionately to the native population which furnishes them...
3. The process of dispersion is the inverse of that of absorption and exhibits similar features.
4. Each main current of migration produces a compensating countercurrent.
5. Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce and industry.
6. The natives of towns are less migratory than those of rural parts of the country.
7. Females are more migratory than males.

workers from peripheral countries. In addition, the structural-historical approach identifies the way that changes in the underlying conditions of society influence individuals differently, depending on their gender, socioeconomic status and ethnic or national identities.

The history of immigration theory in sociology expanded with the Chicago school of Sociology in the 1920s and 1930s, which put the assimilation perspective at the centre of the melting-pot, which was itself the outcome of migration (Heisler, 2000: 77).

Stouffer's concept of the intervening opportunities is among the first sociological theories particularly focused on migration (Bijak, 2006: 6). The concept points out that migratory movements are proportional to the attracting numbers of opportunities available at the regions of arrival, which are close to the regions of departure. Clearly the concept is questionable when long distance movements take place.

Lee's concept of push-pull factors which explains migration through attracting factors in the receiving regions, coupled with deterring factors in the sending regions, is derived from Stouffer's findings. The push-pull factors model however has evident limitations with regard to its explanation of people mobility in the sense that same categories of migrants can prevail over time if the same push factors predominate in the sending regions. Furthermore, Skeldon (1990: 125-126) for instance believes that even though the push-pull model lists a series of reasons for migrating, those reasons merged together still fail to present a clear structure within which the causes of migration can be understood. As a consequence, Skeldon (1990: 126) states that "the push-pull theory is but a platitude at best."

The trends and patterns of international migration have changed over the years, and reasons for and causes of migration have become so complex that a single theory is inadequate to explain and conceptualise them. As argued by Haldenwang (quoted by Olaleye, 2000: 15), the analysis of migration has spread over several fields of study, with each specialist field of study defining its own concept of migration (Brettell & Hollifield, 2000: 3).

Anthropologists put a particular accent on cultural changes that take place because of migration on the one hand, and on the other hand how migration has an effect on ethnic identity. Besides, anthropologists are interested in the roles played by social networks in sustaining cultural difference, particularly in the receiving regions.

Economists focus on the circumstances and conditions that attract different types of migrants to explain migration, in addition to the economic effects of migration which include the human cost and the benefits of in- and out-migration. Moreover, economists show a great interest in wage difference and the structural changes within capital markets and service sectors. Therefore, migration is viewed as a mechanism to redistribute the labour force internationally, with the more economically advanced regions attracting most migrants.

The theoretical models used in demography aim to describe the time and the specific groups involved in the process of migration. The demographic theoretical approach, which is similar to the geographic one, also emphasises the social and economic impact of migration on the regional structure in both the sending and receiving countries. Characteristics such as age, gender, ratios, structure and differential fertility rates of migrants, as well as influences of migration on population growth are therefore considered.

Initially, the sociology of international migration focused on the debate between functionalist and conflict-oriented theories of social migration (DeFay, 1998). The main input was based on the processes of social changes that occur when a specific group migrates from its region of origin and settles in another region. The study of migration then became more complex when economic, structural and political factors were taken into consideration. In his theoretical approach of sociology, Hoffman-Nowotny (Keely, Kritz & Tomasi, 1981: 65) grouped migration and its related phenomena into a single concept of “the theory of societal systems”. The sociological approach to understanding migration could then emphasise constellations of socio-structural conditions and socio-cultural factors, including the interpretation of sociological, socio-psychological and economic concepts through stratification, mobility, social change, status crystallisation, symbolic interaction and marginal utility. Two main streams of questions have dominated the study of migration in the

field of sociology in recent years. On the one hand, it is a question of looking at the reasons why migration takes place and how it continues over time. On the other hand, sociologists are interested in the incorporation of migrants in receiving regions. Ethnic groups take centre stage within these two streams of questions.

Migration has on the one hand been studied through the social and political structures of sending and receiving regions, and on the other hand, sociology has inquired into the processes of social integration and adaptation of migrants in host regions by asking why migration takes place and how the phenomenon sustains itself over time. Migration is often viewed through the pull-push approach because it is a consequence of a combination of both positive factors in receiving regions and negative factors in the sending ones. Migration becomes more effective if forces of attraction in the regions of destination increase.

The theoretical approach to migration can also be viewed and classified from the macro level of analysis, particularly analysis linked to push-pull factors, to the micro level of analysis which takes into account rational choices. Richmond (1994: 48) diversifies both macro and micro theories by pointing out that macro theories “focus on migration streams, identifying those conditions under which large-scale movements occur and describing the demographic, economic, and social characteristics of the migrants in aggregate terms.” In addition macro theories, through structural or cultural perspective, take into consideration adaptation processes, economic and social integration or assimilation of migrants in the host regions. Richmond (1994: 48) shows that micro theories are concerned with:

studies of socio-psychological factors that differentiate migrants from non-migrants, together with theories concerning motivation, decision making, satisfaction and identification. It may also include some aspects of immigrant adaptation when regarded from a strictly individualistic perspective as distinct from the broader societal consequences.

### **3.3 Theories on the initiation of migration**

One of the well-known texts on theories of migration is the compilation made by Massey and his colleagues (Massey *et al.*, 1993). The authors distinguish between

theories that focus on the initiation of migratory movements and theories that emphasise the perpetuation of migration across time and space (Kok *et al.*, 2003: 13). The overview of theories of international migration in this study is based on their compilation, as researchers in sociology of migration expect to understand why migration is taking place, why it sustains over time and how migrants integrate themselves into the host societies (Heisler, 2000: 77).

### **3.3.1 Neoclassical economics theory**

This theory is widely considered the oldest best-known model of labour migration (Jennissen, 2004: 33). It was developed by the likes of Todaro, Harris and Sjaarstad. It explains the causes of migration by looking at wage differences in various geographical regions within the context of labour supply and demand. People are likely to migrate to regions with higher wage rates and migration is a decision undertaken at the individual level. Individual migrants also consider labour productivity and the degree of organisation of workers in the potential regions of destination.

Massey *et al.* (1993: 434) illustrate the neoclassical economics theory with an example of a region that has a large labour force and limited capital resources on the one hand, but a low wage equilibrium on the other hand, whereas another region has a limited labour force in all sectors of activities, but has sufficient capital resources. The latter region is also characterised by high market wages. Workers of the first region are motivated to move away from the region because of differential in wages. However, before moving, migrants must take a number of financial risks considered as investments, such as the costs of traveling and maintenance during the trip and period of searching for work. They must also consider other risks, such as the difficulties in learning a new language, adapting to a new labour market and the psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones. Migrants expect positive returns, especially financial rewards. An economic equilibrium between sending and receiving regions is expected if the flows are pursued over a long period.

However, some critics point out that international political and economic environments are not taken into account. Indeed, Castels and Miller (1998: 21) argue that the theory is among those unable to predict future flows. The authors point out

that a closer analysis shows that labour migrants from underdeveloped regions belong largely to the middle class, whereas the poorest people should be considered as the first to move to more advantageous economic regions.

### **3.3.2 New economics of migration**

Contrary to the theory of neoclassical economics which explains migration as the result of individuals deciding to maximise their income, the new economics of migration theory views population mobility as a collective decision made by groups of people, such as families, households and sometimes the entire community. The theory has been developed by Massey *et al.*, Stark, Stark and Taylor. According to Massey *et al.* (1993: 436), the objective of migrating is to maximise income and to minimise economic risks. To achieve these targets, groups of concerned people diversify destinations of the labour force. Some family members take jobs or other economic activities locally, while others, perhaps the more skillful or those more likely to adapt to a foreign environment, are sent to regions with greater economic potential. Families, households and communities can therefore rely on migrants' income for support if the local economy deteriorates or if their own economic activities fail to generate an adequate income.

Massey *et al.* highlight the importance of decision making by entire communities to send some of their members abroad to overcome barriers to access to capital and credit on the local market. Moreover, the theory considers the diversification of destinations of members of families, households and communities as one of the responses to local market pressures. In developing countries, there are deficiencies in private insurance and governmental and credits markets. Castels and Miller (1998: 22) argue that the non-availability of capital for entrepreneurs, along with chances to secure employment elsewhere are also new economics factors explaining the move of people from underdeveloped regions to the most developed ones. The patterns identified by the new economics of migration theory are likely to expand from sending regions like Francophone Africa "if globalisation, and particularly liberalisation, further reduce the stability of employment, [because] they may make households feel even less secure and increase the need to spread their risks" (Stalker, 2000: 131).

### 3.3.3 Segmented labour-market theory

Also known as dual labour-market, this theory is based on the division on the labor market into the primary and the secondary sectors, with natives having most of the jobs in the primary sector while migrants are found mainly in the secondary sector (Piore, 1976: 35). Migration is therefore an outcome of pull factors observed in the receiving countries. While reviewing the theory, Weeks describes the dual labour market theory as follows (Britz, 2002: 42):

It suggests that in developing regions of the world, there are essentially two kinds of jobs - the primary sector, which employs well educated people, pays them well, and offers them security and benefits; and the secondary labour market, characterised by low wages, unstable working conditions, and lack of reasonable prospects of advancement. It is easy enough to recruit people into the primary sector, but the secondary sector is not so attractive.

The current world economy dominated by capitalism sustains labour migration from underdeveloped regions to the more advanced ones. The more industrialised economies are always looking for a cheaper and more flexible labour force. Massey *et al.* (1993: 441) argue that *structural inflation, social constraints on motivation, economic dualism and the demography of labour supply* are the main reasons behind the quest for a cheaper and more flexible labour force.

Massey *et al.* (1993: 441) explain *structural inflation* as the relation between wages and social status. Wages are often considered a corollary of social qualities, status and prestige. The increase of wages corresponds to the amelioration of social qualities, status and prestige. These informal social expectations coupled with pressure from formal institutions such as trade unions are supposed to ensure that wages correspond to the social status of workers. However, many employers are reluctant to satisfy these requirements although informal social expectations and formal institutions, such as union contracts, bureaucratic regulations or company job classifications, oblige them to do so. For employers, increasing wages, particularly in “times of labour scarcity, is expensive and disruptive” because “wages must be increased proportionately throughout the job hierarchy in order to keep them in line with social expectations” (Massey *et al.*, 1993: 441). Consequently, for the employers the best



option appears to be to recruit from the migrant population which is likely to accept low wages.

Massey *et al.* (1993: 441) also point to *motivational problems* as an explanation for migration through the dual labour market theory. Those motivational problems could result from the readjustment of the hierarchy caused by the movement of a number of workers up the ladder of the company. Apart from seeking an income, the accumulation of social status is the main concern of many workers. However, each hierarchy has a lowest level and employers need workers to occupy the jobs at the bottom of the hierarchy and to replace those who have moved up. However, at the bottom, “there is no status to be maintained and there are few avenues for upward mobility” (Massey *et al.*, 1993: 441). Employers therefore have to fill these positions largely with workers whose primary interest is money, not prestige and status. Migrants often take these jobs because for many, especially when they first arrive in a new environment, the sole aim is to work to earn money to achieve specific goals, such as sending money home or improving their living standards.

According to Massey *et al.* (1993: 442), the dual labour market theory explains the demand for migrants by most economies through an *economic dualism*, in which there is a clear distinction between capital and labour force:

Capital is a fixed factor of production that can be idle by lower demand but not be laid off; owners of capital must bear the costs of unemployment. Labour is a variable factor of production that can be released when demand falls, so workers are forced to bear the costs of their own unemployment (Massey *et al.* (1993: 442).

As a consequence of that dualism, there are, on the one hand, skilled workers in the labour intensive primary sector who are dealing with the best, most costly and most advanced equipment. Their jobs are stable and they can be considered as part of the capital because employers have invested in them for the long term through training and education, for instance. It becomes too expensive for employers to let these workers go elsewhere. On the other hand, there is the labour intensive secondary sector where workers hold unstable and unskilled jobs. They can be laid off at any

time with little or no cost to employers, especially during quiet periods. Therefore, because of low wages or unstable conditions in the secondary sector, local citizens are not keen to work there. Once again, the recruitment of migrants is often viewed as the solution to fill the void in the secondary sector.

With reference to the dual labour market Massey *et al.* (1993: 443) also lately emphasise the *demography of labour supply*, which focuses on the participation of women and teenagers in the job market. The status of women has changed, especially in developed countries. Unlike in the past, women have increased their presence in the job market because of three essential socio-demographic reasons. Firstly, women want to have a career and earn an income. Secondly, the increase in divorce rates makes it necessary for women to focus on well-paid jobs because it will be their only source of income. Thirdly, the decline in birth rates and the extension of formal education have pushed more women into the job market. On the other hand, teenagers permanently move in and out of the job market. Teenagers are not reluctant to take on dead-end jobs because they do not consider these jobs as permanent.

### **3.3.4 World system theory**

Population mobility is viewed as a consequence of upheavals caused by the penetration of a capital economy into non-capitalist or pre-capitalist regions and which since then has brought as many people as possible from the previous non-capitalist regions into the world market economy (Jennissen, 2004: 52). Since the expansion of European civilisation into other continents, capitalism has not ceased to spread its influence. Indeed, the present capitalist world-economy has its roots back in the sixteenth century (Wallerstein, 2000: 253). A world-system is viewed as a social system, with boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation and coherence based in core, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries (Wallerstein, 1974: 374). This penetration was first supported by colonial regimes, then by neo-colonial governments and nowadays by multinational firms. Moreover, “the drive for the endless accumulation of capital” (Wallerstein, 2000: 260) has brought owners and managers of capitalist companies to look for greener pastures beyond Europe and North America. Developed countries, where multinational companies have their headquarters, are known as core countries while developing countries are those on the periphery. The implementation of the world-economy has been accompanied by the

spread of a functional and geographical division of labour. Therefore, the main streams of people mobility seem to take the opposite direction to the penetration of capitalism, whereas capital spreads from the core sphere to the peripheral, people migrate from the peripheral to the core countries. In addition, Massey *et al.* (1993) explain this movement in opposite directions with reference to the use of *land, the extraction of raw materials, labour, material links, ideological links* and the composure of *global cities*.

Massey *et al.* (1993: 445) describe *land* as one of the main elements sustaining the world systems theory. Once established in the periphery countries, capitalist farmers strengthen their landholding and introduce mechanised production, cash crops and industrially produced inputs such as fertilisers or insecticides. Traditional land production is destroyed because individual ownership displaces community ownership existing in periphery countries before the arrival of capitalist farmers. The peasant farmers become redundant particularly because of the mechanisation of farming introduced by capitalist property owners. Peasant farmers thus find themselves excluded from the local market network and are consequently driven out of their own country to become a displaced labour force.

According to Massey *et al.* (1993: 445), supplying the core region with *raw materials* has always been one of the reasons for the expansion of capitalism across the world. A *paid labour force* is the driving force behind the extraction of raw materials, especially in the peripheral regions, to be sold on the international market. Furthermore, factories established in the peripheral regions have pushed peasant farmers to abandon their traditional social equilibrium, a loss aggravated by the recruitment of more women. Women have become the main providers in many households, but traditional crafts and home industries cannot compete with the capitalist factories. Therefore, in periphery regions, thousands of people have been turned into potential migrants because they have lost their traditional identities and places in their communities.

Massey *et al.* (1994: 446) also consider *material links* to explain the causes of migration through world systems theory. Multinational companies and neo-colonial governments have developed material links in communication and transportation in

order to send the results of their investments in the peripheral regions to the core countries. These material links not only facilitate the transportation of goods, information or capital; but also favour the flow of people between the two regions, especially from the peripheral regions to the core regions. The development of communication and transportation structures has made people-mobility easier in terms of distances and costs.

Others elements, according to Massey *et al.* (1994: 446), that explain migration through world systems theory are *ideological links*. The legacy of colonialism has established close ties between the former colonial powers and the former colonies. The cultural links forged through language, educational systems and lifestyle have reinforced ideological links from the core countries to the periphery regions. Potential migrants have been lured by the lifestyle portrayed by the mass media from the more technologically advanced regions, particularly Western countries.

Finally, the last point of world system theory that Massey *et al.* (1993: 447) focus on is the structure of *global cities*. The interconnected world ruled by globalisation is managed by a small number of major cities linked by banking, finances, services and high-technology inputs. These global cities are characterised by the high profile of the labour force whose wealth and education are the main features. This high-class labour force manifests the need for unskilled workers to be domestic servants, waiters or drivers. Global cities are also major attractions for potential migrants.

### **3.4 Theories on the perpetuation of migration**

Once established, whatever the reasons that motivate it, the movements of people are perpetuated over time through migrant networks forged between sending and receiving regions, the participation of international organisations and the migration system.

#### **3.4.1 Social network theory**

Bourdieu has put capital at the core of his theoretical approach (Bourdieu & Wuthnow, 1991: 511-512). He points out that the economic, symbolic, social and cultural resources define the place of individuals in the social strata and that individuals use these forms of capital to enhance or perpetuate their positions in the social

classification. Social capital is therefore viewed as positions and relations that individuals have within different groups or social networks. Portes and Sensenbrenner describe the application of social capital to the sociology of migration through “bounded solidarity” and “enforceable trust”. They state that

...the former refers to principled group behavior that emerges specifically from the situational circumstances in which immigrants may find themselves in host societies. It is independent of earlier shared values. The latter refers to the ability of group goals to govern economic behavior based on expectations of higher community status and the fear of collective sanctions” (Heisler, 2000: 83).

However, according to Massey *et al.* (1993: 447) “migrants’ networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin.” A social network presents nodes and links that facilitate flows and enhance migration movements thus reducing cost and risk for other potential moves. For first arrivals, migration is necessarily costly because they have no social ties to rely on. However, as the number of migrants increases, a social network provides useful information and enables further moves and settlement. Sometimes the network is expanded to every location where the same community’s migrants have settled and every group will then be aware of what is happening elsewhere. Potential migrants can thus maximise their job opportunities by choosing lower risks areas and migration becomes a reliable and secure source of income. A social network increases the probability of migration followed by additional movements and an expanding network, and so forth.

### **3.4.2 Institutional theory**

Institutional theory points out the role played by private institutions and voluntary organisations in the perpetuation of migration. In many receiving regions, imbalances are created by the discrepancies between the number of people who want to gain entry into the country of destination and the small number of visas and permits allowed by the policies implemented to curb the flow of migrants into the country. As a consequence,

a migration industry emerges, consisting of recruitment organisations, lawyers, agents, smugglers and other middle-people. Such people can be both helpers and exploiters of migrants. Especially in situations of illegal migration or of oversupply of potential migrants, the exploitative role may predominate” (Castels & Miller, 1998: 26).

Private and voluntary organisations extend their role by providing help to those migrants who are marginalised because they lack legal status. Their assistance ranges from social services, counseling, obtaining of legal documentation, transport, or labour contracts. According to Britz (2002: 43), these organisations “help perpetuate migration in face of government attempts to limit the flow of migrants”.

### **3.4.3 Cumulative causation**

Myrdal (1957: 27) points out the inequalities between regions. He sees migration as an evolutionary process which takes place from disadvantaged economic regions to “the lucky regions”. In addition, according to Massey *et al.* (1993: 451), “causation is cumulative in that each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely.” The authors point out six socioeconomic factors - *the distribution of income, the distribution of land, the organisation of agrarian production, the culture of migration, the regional distribution of human capital and social labeling* – that perpetuate migration as far as cumulative causation is concerned.

Massey *et al.* (1993: 451) identify *the distribution of income* as one explanation for the perpetuation of migration because before being involved in the migration patterns, a specific community witnesses disequilibrium in household incomes, which may be low because the subsistence level or the standard of living is similar. Once one or more members of a household migrate and send part of their income back home, the remittances increase the income of the household. The concerned household will move up the social strata. As a result, more households will encourage members to migrate to enable them to move up from the low level of the local income hierarchy. The level of income of the entire community will be at the same level again once

many households reach a certain level of social life because of the migrants' earnings. However, more departures will be needed to sustain the level of income.

Massey *et al.* (1993: 452) also emphasise *the distribution of land* in their analysis of the perpetuation of migration according to the cumulative causation theory. The theory focuses on non-migrants who acquire land for agricultural reasons on the one hand, and on migrants who in many cases buy in their regions of origin for its prestige value or for a future use, on the other. The more migrants use their higher earnings to buy farmland, the more land they withdraw from local peasants. Thus, more local peasants will wish to migrate with the intention to acquire higher earnings and to become landowners.

Another socioeconomic factor of cumulative causation mentioned by Massey *et al.* (1993: 452) is *the organisation of agrarian production*. Migrant landowners who would like to farm their land are likely to use more capital-intensive methods such as machinery, herbicides, fertilisers and improved seeds because they will be able to afford them with their financial resources. Local labourers are however still using traditional techniques due to the lack of financial resources. The number of people willing to migrate consequently increases with the intensification of the mechanisation of agriculture.

The fourth socioeconomic factor of cumulative causation pointed out by Massey *et al.* (1993: 452) is *the culture of migration*. Initially people migrate for a short period in order to satisfy specific needs and to achieve specific aims. However, their perceptions change once they are in host regions because of difficulties encountered and achievements. "Once someone has migrated, therefore, he or she is very likely to migrate again, and the odds of taking an additional trip rise with the number of trips already taken" (Massey *et al.*, 1993: 452). Moreover, over the years, in the sending regions, migration becomes part of the values of the community. This will lead to further departures.

The *regional distribution of human capital* concerns the quality of migrants. Initially, migration is selective because it involves at least well-educated, skilled, productive and highly motivated people. Massey *et al.* (1993: 452) also posit that the departure of

these quality migrants is an economic gain for the receiving regions, while it is a loss for the sending ones. Consequently, further movements of departure from the sending regions are expected as economic stagnation is observed. Moreover, the spread and the rise of education in the sending regions causes the perpetuation of migration because, over time, well-educated, skilled, productive and highly motivated generations will emerge who would want to satisfy their ambitions elsewhere.

Lastly, Massey *et al.* (1993: 453) identify *social labeling* a socioeconomic factor that expresses the way native citizens consider the nature of jobs. Some jobs in receiving regions are labelled as migrants' jobs because many migrants are recruited for specific jobs and for a specific period of time. However, once this period is over, the jobs are still seen as migrants' jobs by local citizens. The social definition of work is thus changed due to migration.

#### **3.4.4 Migration system**

Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) lay emphasis on the components of migrants between two or a group of countries. Although the movements are happening in all the directions, it is likely the countries with higher wages and better welfare conditions mostly attract migrants; while countries with lower wages and poorer welfare conditions are the sending ones. Kritz and Zlotnik also put a particular accent on space and time in the determination of an international migration system. Indeed, historical relationships between two or a group of countries set up structural conditions which determine the flows within a system. Besides, the evolution of political and economic spaces affects "the supply of and demand for migrants" (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992: 4).

Massey *et al.* (1993: 454) offer some hypotheses and propositions about a migration system:

1. Countries within a system need not to be geographically close since flows reflect political and economic relationships rather than physical ones. Although proximity obviously facilitates the formation of exchange relationships, it does not guarantee them nor does distance preclude them.
2. Multipolar systems are possible, whereby a set of dispersed core countries receive immigrants from a set of overlapping sending nations.



3. Nations may belong to more than one migration system, but multiple membership is more common among sending than receiving nations.
4. As political and economic conditions change, systems evolve, so that stability does not imply a fixed structure. Countries may join or drop out of a system in response to social change, economic fluctuations, or political upheavals.

### **3.5 Research design and methodology**

The following section provides the research design and methodology followed for this study because, as stated by Franckfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996: 15), methodology is “a system of explicit rules and procedures upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge are evaluated.” Methodology therefore tends to play a triple role. Firstly, it is a replication because it is conducted in the same way by other scientists and researchers in order to avoid unnecessary mistakes. Secondly, methodology uses logical interpretation to present reliable inferences from actual observations. Finally, methodology looks at intersubjectivity for the sharing of information within the scientific community. The methodological process, however, can be conducted only after a clear research design, such as this appendix features, including data collection, data analysis and the problems encountered.

#### **3.5.1 The research design**

Studying Francophone African migration to South Africa was primarily conducted as empirical research based on existing studies on migration (as I shall demonstrate in the literature review) in South Africa, on the continent and worldwide. Considered as “the blueprint that enables the investigator to come up with solutions to the problems and guides him or her in the various stages of the research” (Franckfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 99), the research design on the migration of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town intended to verify four components. Firstly, the research process was designed to compare whether the arrivals of Francophone Africans in South Africa in general and Cape Town in particular (viewed as the independent variable) are related to the streams of Francophone African migration from the continent to other parts of the world (considered as the dependent variable). Secondly, the research design was intended to evaluate the flows of Francophone Africans to South Africa as the consequences of both the demise of apartheid in South Africa and

the implementation of restrictive measures in traditional destinations such as France, Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire. Thirdly, the research was designed to attempt to understand further Francophone African arrivals in South Africa within the framework of South Africa, viewed as a new destination. Finally, the last component (generalisation) is intended to apply the findings on Francophone Africans in Cape Town to other communities within the country or elsewhere.

A combination of both quantitative and qualitative research was considered because they complement each other although there are some differences between the two. As pointed out by Patton (quoted by Nkai, 2003: 42), both quantitative and qualitative models can be combined for the study of one project. It is important that the two paradigms use systematic procedures for gaining new information. Neuman (2000: 122) states that, apart from different assumptions about social life and objectives, one of the major differences between qualitative and quantitative research is the nature of data. Qualitative research deals with "soft data", including words, sentences, photos, symbols and so forth, while quantitative research focuses on "hard data" which lies with numbers in particular. This leads to different research strategies and techniques of data collection. Qualitative research guides me towards the analysis and the interpretation of the reasons behind the departure of Francophone African migrants from their countries of origin and their choice of South Africa in general, and Cape Town in particular. Quantitative research oriented me towards the interpretation of economic and demographic data of the countries of origin of migrants to explain the reasons for their departure. It was also helpful in measuring and testing the hypothesis of the growth of the arrival in South Africa of African migrants in general and Francophone Africans in particular. The quantitative approach allowed the construction of an historical profile of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town. However, with reference to the present study, the researcher puts more emphasis on a qualitative approach for four main reasons among the five that Maxwell highlights (Nkai, 2003: 39). Firstly, a qualitative approach was useful to understand the course of events which push Francophone Africans to migrate; they gave their feelings about and perceptions of the events leading to their decision to leave. Secondly, the context within which the events took place had a major impact on the decision to migrate. Thirdly, through a qualitative model, the course of events could not be anticipated and explained prematurely. Finally, a qualitative approach allowed an understanding of

the context within which the events and actions took place. Qualitative work at the individual level described migrants' life histories from their sending countries to Cape Town. Qualitative methods facilitated the capturing of information about the migration process. In this regard, comparative analysis makes a distinction between information gathered from Francophone African migrants in Cape Town and their counterparts in Johannesburg, as well as from potential migrants outside South Africa.

With regard to the qualitative approach, case studies were considered as one of the strategies used to understand the complexities of the different categories considered. Considered as being probably "the most flexible of all designs" (Hakim, 1987: 61), case studies are able to describe a social phenomenon clearly. The case studies were the examination of the migration life of each respondent, from the reasons explaining his/her departure from the country of origin to his/her settlement in Cape Town. The case studies gave flexibility and diversity, which explains the choice of both a single case and multiple cases. As shown by Hakim (1987: 63) "a single example often forms the basis for the researcher on a typical, deviant or critical cases", while "multiple case designs can be limited to two or three settings or extend to dozens of cases either to achieve replication of the same study in different settings or to compare and contrast different cases".

Hakim (1987) considers five types of case studies (individual case histories, community studies, case studies of social groups, case studies of organisations and institutions and case studies of events, roles and relationships). From the five types of case study, individual case histories is the type best suited to understand Francophone African migration to Cape Town. Individual case studies are set to "provide an enormously detailed and substantiated account of a person's history with reference to some specific personal characteristic or series of events they have experienced" (Hakim, 1987: 65). Furthermore, individual case studies offer detailed explorations of personal insight into experiences that could help the researcher to make a distinction between popular perceptions of the reasons causing the departure of migrants and their personal analysis of the situation. These popular perceptions could for instance be the general idea that French migrants come to South Africa solely because they are escaping from civil war or seeking better economic opportunities (Sichone, 2003:

131). These perceptions contrast with the reasons given by migrants themselves when they explain their departure, such as the language factor or the pursuit of their studies.

### **3.5.2 Interviews and focus groups**

42 in-depth interviews and four focus groups were conducted. After a review of available literature and media articles, a list of questions was developed in order to collect data orally. In-depth interviews have been chosen because they are free and non-directive and respondents are therefore able to supply more information. Focus group interviews were considered in order to obtain information from a group discussion because it reveals and clarifies a diversity of opinions. The researcher considered a smaller group of Francophone Africans in order to illuminate the dynamics of the Francophone African migration to Cape Town. The respondents were therefore found through the snowball technique, whereby interviewees are located by an interconnected web of linkages.

Interviews were conducted in Cape Town, Johannesburg and in Libreville in Gabon. The interview schedule containing a number of broad questions on migration causes and consequences was piloted. This is an example of the structure of the interviews conducted in Cape Town:

- **Place and date where the interview takes place**

#### **Presentation of the interviewee**

- First and surname
- Occupation
- Nationality
- Age (facultative)
- Marital status

#### **1. Background of the interviewee**

- Educational and professional formation
- Professional experience
- Social situation back home

## **2. Before leaving**

- Perspectives
- In which other places (countries especially, had you been and for how long before coming to South Africa)?
- The motivations for leaving
- Did you have other alternatives than leaving?
- When exactly did you decide to leave?
- What was your opinion about migration before leaving your country?
- What were your familial and surrounding influences in your move?
- What kind of help did you get from your family and friends?
- What were the criteria of the choice of the country of destination?
- What was your knowledge on the country of destination?
- What did you know about South Africa?
- Where did you get your information about South Africa?
- How many languages could you speak?
- For how long did you plan to spend away?

## **3. The migration route**

- Did you use some networks to make things easier for you?
- How did you leave (car, plane, boat, train or walk)?
- How did you get required travel documents (passport, visa, permit etc)?
- Was it difficult to get the required documents from the South African Embassy in your country (for non-extra-legal migrants)?
- How did you enter into South Africa without required documents and without been caught by the police (for extra-legal migrants)?
- Did you know exactly where you were going?
- Free talk about the migration route, from his/her place up to Cape Town (with some interruptions to clarify if necessary, with some issues like controls on borders of every country crossed)
- Did you come to South Africa because you could not go to Europe or America?
- What was special about the choice of South Africa and Cape Town?

- In which other cities and towns had you been before moving to Cape Town and for how long did you stay there?
- What was your main reason of moving to Cape Town?
- Arrival in Cape Town and settlement.

#### **4. Life in Cape Town**

- The current position (job, study, accommodation and the price of the rent, family, etc.).
- What is your impression of Cape Town about: the cost of life, public services, availability of decent jobs, business opportunities, treatment by employers, by customers, violence, health care, xenophobia, freedom and democracy, police harassment, etc?
- How much approximately do you earn monthly?
- What are your first priorities?
- And then, what do you do with the rest of money?
- Are conditions in Cape Town like you expected?
- Has your condition dropped or improved since you came to Cape Town?
- How and for how long did you learn English?
- How can you evaluate your level in English now?
- Apart from English, do you speak any South African language?
- What is the situation of a new Francophone African migrant in Cape Town who does not know English very well?
- What are the advantages and the disadvantages of being a Francophone African in Cape Town?
- Does a Francophone African community exist in Cape Town? If yes, what are their characteristics? If no, what is missing regarding the implementation of such a community?
- Do French reinforce relations between Francophone Africans despite coming from different countries?
- In your communities, is French mostly used as the main language?
- Are Francophone African migrants different from others?
- Are religious brotherhoods (like Mourides for Senegalese Muslims) or countrymen associations stronger regarding people relations than French?

- Have you already achieved your expectations in Cape Town?
- If no, what do you think still to do and for how long?
- Do you send money back home?
- What advice will you give a fellow countryman or another African who would like to come to South Africa in general and in Cape Town in particular?
- What is your opinion on xenophobia in South Africa?
- Do you think the position of South African politicians (about NEPAD, African Renaissance and African Union, etc) is reflected by the behaviour of the population towards African migrants?
- As a foreigner, do you see yourself in South Africa as an invader, a businessman, an African brother who has brought something (what?) or someone who is taking advantage of South African opportunities?
- What is your comment about some stereotypes of foreigners, such as Nigerians as being linked with illegal activities like drug, Congolese to prostitution, etc?
- What are your futures plans (futures destinations and the reasons)?

**Table 1: Composition of interviews**

	<b>Cape Town</b>	<b>Johannesburg</b>	<b>Libreville (Gabon)</b>
<b>Legal migrants</b>	<b>6 (2 women)</b>	<b>3 (1 woman)</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Students</b>	<b>6 (2 women)</b>	<b>3 (2 women)</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Refugees</b>	<b>6 (2 women)</b>	<b>3 (1 woman)</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Extra-legals</b>	<b>6 (2 women)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

The interviews were done in English and French, and the gender, age and class of the interviewees were considered. The interviews were recorded on audiotape after obtaining permission from the interviewees. The conventions indicating hesitations, silences, emphases and overlaps provide a method for interpreting data and identifying structure and patterns in it. The interviews were transcribed and the resulting texts were analysed. In addition, extensive notes were taken during the interviewing process.

Four focus groups were formed (three in Cape Town and one in Johannesburg). Most of the focus groups were held in Cape Town. The focus groups were organized according to two major characteristics. The first aim was to gather information from Francophone African migrants' experience in some others countries before their arrival in South Africa. Lastly, the objective of the focus groups was to understand similarities and differences of various experiences of migrants collectively, besides the information gathered from individual interviews. These major characterisations of focus groups were useful to generate new ideas for the four hypotheses considered at the beginning of this study as highlighted in the conclusion of Chapter 2. The questions addressed in the focus groups were related to the three main questions of this study: the motivations for migrants to leave their countries, their choice of South Africa and their arrival in Cape Town.

The four focus groups were structured as follows:

**Table 2: Cape Town Focus group 1**

<b>Participants</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Category of migrant</b>	<b>Country of origin</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Legal migrant</b>	<b>Cameroon</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Refugee</b>	<b>DRC</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Woman</b>	<b>Student</b>	<b>Congo</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Extra-legal</b>	<b>DRC</b>

**Table 3: Cape Town Focus group 2**

<b>Participants</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Category of migrant</b>	<b>Country of origin</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Woman</b>	<b>Refugee</b>	<b>Rwanda</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Woman</b>	<b>Student</b>	<b>Gabon</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Refugee</b>	<b>Burundi</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Legal migrant</b>	<b>Cote d'Ivoire</b>



**Table 4: Cape Town Focus group 3**

<b>Participants</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Category of migrant</b>	<b>Country of origin</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Student</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Legal migrant</b>	<b>Senegal</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Refugee</b>	<b>DRC</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Extra-legal</b>	<b>Congo</b>

**Table 5: Johannesburg Focus group**

<b>Participants</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Category of migrant</b>	<b>Country of origin</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Legal migrant</b>	<b>Morocco</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Student</b>	<b>Cameroon</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Man</b>	<b>Extra-legal</b>	<b>DRC</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Woman</b>	<b>Refugee</b>	<b>DRC</b>

Lastly a simple observation of Francophone African migrants, particularly Congolese refugees was conducted in Muizenberg for a short period of time. The simple observation was aimed on the one hand to assess migrants' proficiency in English, Afrikaans and isiXhosa and their aptitudes to communicate with the local populations. On the other hand, the simple observation of Congolese refugees was intended to look at the degree of integration of those migrants into the local community as far as their economic activities were concerned.

### **3.5.3 Data analysis**

The analysis of data gathered depends on the type of research. Qualitative and quantitative data analyses have similarities and differences as shown by Neuman (2000: 418-419). Four similarities relate the two forms of data analysis. Firstly, inference guides the researcher to scrutinise the information gathered, expecting to reach a conclusion by reasoning and simplifying the density of the data. Secondly, the methods of data gathering used by researchers make the data available to a large number of people. Thirdly, data analysis in both forms gives prominence to the

comparison of all data gathered. Lastly, the researcher aims to avoid errors or false conclusions. Four methods of data analysis differentiate quantitative and qualitative forms. Firstly, “qualitative research is often inductive” (Neuman, 2000: 418), which allows researchers to discover specific data when the process of gathering evolves, while quantitative analysis is highly developed around standardised data. Secondly, the analysis of quantitative data is possible once the whole process of gathering is done, which is quite different from qualitative forms of analysis, which can be guided in unanticipated directions in the early data collection process. Thirdly, qualitative analysis can lead to the construction of new concepts by verifying the interpretation or the generalisation of a theory. In contrast, quantitative analysis “manipulates numbers that represent empirical facts in order to test an abstract hypothesis with variable constructs” (Neuman, 2000: 418). Fourthly, qualitative analysis is less abstract than statistical analysis and closer to raw data.

Tech’s methods of handling qualitative data were used to transcribe both focus groups and interviews. Eight steps were followed that Creswell (1994: 155) describes as follows:

- (a) reading through all the transcripts carefully with a purpose of getting a general sense of the whole and underlying meaning of the transcripts;
- (b) picking a single shortest or most interesting transcript and going through it once again;
- (c) making a list of topics or clusters to get similar topics;
- (d) going back to original data and abbreviating the topics as quotes and writing quotes next to the appropriate segments of the text;
- (e) developing the most descriptive wording for the topics and converted them into categories by grouping related topics;
- (f) making final decisions on abbreviations for each category and alphabetising existing data;
- (g) assembling the data material belonging to each category in one place and performing a preliminary analysis; and
- (h) recoding the existing data.

### **3.6 Limitations of the study and difficulties encountered**

Although all efforts have been made to make this study descriptively defensible, like many other scientific research studies it suffers from a number of weaknesses.

First, the study uses statistical data from the 1996 and 2001 censuses in order to draw up a representative population of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town. It does not, however, cover the total population during the decade that the study is focused on (1994-2004). The study also suffers from a lack of reliable sources for data to give an insight into all categories considered, particularly refugees and extra-legals.

Second, the fieldwork undertaken outside South Africa is limited to Libreville in Gabon. The aim of conducting research outside South Africa was to gather the potential migrants' perceptions on the reasons for leaving their countries of origin and their idea of South Africa, while still outside the country. Gabon was chosen because it is one of the traditional destinations of Francophone Africans on the continent, as is Cote d'Ivoire. Fieldwork conducted in the latter country might have given more scope and comparative aspects. However, this choice could be justified by the problems encountered during this study.

Another difficulty was the time spent on organising the interviews and focus groups due to the lack of trust that respondents felt towards the researcher. This was more perceptible for the category of extra-legals, who were not keen to be interviewed. The snowball technique and the fact the researcher himself is a French-speaking African helped to break the barrier of distrust.

Even though these limitations and difficulties could have had an adverse effect on the findings of this research, it is assumed that their effects are minimal and may not significantly influence the descriptive analysis of this study.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

The main purpose of this chapter was to show a synthesis of theoretical background of international migration based on the initiation and the perpetuation of migration; with an overview of the evolution of the theoretical analysis. This synthesis was mainly

based on the work done by Massey *et al.* (1993). The chapter also aimed to provide a group of theories which will be used to confirm hypothesis on the departure of Francophone Africans from their countries of origin to their arrival in South Africa in general and in Cape Town in particular; as well as the conditions of perpetuating these movements. The chapter also describes the methodology used to conduct this study. The research design hypothesises the arrivals of Francophone Africans in Cape Town as the outcome of the implementation of restrictive measures and policies in some of the traditional countries of destination as well as of the rise of South Africa's political and economic profile.

## **Chapter Four**

### **PUSH FACTORS IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA AND PULL FACTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The chapter is subdivided into two parts. In the first part, the reasons for the departure of Francophone Africans are highlighted. The reasons motivating the flows of people are complex and could range from economic to environmental ones. Solomon (2001: 76) gives a revised version of the variables stated by Adepaju (2005) to explain the causes of migration in West Africa and adds socio-cultural factors, geographic proximity, precedent and global economic political economy to explain the migration system in the Southern African region. These variables inform the analysis in this chapter of the push and pull factors that influence migration from Francophone African countries. In its second part, the chapter focuses on the reasons why Francophone African migrants choose to move to South Africa. Firstly, the analysis pays particular attention to the place South Africa occupies on the continent. Secondly, this section considers South African political achievements, economic opportunities, educational infrastructures and the language factor as the reasons that migrants note as motivating their choice of South Africa as host country. Along with these South African pull factors, this section also reflects on social capital as one of the main factors in migrants' choice of South Africa. The research method used in this chapter draws on a wide range of secondary resources on push and pull factors, on the theoretical orientation discussed in Chapter 3 as well as the empirical interview material gathered during the fieldwork. These three sources have guided analysis.

#### **4.2 The reasons for leaving their countries of origin**

Generally, migration is viewed as a desperate solution to the deterioration of living conditions, including political, economic, social and environmental conditions (Solomon, 2001: 76). This section, based on the theoretical models that explain the movements of people and the results of the fieldwork, highlights the reasons why Francophone Africans leave their countries of origin by the thousands. It furthermore

aims to describe the political, economic and demographic settings, as well as the social-cultural context and environmental conditions of these departures.

#### **4.2.1 Political settings**

##### **4.2.1.1 Historical evolution of Francophone African politics**

If there is a group of countries that continues to feel the pressures of the legacy of colonisation, it is the Francophone African countries. According to Meredith (2005: 493), “the Francophone states in Africa constituted the only region in the world where France retained enough influence to support its claims to medium-power status.” The post-colonial era in Francophone Africa was symbolically a continuum of the colonial state. All Francophone African countries earned their independence peacefully and with the former ruler’s blessing, with the exception of Algeria, which became independent after eight dramatic years of civil war, and to a lesser extent Guinea, which refused to be part of the *Communauté* (a new political and administrative colonial organisation proposed by France to its colonies in 1958).

Chazan *et al.* (1999: 42) argue that the functional notion of government could not separate decision-making from the implementation of those decisions. These failings in governing capacities are rooted in the years preceding and following independence. African societies were unable to muster a strong opposition to France’s intention to choose the leaders of the newly independent countries. One could argue that at independence, African countries lacked a well-educated political elite due to the colonial academic system. Many of the new African leaders at independence were part of the French colonial political and administrative organisation during the colonial era. The most prestigious were the Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Ivorian Félix Houphouët-Boigny who were ministers in the French government before the independence of most Francophone African countries in 1960 (Meredith, 2005: 58). Meredith (2005: 70) also argues that the newly independent states survived due to French assistance, including financial and technical support, presidential aides, military advisers and government servants.

In return, France jealously preserved its control and influence over its former colonies from potential Western and Communist rivals in the context of the Cold War. Francophone Africa constituted France’s *domaine réservé* (natural preserve) or *chasse*

*gardée* (private hunting ground) (Schraeder, 2000: 321). Within that sphere of influence, France set up a core of countries, called *le pré-carré* according to their economic importance and the charisma of their leaders to police its policy, guided by economic interests on the continent. The leaders of these countries and their successors were guaranteed long term-term reigns, regardless of their political achievements and their democratic records as long as they looked after France's interests. One illustration of France's paternalism in regard to its former colonies is the former Metropolis's military intervention in Gabon to restore to power President Leon M'Ba, victim of a *coup d'état* in 1964 (Meredith, 2005: 177).

France's paternalism worsened the political situation in Francophone Africa due to two factors: the setting up of autocratic regimes and the involvement of the military in the political scene. The support of autocratic regimes was symbolised by the adoption of a single-party political system in most Francophone African countries. In the late 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, a single-party system spread over the continent, for example (Chazan *et al.*, 1999: 503): National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria; Cameroonian People's Democratic Union (RDPC) in Cameroon; Congolese Workers Party (PCT) in Congo; Popular Movement of Revolution (MPR) in Zaire; Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire-African Democratic Union (PDCI-RDA) in Cote d'Ivoire or Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) in Gabon. Schraeder (2000: 269-270) points to the reasons for the creation of a single-party system in Africa: a single party was seen as the representation of African political organisation during the pre-colonisation era. Within it, the African traditional consensus building allowed each individual to express his/her opinion. The creation of a single-party system was justified by the need for an "enlightened elite" as the driving force to lead African societies towards a communist development. Furthermore, a single-party system was viewed as the ideal solution to end ethnic conflicts that emerged on the continent soon after independence. For the Gabonese president, Omar Bongo, the multi-party system weakened national unity and countries became vulnerable to external covetousness (Rossantaga-Rignault, 200: 124).

The African political scene was also characterised by the seizure of power by "leaders in khaki". The murder of the first Togolese president, Sylvanus Olympio, by a fringe of the army led by Etienne Eyadema (who later became known as General

Gnassingbé Eyadema) in 1963 launched an endless outbreak of both successful and unsuccessful *coup d'états* in Francophone Africa. Schraeder (2000: 246) shows that by 1999 Djibouti was the sole Francophone African country which had not experienced an attempt of seizure or a full seizure of power by the army. Some countries such as Benin and Burkina Faso had a record of six successful armed challenges of power before the democratic changes at the beginning of the 1990s. The assumption of power by “men in khaki” was made possible by the incapacity of politicians to handle ethnic crises that emerged soon after independence. The army’s break into the political arena was accompanied by the promise to return power to civilians once the crises were solved. However, in most cases, soldiers did not keep their promises, as Mobutu did in the then Congo-Leopoldville in 1965 (Meredith, 2005: 115). Later, *coup-d'états* were justified as the solution to overthrow despotic regimes. One could argue that it was likely to be considered that change could not only be brought by guns. The army has always represented a permanent threat to civilian leaders because “military intervention is not a habit that men with guns will find easy to abandon” (Solomon, 2001: 101). Once in power, most of the leaders consolidated their regimes under a single-party system like in Congo, Zaire, Mali and Burkina-Faso.

The evolution of political regimes under a single party led by a civilian or a soldier failed to promote diversification of points of view. When elections were organised, it was mainly to confirm the incumbent leader and his ruling party in power. Francophone African political conservatism was characterised by long reigns of presidents like Houphouët-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire, Eyadema in Togo, Bongo in Gabon and Mobutu in Zaire, who were pillars of the French *pré-carré* (backyard) on the continent. Opposition parties were illegal, except in Senegal and in Mauritius.

The single-party system reached its nadir at the end of 1980s, considered as the “lost decade” (Meredith, 2005: ), when many Africans preferred to exile in order to escape death or jail, as they dared to express opinions than opposed the official discourse of the dictatorial regimes in power. Gordon<sup>10</sup>, (quoted by Schraeder, 2000: 224) argues that one of the causes of emigration in Africa from the 1970s was political

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<sup>10</sup> Gordon, A. 1998. “The New Diaspora: African Immigration to the United States”. *Journal of Third World Studies* 15, n 1: 79-103.



persecution. Emigration was synonymous with an “exit option”, by which Gordon (2000: 224) meant “the difference between freedom and prison and even life and death”.

The end of Cold War brought hope for democratic reforms in Francophone Africa. Changes in Eastern Europe had a significant effect on public opinion and were followed by strikes in most Francophone African countries asking for political reforms. These political reforms were put into effect following the famous discourse of La Baule by French President François Mitterrand in June 1990. During the annual Franco-African summit, the French president launched the famous *La Doctrine de La Baule* (The Baule Doctrine) (Schraeder, 2000: 328) when he said:

French eagerness to offer development aid is bound to cool off in the case of authoritarian regimes which fail to heed the need for democratisation while regimes prepared to embark on the courageous path of democracy will continue to have our enthusiastic support (Meredith, 2005: 387).

Mitterrand warned African leaders that France’s aid would be directed to those who were engaged in political reforms towards the implementation real democracy. Political changes and democratic reforms subsequently did occur on the continent. In Francophone Africa, the path of democracy started with the organisation of national conferences where national business, professional, religious, labour, and particularly political representatives gathered to draw up new mechanisms for political life. The national conferences were organised following the example of the *Etats-Généraux* in France during the *Ancien Regime*.<sup>11</sup> The single-party system in Francophone Africa was perceived as the French absolute monarchy, responsible for the stagnation of the society. Like the French *Etats-Généraux*, participants viewed the national conferences in Francophone Africa as a way to a new beginning.

Schraeder (2000: 275) outlines the major pillars of these meetings in Francophone Africa. The meetings were held in the capital of each country, the place that

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<sup>11</sup> During the Ancient Regime in France, the *Etats Généraux* were political meetings during which new ideas were proposed to the king to rule. These meetings were not held to question the king’s ruling or reign. On the contrary, at the end of the meeting, the king was granted a new legitimacy (Rossantaga-Rignault, 2000: 192).

symbolised the political and administrative power of the country. The meetings were granted the feature of sovereignty, in the sense that they were independent from external influence. In some cases like in Zaire, the adjective “sovereign” was added to the title of the meeting, which became the sovereign national conference. At the end of these meetings, a government was appointed and mandated to implement the decisions taken. The national conferences appeared to be legislative bodies in charge of elaborating a new constitution. In Gabon, for instance, five principal resolutions concluded the meeting: (1) the full and immediate adoption of multiparty-system, (2) the formation of a transitional government, (3) the organisation of parliamentary elections, (4) the adoption of a Charter of freedom and of a financial, economic and social programme and (5) the administrative and political re-organisation of the state. Finally, a committee was set up to follow the conclusions of the national conference (Rossantaga-Rignault, 2000: 191).

From 19 to 28 February 1990, Benin organised the first national conference in Francophone Africa. At the beginning of the conference, delegates proclaimed the meeting sovereign and called for the creation of transitional institutions. Civil society was one of the major beneficiaries of the meeting, as it was incorporated within political, economic and social structures for the first time in the history of the country (Joseph, 1999: 23). The success of the Benin meeting, which was concluded by the adoption of democratic reforms known as *renouveau démocratique* (democratic revival), stimulated the other Francophone African countries. Overall, the national conferences in Francophone Africa played a double role as argued by Rossantaga-Rignault (2000: 193). On the one hand, they freed the populations from the fear imposed during dictatorial reign. On the other hand, the national conferences were used as a platform for the participants to negotiate their roles and places in the new political structures. In the latter case, the Benin example was also used by other regimes to consolidate power in a multipartite system. In Zaire, for instance, the national conference lasted more than two years because President Mobutu found it difficult to accept the recommendations of the meeting, which was supposed to be sovereign. A political rift appeared between him and the prime minister elected by the sovereign national conference. Etienne Tshisekedi was also Mobutu’s fierce opponent. A Zairian politician described Mobutu’s attitude towards political change as follows (Meredith, 2005: 392):

He loves power ... He can't see himself sharing the power with somebody that he doesn't nominate. His conception hasn't changed since democracy arrived. Mobutu explains himself very easily: one chief governs ... He doesn't consult. But people like him never believe that they take wrong decisions. Mobutu is a man who is very influenced but he has his opinions. The last word is always his.

It is true that the national conference was a turning point in the implementation of democracy in Francophone Africa. Since then, tremendous achievements have been witnessed, illustrated by *alternance* (changeover) of leaders and parties in some countries, with the more successful cases including Benin, Madagascar and Mali.

However, in most of the Francophone African countries, democracy has consolidated dictatorial regimes. Unfair elections have replaced *coup-d'états* and other means used during the one-party system to stay in power. Nowadays, it appears that the candidate in power in Francophone Africa cannot lose elections, except in a few countries, such as Benin and Mali. More than a decade after democracy was established in Francophone Africa, many leaders and parties who ruled during the one-party system are still in power, including Blaise Campaoré in Burkina Faso since 1987, Paul Biya in Cameroon since 1982, Omar Bongo in Gabon since 1967, Lansana Conté in Guinea since 1984 and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia since 1984. Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Congo has returned to power, following a civil war. Others died while they were still in charge, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 in Côte d'Ivoire after thirty-three years in power and the Togolese Gnassingbé Eyadema who led his country from 1967 to his death in 2005.

This leads to the lack of organisation of free and fair elections on a regular basis. When elections are held in most Francophone African countries, most of the parties and candidates do not have equal access to media, for instance. It is common in Francophone Africa that the losers accuse the winners (mostly the party in power) of cheating. The lack of free and fair elections also results in legislative assemblies where the ruling parties have an overwhelming majority. The opposition is sometimes represented by satellite parties controlled by the ruling party. Another feature of the

lack of free and fair elections is the failure to distinguish the ruling party from the state. It is not a surprise that the ruling party controls the institutions of the state, such as the judiciary, military and administrative institutions. This means that the ruling party controls its own actions, as was the case during the one-party system era.

#### **4.2.1.2 Some examples of armed conflicts in Francophone Africa**

The quest for political power has also resulted in wars in Francophone Africa. Armed conflicts are viewed as one of the main causes of the displacement of many Africans. Africa as a whole is considered a home for armed conflicts (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Joseph, 1999; Nugent, 2004; Schraeder, 2000). Even more than conflicts between states, civil wars have devastated the continent. Thirty-five civil wars were registered in Africa from 1960 to 2000, although some of those conflicts took place in the same countries, over time with some examples being the Biafra war in Nigeria, which killed approximately one million people, and the longest civil war on the continent in Sudan with its one million and half victims (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004: 141).

In general, civil wars on the continent are viewed as the last solution in the process of contested sovereignty when a group of people assert their authority over a part of the territory and challenge the central authority (Schraeder, 2000: 280). Francophone countries have also witnessed civil wars since their independence, for example in Chad, Congo, Senegal, Algeria, Central African Republic and Cote d'Ivoire. However, in the region of the Great Lakes, the most notorious conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and DRC have their roots back in the 1950s before escalating beyond imagination in the late 1990s. The conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are the ones detailed in this study because of the number of victims and migrants that they caused.

##### **4.2.1.2.1 Civil war in Burundi**

Conflicts in both Burundi and Rwanda have many similarities because of historical and social parallels between the two countries. Although Nugent (2004: 456) suggests "the passage of the events in Burundi ... had a dynamic of their own," the reality is that the two countries have so many similarities that the course of events cannot be separated. Both conflicts have their roots in the time before the independence of the two countries in 1962. The Ruanda-Urundi colony was first under the rule of

Germany before Belgium was put in charge to administer the colony by the League of Nations, following the defeat of Germany in the First World War and the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty. After the Second World War, Ruanda-Urundi acquired the status of United Nations Trust territory under the Belgian administrative authority. The societies of the two entities were and still are dominated by two major ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, which the colonial rulers, particularly the Belgians, had divided into two opposed ethnic and racial groups. To divide and rule, Belgians spread the so-called “Hamitic hypothesis” which states that the Tutsis were descendents of the Hamites and were superior to the Hutus (Nugent, 2004: 51). During the colonial period, Belgians gave the minority Tutsis access to education and chieftaincy. Colonisation effectively separated ethnic groups with the same language, the same culture and a common history forever. However, as shown by Nugent (2004: 113), there were some exceptions in Urundi because some Hutus were still able to infiltrate the chieftaincy hierarchy. Besides, two lineages, the Bezi and the Batare, were competing for the control of the chieftaincy.

The societies were further divided with the creation of political parties, which took the competition for power between the ethnic groups or lineages to another level. In Urundi, the Bezi lineage was linked with the nationalist *Parti de l'Union et le Progrès National* (Union and Progress National Party, UPRONA), while the Batare lineage was associated with the *Parti Démocratique Chrétien* (Christian Democratic Party, PDC). The UPRONA won the legislatures in 1961, but its leader, Prince Rwagasore, was assassinated after the victory. From that point, the country has witnessed reprisal and counter reprisal likely to be considered as boxing games, in which both Hutus and Tutsis have retaliated in massacres. The first series of killings in the post-independence era occurred in 1965 when a Hutu prime minister was killed. The Hutu revolt was answered by army repression, which was mainly dominated by Tutsis. The country entered into further turmoil during the 1960s and 1970s, especially in 1972, following a Hutu rebellion attack in the Tutsi region. In a space of three months, about 200 000 Hutus were killed in a reprisal and many more people, mostly Hutus were forced to leave the country (Meredith, 2005: 489). The Tutsi domination was consolidated by two consecutive military regimes of Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza and Major Pierre Buyoya. In 1993, the assassination of the elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, by the army plunged the country into a maelstrom of violence

which resulted in the killing of Tutsis and the reprisal of the army against the Hutu population. Sixty per cent of the 50 000 to 100 000 people killed were Tutsis, while some 500 000 refugees fled the country (Nugent, 2004: 458). In April 1994, the death of President Cyprien Ntaryamira was also a source of more ethnic conflicts, which were also influenced by the situation in neighbouring Rwanda.

#### **4.2.1.2.2 Genocide in Rwanda**

By sharing the same ethnic puzzle and having been ruled by the same colonial powers, Rwanda evolution seems similar to Burundi's. However, in Rwanda a major change introduced by the colonial power brought significant upheavals in the Rwandese society. The Belgians decided to redistribute cattle between the two ethnic communities, and as a result, a new social hierarchy determined by the possession of cattle appeared. Some Hutus took advantage of the situation and found themselves within a new social stratum. Later the introduction of political parties and subsequent elections as a mode of designation allowed the Hutus to overpower the Tutsis because of their numbers. Moreover, the last Tutsi King, Kigeri V, was overthrown in November 1959. A Tutsi attempt to kill Grégoire Kayibanda, the leader of *Mouvement Démocratique Républicain* (Republican Democratic Movement, MDR), the largest Hutu party, was followed by extraordinary massacres, which forced some 22 000 Tutsis to look for refuge elsewhere (Nugent, 2004:55). After independence in 1962, the Hutus consolidated their domination in the Rwandese political arena. Approximately 130 000 Tutsis had found refuge in Congo, Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda (Meredith, 2005: 487). Under Grégoire Kayibanda, the first president, a system of quotas was established for school and university places and in civil services; where the Tutsis were allocated a 9% take, the percentage supposed representing their proportion of the population (Meredith, 2005: 489).

According to Meredith (2005: 490), at the beginning of the 1990s, an economic crisis hit the country mainly due to drought, resulting in shortages in food production and a drop in coffee prices which had an impact on the farmers' incomes. Moreover, the government's budget decreased by 40% in 1989; at the same time the GDP of the country fell by 5.7%. The economic situation created a climate for new ethnic conflicts. The Kigali regime was contested through a civil war by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a group dominated by Tutsis. Some of them were living in exile

since the events of 1959. The situation was worsened by the shooting down of the airplane carrying both the Rwandese president, Juvénal Habyarimana, and his counterpart from Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, on 6 April 1994. As if it was a signal, the shooting down of the plane was viewed as a pretext for killing Tutsis and moderate Hutus. From 6 April to July 1994, more than 937 000 people were killed in what has been considered the cruelest genocide the African continent had ever witnessed. Moreover, the genocide in Rwanda has been viewed as “slaughter on a scale not witnessed since the Nazi extermination programme against the Jews” (Meredith, 2005: 487). The seizure of power by the RPF stopped the genocide. However, the aftermath was terrible.

In the space of 100 days some 800 000 people had been slaughtered ... More people had been killed more quickly than in any other mass killing in recorded history. ... The entire country had been laid to waste. Nearly two millions people inside the country were refugees, uprooted from their homes. According to the World Bank, the genocide had left Rwanda the poorest country on earth (Meredith, 2005: 523).

The genocide forced some 1.7 million people to find refuge outside the country, with one million in ex-Zaire, 550 000 in Tanzania, 160 000 in Burundi and 5 000 in Uganda, and approximately 1.2 million internal refugees (Appleyard, 1998: 193).

#### **4.2.1.2.3 The Congolese conflicts**

Turmoil has always accompanied the evolution of the DRC since the Belgian king appropriated the territory in the nineteenth century. Under the tutelage of King Leopold II, the Congo was one of the territories where colonial abuses reached a climax. However, colonisation made a vast territory approximately 80 times bigger than Belgium into a single geographical, administrative and political entity. The complexity of the Congo is first and foremost its geographical features. Nugent (2004: 85) points out that “the Western Congo faced towards the coastal port of Matadi and Leopoldville, on the lower reaches of the Congo River. The minerially rich regions of Kasai and Katanga were linked by rail to Zambia and South Africa.” The colonial enterprise of grouping into one territory different communities failed nearly as soon as independence was won. The country faced the temptation of the richest provinces of

Katanga and Shaba to secede, the mutiny of the army and the struggle of politicians to implement national unity (Laremont, 2005: 140). The unity of Congo was also shaken when another uprising broke out in the Kwilu District under the leadership of Pierre Mulele and contested the legitimacy of the central government in 1963. The next rebellion broke out when the FLNC (Front pour la Libération du Congo) invaded the province of Shaba twice, in March 1977 and a year later. The troops of the FLNC were mainly made up of former rebels behind the secession of the province of Katanga more than a decade earlier. Furthermore, the country was torn by two successive and identical civil wars, which have created more than two million victims and the displacement of more people both internally and beyond the Congolese borders.

For more than three decades, these civil wars and other attempts at rebellion were quelled by the dictatorial reign of Mobutu, who was backed by Western powers. However, ethnic resistance and regional minorities had never been shut down totally, especially in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the country where the movements were claiming to represent the inheritance of Patrice Lumumba, the country's first prime minister, assassinated on Mobutu's instructions in 1963.

When millions of Hutu refugees escaped from the Tutsi retaliation after the Rwandese genocide in 1994, *Interahamwe* militia groups also crossed the Zairian border. They were suspected of taking part in the genocide. Once in the refugee camps in Zaire, they continuously attacked the Zairian Tutsis, called Banyamulenge. Many of those groups of Banyamulenge were descendents of the Rwandese and Burundian Tutsis who found refuge in Zaire after the early pogroms in both Rwanda and Burundi before and after their independence. Mobutu was accused of supporting the *Interahamwe* because he did not attempt to prevent the attacks and he did not crack down on the establishment of a small Hutu state in refugee camps where the former soldiers of the Rwandan army set up their own administration and organised the recruitment and training programmes (Meredith, 2005: 527).

The Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan governments used security concerns at their respective borders to justify their support of rebel movements to topple the Mobutu regime, which led to what many like Weiss and Carayannis call the First Congo War



(Laremont, 2005: 147). The First Congo War started in November 1996, following the order given by the vice-governor of the province of the south-Kivu to all the Banyamulenge to leave Zaire on penalty of death (Meredith, 2005: 531). Many of the Banyamulenge joined various small rebel groups. Later all those groups formed the *Alliance des Forces de Liberation du Congo* (AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. From the eastern region of the country the rebels without interruption marched towards the capital Kinshasa, sometimes without fighting. The First Congo War ended in May 1997 when the AFDL entered into Kinshasa, the capital of the country, and its leader proclaimed himself the new president.

Soon after his seizure of power, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was suspected of ruling the country in the same way his predecessor had done, and among the evils he was criticised for were corruption and the lack of democratic reforms. Some of his allies, mostly those from the eastern part of the country, abandoned him. “In the short fifteen months between the end of the First Congo War and the start of the second, Kabila managed to antagonize the UN, Western donors, his domestic opposition, and his foreign sponsors” (Laremont, 2005: 150). Furthermore, Kabila started accusing his former Rwandese and Ugandan allies of exploiting for their own interests the immense Congolese mineral resources.

The Second Congo War started in August 1998 and ended in 2003 with the setting up of a transitional government, although sporadic tensions continued. On 2 August 1998, some of the best units of the Congolese army mutinied and launched a rebellion from the eastern part of the country, with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. A heterogeneous political wing of the rebellion was grouped under the RCD (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*, Congolese Rally for Democracy). However, Kabila received support from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan. Some of these countries intervened because of security at their own borders, for instance Angola, but most of them were attracted by Congolese mineral resources, expecting the Congolese government's reward.

The Congolese conflicts were also singular because of their consequences. Approximately three million people lost their lives in both the First and the Second Congolese Wars. Many victims died from disease or starvation. Millions of others

were forced to look for refuge elsewhere. The Congolese conflicts have also been characterised by the vast number of children used as soldiers. Its configuration also underpins the continued abuse of civil populations by militia groups despite cease-fires between their patrons. Thousands of civilians have been raped, left homeless, killed or have suffered from any number of crimes. The spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic by displaced persons and soldiers in particular throughout the entire Great Lakes region and even beyond is another feature of the Congolese conflict.

#### **4.2.1.3 The collapse of the Francophone African state**

The conditions that drive Francophone Africans from their countries create the feeling that the state is incapable of designing and implementing real policies for development. The populations thus lose confidence in the state as the driving force behind any form of development. The crisis of the African state is illustrated by a myriad of challenges, including the weakness of the economy, the lack of genuine democratic reforms and the pressure from international financial and economic organisations, as well as from the Western governments (Huxtable & Villalon, 1988: 279).

Huxtable & Villalon (1988: 11-13) broadly define the postcolonial African state as follows: Firstly, the African state is defined as a *client state* particularly in the context of the Cold War, which ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. During the Cold War period, the African client state was a major beneficiary of the superpowers' military rivalry, which allowed the African states to conduct to major armed conflicts in the 1990s in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC, for instance.

The second type of postcolonial African state is the *personalised state*, based on the centralisation and the paternalism of the head of the state. In the personalised state, the concept of state itself is closely tied to one individual. Consequently, a generational debate limits the state's performances, with permanent pressures asking for the modernisation of both the state and the party in the case of a one-party regime. Although the phenomenon was not only encountered in Africa, the authors believe that it was widely implemented throughout the continent, with some notorious examples such as the Zaire of Mobutu Sese Seko, the Togo of Gnassingbe Eyadema,

the Cote d'Ivoire of Felix Houphouet-Boigny and the Gabon of Omar Bongo. Lancine Sylla (Huxtable & Villalon, 1988: 12) describes the succession of the charismatic leader as the "Gordian knot of African politics."

Thirdly, the postcolonial African state as the consequence of the second feature was labelled as both an *overdeveloped* and a *centralised state*. One of the characteristics of the personalised state was to gain political support from as many crucial social sectors as possible. The public sector of the African state following independence was the major employer in most of the countries. The number of employees in the public sector increased dramatically and unnecessarily, with greater centralisation of power and almost no local government responsibility, resources or power. The highly inefficient state therefore becomes the primary consumer of resources to the detriment of economic development. Overcrowded administrations were among the focal points targeted by the SAPs imposed by the IMF on the African states.

Fourthly, the postcolonial African state was regarded as a *prebendal* or *rentier state*. Many leaders in Africa, in order to consolidate their power, have not hesitated to allocate specific groups of individuals some material privileges, with a direct access to the state. This has created clientelist networks within which "the very exercise of state power inhibits economic growth, and thus the state eventually undercuts the very basis of its own survival" (Huxtable & Villalon, 1988: 13).

Lastly, some postcolonial African states have been considered *extractive states*. The main function of the state has been to extract mineral resources and other forms of wealth for the profit of those in power, instead of building developmental capacity for the benefit of the state and the population. Moreover, the fluctuations of the mineral and agricultural products on the international market have hastened the disintegration of the state.

Chabal and Daloz (1999: 5) focus on the Weberian tradition in sociology in their interpretation of the state. They summarise the analysis by pointing out that the modern state is the consequence of the process of emancipation from society to an autonomous entity with genuine political institutions. An efficient state will successfully implement and run a civil service unimpeded by the dynamics of social

pressures. The debate on the postcolonial African states has been on the sustained legacy of colonisation. Following independence, the African state was the transplantation of the colonial state. Chabal and Daloz add neglect of culture as one of the failures of the African state. Indeed, the postcolonial Francophone African state inherited aspects of the colonial state, such as centralization, and it has effectively been put in place as a rigid institution, which has represented a major hurdle for development.

The Francophone African state has been weak and has failed or collapsed over time because they have been incapable of fulfilling their required functions. As a political institution, a state has three main functions, as pointed out by Zartman (1995: 5):

- (1) The state as the sovereign authority, the accepted source of identity and the arena of politics;
- (2) the state as an institution - and therefore a tangible organization of decision making and an intangible symbol of identity; and
- (3) the state as the security guarantor for a populated territory.

Apart from these traditional functions, the state also supplies other services including medical and health care, education and infrastructure such as roads and railways, and a banking and fiscal system. The state can also ensure the promotion of civil society and the sharing of environmental benefits.

When a state is unable to perform these functions, it passes through different levels of disintegration: weakness, failure and collapse. Rotberg (2004) describes these levels as follows:

Weak states cannot properly deliver political goods due to open ethnic or religious conflicts. States are ruled by despots, therefore law is weakly applied, corruption increases and the GDP (gross domestic product) declines. Handler (1990: 52-53) presents weak states according to criteria ranging from the size of the population to the place of a country on the international system. According to him, the small size of the population and the area of a country are the first two criterions of a weak state. As far as economy is concerned, weak states are characterised by a small GNP in absolute terms, with a little or no heavy industry. Economically, a high degree of

specialisation of products, particularly the exportation of mineral and agricultural resources, small domestic markets and a high dependence on foreign capital are the other features of weak states. Weak states have limited military powers to defend themselves against external threats, with a very high or a total dependence on weapons acquisition on the international market. On the international system, weak states have little or no influence at all on the balance of power and they have a strong support for international law and norms and of international organisations, from which they expect much support and aid. The perpetuation of the disintegration of weak states results in failed states.

According to Rotberg (2004), in failed states the central authority is unable to control national borders and is incapable of fulfilling required functions. Mostly, government troops battle against warlords. Furthermore, the economic infrastructures, health care and academic systems often deteriorate. The failed system is controlled by a small group surrounding the ruler, from whom that oligarchy derives advantage. Life for the majority of the population becomes difficult because of inflation, corruption or food shortage.

Collapsed states are the bottom line of disintegration. Political, economic, social or academic indicators are non-existent.

However, as far as Francophone African states are concerned, their evolution since independence has been characterised by the transition from weak states inherited from colonisation to failed and then collapsed states. The DRC is the most salient example of the passage from a weak to a collapsed state in Francophone Africa. As described by Castells (2000: 99), the DRC (then Zaire until 1997) demonstrated a typical personal appropriation of the state by the late President Mobutu. As a consequence of the collapse of the state, according to Castells (2000: 99) “Zaire became ... the epitome of predatory politics, as well as of human catastrophes”.

Using the political and socioeconomic aspects described above, Table 6 classifies Francophone African states from their independence up to 2004.

**Table 6: Classification of Francophone African states**

<b>Weak states</b>	<b>Failed states</b>	<b>Collapsed states</b>
<b>Benin</b>	<b>CAR</b>	<b>Burundi</b>
<b>Burkina-Faso</b>	<b>Chad</b>	<b>Comoros</b>
<b>Cameroon</b>	<b>Congo</b>	<b>The DRC</b>
<b>Djibouti</b>	<b>Cote d'Ivoire</b>	<b>Rwanda</b>
<b>Gabon</b>	<b>Mauritania</b>	
<b>Guinea</b>	<b>Niger</b>	
<b>Madagascar</b>		
<b>Mali</b>		
<b>Morocco</b>		
<b>Mauritius</b>		
<b>Senegal</b>		
<b>The Seychelles</b>		
<b>Togo</b>		
<b>Tunisia</b>		

**Source: Author**

The wellbeing of a Francophone African state is shown by its economic potential and its democratic achievements. The disintegration of states in Francophone Africa includes the deterioration of socio-economic conditions, the collapse of the academic and health systems, and the spread of poverty. Crossing national boundaries has become the last resort to escape the collapse and to look for better living conditions, especially when there is no guarantee that a country would be able to perform better in the near future and no guarantee that the state would not fail or collapse.

#### **4.2.2 Economics conditions**

Economic disintegration has been considered by Castels and Miller (1998), Solomon (2001), Adepoju (2004) and Meredith (2005) as one of the major causes of migration in Africa. This assertion has been supported by theoretical models such as neoclassical economics, new economics of migration, segmented labour-market theory and world system theory which view migration as a consequence of economic motives. Africa in its entirety has entered the twenty-first century as the poorest continent. The economy of many countries is still based on the exportation of raw materials and agricultural products because the industrialisation of those products on the continent has not occurred. Therefore, Africa has missed out on becoming an

industrialised society and it seems that the continent is also likely to miss out on the information revolution.

Similar to the political conditions, the economic situation of Francophone African countries can partly be explained by colonisation. The “*economie de traite*” (trade economy) was one of the pillars of the colonial enterprise (Hugon, 2004: 19). Under the trade economy, colonies were viewed as providers of both mineral resources and agricultural products to the Metropolis, on the one hand, and on the other hand the same colonies were also seen as markets for French manufactured products. The trade economy was sustained by “the monopoly of the French flag, the polarisation of the flows between colonies and France, the protection of colonial markets from other colonial powers and overpriced imports and exports” (Hugon, 2004: 19). After the independence of Francophone African countries, these economic relations between the Metropolis and its former colonies were not ruled out. Instead, the influence of France kept on growing. As a matter of fact, pointed out by Hugon (2004: 22), “in 1970 70% of the cumulated social capital of processing industries belonged to foreigners.”

Characteristics of the economy in Francophone Africa are also the inheritance of both the political and economic doctrines adopted by this group of countries in the years following their independence. As pointed out by Nugent (2004: 140), most Francophone African countries chose to embrace capitalism due to the influence of the former colonial ruler, France. However, a few countries adopted socialism, including Guinea, Mali, Benin and Congo. The debate around the adoption of either capitalism or socialism in Western Africa in particular was illustrated by the choices of Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, two of the economic powers at the eve of independence. As a response to the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah, who advised French colonies to cut themselves free from the Metropolis in order to develop, the Ivorian leader Félix Houphouët-Boigny replied (Nugent, 2004: 167):

A wager has been made between two territories, one having chosen independence, the other preferring the difficult road to the construction, with the Metropolis, of a community of men in equal rights and duties. Let us each

undertake his experiment, in absolute respect of the experiment of his neighbour, and in ten years we shall compare the results.

However, during the single-party regime, Francophone African leaders adopted an ambiguous position, in which on the one hand they were convincing their supporters of the necessity of cutting ties with imperialism, which was seen as the driving force of colonisation, yet on the other hand, the same leaders kept economic relationships with the Western countries. Private companies, particularly from France, were the main actors in the private sectors in Francophone Africa (Nugent, 2004: 140).

The nature of Francophone African economy has been the continuation of the idea of French colonialism in Africa. Of all its colonies on the continent, France only considered Algeria as a colony of settlement. The others were viewed as colonies of exploitation. The main purpose was to take and send to France all kinds of resources, including mineral resources, cash crops and human resources, such as soldiers and workers. After their independence, Francophone African countries did not break that trend, as industrial centres were not developed to transform those resources on the continent. For many scholars (Hugon, 2004; Meredith, 2005) the failure of mastering industrial technologies has a variety of causes, including over-investment, weak external competitiveness, small markets, bureaucratic hurdles, political risk and import-substitution industries.

However, despite the differentiation in the choice of political and economic doctrine, African leaders staked the fate of their countries' economies on the selling of mineral resources and cash crops on the international market where prices are regulated largely by the Western buyers. Francophone African countries have specialised as producers and exporters of mineral resources and cash crops. In the first category, Algeria, Gabon and Congo are among the main exporters of oil and natural gas, while the DRC, for instance, is well known for mineral resources such as uranium, cobalt, manganese and copper. As far as the agricultural producers are concerned, Cote d'Ivoire has based its economy on the production and the exportation of cocoa and coffee, Senegal produces and exports peanuts, while other Sahelian countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad have opted for cotton. Finally, the countries of



the rain forests of the Congo basin (Cameroon, Gabon, Congo and the DRC) and Cote d' Ivoire also export timber.

The first signs of a slowdown of national economies appeared when non-producers where hit by the first oil crisis at the beginning of the 1970s. According to Meredith (2005: 276-277), oil prices went from \$3 in 1973 to \$12 in 1974. Later on, the price for an oil barrel doubled from \$19 in 1979 to \$39 in 1981. As a result in, the non-producer countries, some economic sectors such as agriculture and industry were hit by higher oil costs. Apart from the oil crisis, the African economy entered into a new chapter when the prices of commodities started to fall. Schraeder (2000: 228) points out that the economic turning point for the DRC (then Zaire) was linked to the decline of the price of copper on the international market. In fact, the decline of 62% of the price of copper (from \$1.40 a pound to \$0. 5 a pound in 1974) caused a shortage of \$600 million for the government in 1975. The decline of the price of commodities on the international market also had a huge impact on the agricultural sector. The collapse of the agricultural sector was mainly the consequence of the lack of efficient investment, the low prices for products and inadequate marketing systems. The agricultural sector became unattractive and thousands of peasants migrated to cities to look for a better life. Food production deficits were covered by food imports by some relatively wealthy countries, while others opted for food aid.

The collapse of Francophone African economies at the beginning of the 1980s could be interpreted as the result of bad choices made by the leaders throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Unable to face financial challenges, Francophone African states, like others on the continent, called for Western countries and international donors to intervene. "Senegal in 1979 became the first African state to obtain a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank" (Meredith, 2005: 369). The solution was built according to the metaphor used by Nugent (2004: 328): "African states were sick because they had drunk from the same contaminated source." The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were considered by economic experts from the developed world to be the ideal solution to alleviate economic paralysis in Africa. Four major conditions are seen as the main pillars of the SAPs in Africa (Schraeder, 336-337).

(1) The termination of food subsidies that kept food prices artificially low, effectively discouraging farmers from planting food crops; (2) the devaluation of national currencies to stimulate exports and the domestic production of manufactured products; (3) the trimming of government bureaucracies; and (4) the privatisation of parastatals (state-owned corporations).

The implementation of the SAPs has become the *sine qua non* condition for African countries to receive aid from international institutions. The seal of approval of the IMF is yet another drastic condition for African countries that must agree to its terms for debt rescheduling or renewed lending.

But since their implementation, the SAPs have received strong criticism for not ending African economic paralysis. One of the shortcomings of the SAPs is that these economic reforms were drawn up by the employees of the IMF or the World Bank who did not understand or consider the specific political, economic and social features of each country where the programmes were to be implemented. As far as the four major conditions are concerned, when government subsidies for food were cut, some products like bread disappeared from the local markets. The trimming of government bureaucracies and the privatisation of parastatals increased the level of unemployment and finally, the devaluation of the CFA franc<sup>12</sup> impoverished the largest part of the population.

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<sup>12</sup> The CFA franc is the common currency of 14 African states, mainly former French colonies. The CFA franc had a fixed exchange rate with the French franc and later with the euro. The countries using of the CFA franc are grouped into two zones, with each zone using a common currency in both the *Communauté Economique Monétaire d'Afrique Centrale* (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa or CEMAC and the *Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine* (West African Economic and Monetary Union) or UEMOA. The 14 countries using the CFA franc are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in Central Africa. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo in West Africa. The CFA franc was created on 26 December 1945, the same day France ratified the Bretton Woods Agreement, with the aim of sustaining French Franc devaluation. CFA stood for *Colonies Françaises d'Afrique* (French colonies of Africa). The exchange rate was 1 CFA franc = 1.70 FRF (FRF = French franc). In 1958, the CFA stood for *Franc de la Communauté Française d'Afrique* (Franc of the African Financial Community). When most of the former African colonies became independent in 1960, the French franc was already revalued since 1st January, and the exchange rate at that time was: 1 FCFA = 0.02 FRF.

France and the countries using of the CFA franc form the Franc Zone within which the CFA franc was guaranteed stability with France and it was set up to encourage investment and trade. The Franc zone also guarantees the CFA franc financial and budgetary discipline by binding treaties. However, during the collapse of Francophone African economies from the 1980s, the French franc was appreciating vis-à-vis the dollar. France then decided in January 1994, with the pressure of the IMF, to devalue the CFA

The implementation of SAPs and the weight of external debt have caused many African countries to enter into “a vicious cycle whereby poor education, poor health, and malnutrition forestall economic growth to perpetuate poverty” (Adepoju, 2004: 61). These external factors have been amplified by internal hurdles which have led to the plight of Africa.

For many years, the GDP has been used to measure the economic growth of African states. The GDP *per capita* is viewed as the indicator of economic wealth, because it is the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year, divided by the average population for the same year. As shown by Table 7, countries with a high GDP *per capita* such as Algeria, Gabon, Morocco, Mauritius and Tunisia have been considered the wealthiest in Francophone Africa. One could ask if there is a correlation between the importance of the GDP *per capita* of a specific country and its profile as a host country for migrants. At first glance, it seems possible because the wealthiest countries (according to their GDP *per capita*) in Francophone Africa, like Gabon in Central Africa and Tunisia and Morocco in Magrheb, are the main receiving countries in these regions. Likewise, Cote d’Ivoire in West Africa enjoyed a high annual GDP *per capita* and was the main direction chosen by migrants of the region before the civil war. The GDP *per capita* surely expressed the economic growth of some of these countries, mainly because of the exportation of resource minerals and agricultural products, oil for Gabon and cocoa for Cote d’Ivoire. The economic growth therefore justifies the relatively strong economic performances which have attracted migrants.

However, the high GDP *per capita* only sustains relatively strong economic performances because of the poor redistribution of the economic growth. Indeed, because of corruption, mismanagement and bad choices, the majority of the populations have not fully benefited from economic growth. The GDP *per capita* has been criticised because it does not reflect the economic development, which differs from the economic growth (Hugon, 2004: 30). In general, the GDP *per capita* does

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franc by 50% to boost Francophone African economies to become more competitive on the international market. The exchange rate became: 1 CFA franc= 0. 01 FRF. Since 1st January 1999, with the adoption of the European Union currency, 1 CFA franc = 0. 152449 euro or 1 euro = 655. 957 CFA franc.

not take into account differences in the cost of living in different countries and the indicator can greatly vary from one year to another based on fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates of the country's currency. Such fluctuations may change a country's ranking greatly from one year to the next, even though they often make little or no difference to the standard of living of its population.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has therefore set up other indicators to more accurately value the economic development. Among these indicators are the Human Development Indicator (HDI) and the Human Poverty Indicator (HPI). Hugon (2004: 31) distinguishes one from another by explaining that the former is an aggregate reflecting life expectancy at birth, literacy rates and an adjusted GDP *per capita*; while the latter is related to life expectancy, education, and basic services such as access to clean water and health services.

With some exceptions, such as Seychelles, Mauritius, Tunisia and Morocco which have indicators superior to 0.7 (Table 7), economic development in Francophone African countries is still low. The state of economic development in these countries does not distinguish itself from the rest of the continent. According to Adepouju (2004: 61) "Africa is a region of contradictions: rich in resources, it is nevertheless the world's poorest major region ... Across the continent, illiteracy remains high and health conditions continue to deteriorate." Migration then becomes a strategy to escape these deteriorating economic conditions, which seem unlikely to improve soon.

**Table 7: GDP *per capita* and the HDI of Francophone African countries in 2003**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>GNP <i>per capita</i> in 2003 (US dollar)</b>	<b>HDI in 2003 (World Ranking)</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>2 090</b>	<b>0.722 (103)</b>
<b>Benin</b>	<b>517</b>	<b>0.431 (162)</b>
<b>Burkina-Faso</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>0.317 (175)</b>
<b>Burundi</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>0.378 (169)</b>
<b>Cameroon</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>0.497 (148)</b>
<b>CAR</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>0.355 (171)</b>
<b>Chad</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>0.341 (173)</b>
<b>Comoros</b>	<b>538</b>	<b>0.547 (132)</b>
<b>Congo</b>	<b>949</b>	<b>0.512 (142)</b>
<b>Cote d'Ivoire</b>	<b>816</b>	<b>0.420 (163)</b>
<b>DRC</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>0.385 (167)</b>
<b>Djibouti</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>0.495 (150)</b>
<b>Gabon</b>	<b>4 505</b>	<b>0.635 (123)</b>
<b>Guinea</b>	<b>459</b>	<b>0.466 (156)</b>
<b>Madagascar</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>0.499 (146)</b>
<b>Mali</b>	<b>371</b>	<b>0.333 (174)</b>
<b>Mauritania</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>0.477 (152)</b>
<b>Mauritius</b>	<b>4 274</b>	<b>0.791 (65)</b>
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>1 452</b>	<b>0.631 (124)</b>
<b>Niger</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>0.281 (177)</b>
<b>Rwanda</b>	<b>195</b>	<b>0.450 (159)</b>
<b>Senegal</b>	<b>634</b>	<b>0.458 (157)</b>
<b>Seychelles</b>	<b>8 610</b>	<b>0.821 (51)</b>
<b>Togo</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>0.512 (143)</b>
<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>2 530</b>	<b>0.753 (89)</b>

Source: <http://hdr.undp.org>

### 4.2.3 Demographic settings

**Table 8: Area and population indicators of Francophone African countries in 2004**

Countries	Areas	Population	Percentage of Urbanised population	Percentage of the population under the age of 15
Algeria	2 381 740	32 000 000	58.3	33.5
Benin	112 620	7 000 000	43.8	45.6
Burkina-Faso	274 000	13 000 000	17.4	48.9
Burundi	27 830	6 800 000	9.6	46.9
Cameroon	475 440	16 000 000	50.6	42.4
CAR	622 980	3 900 000	42.2	43.1
Chad	1 284 000	8 600 000	24.5	46.7
Comoros	1 862	800 000	34.4	42.3
Congo	342 000	3 700 000	53.1	46.8
Cote d'Ivoire	322 460	16 600 000	44.4	41.8
Djibouti	23 200	700 000	83.3	43
DRC	2 344 860	52 800 000	31.2	46.8
Gabon	267 670	1 300 000	83.1	41
Guinea	245 860	8 500 000	34.2	44
Madagascar	587 040	17 400 000	26.3	44.6
Mali	1 240 190	13 000 000	31.6	49.2
Mauritania	1 025 520	2 900 000	60.5	43.2
Mauritius	2 040	1 200 000	43.1	25.3
Morocco	712 550	30 600 000	56.8	31.8
Niger	1 267 000	12 000 000	21.6	50
Rwanda	26 340	8400 000	16.6	45.2
Senegal	196 720	10 000 000	48.9	43.5
Seychelles	450	80 000	48.8	NC
Togo	26 790	4 900 000	34.5	43.9
Tunisia	163 610	9 800 000	63.4	28.5
Total	13 974 772	281980 000		

*Source: Jeune Afrique L'intelligent. L'Etat de l'Afrique. Hors-Série N° 8. Paris: Jeune Afrique.*

The repartition of the Francophone African population over space is unequal if one compares various countries. Francophone African countries can be subdivided into four categories as far as their population is concerned. The first category is made up of countries that have a population of more than 20 million inhabitants. These countries are Algeria (32 millions), Morocco (30 566 000) and the DRC (52 771 000). The countries with a population of between 10 and 20 million are in the second category. Among the seven countries in that category, Madagascar, Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon are the most populous with a number of 17 404 000, 16 631 000 and 16 018 000 inhabitants respectively. Forty-eight per cent of Francophone African countries represent the third category, with populations numbering between one and ten million. These are heterogeneous categories because, on the one hand, countries such as Rwanda (8 400 000) and Guinea (8 480 000) have populations close to ten million while, on the other hand, Gabon and Mauritius have a million inhabitants. Lastly, Comoros (768 000), Djibouti (703 000) and Seychelles (81 000) are in the fourth category, with fewer than one million inhabitants. Although it is not a general assumption, it appears that the most populous countries provide the most migrants in Francophone Africa according to their numbers in host countries such as France, Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon or in South Africa. However, the number of inhabitants alone cannot explain the dynamics of emigration from some countries.

The forecasts of the Francophone African population predict an increase in many countries. According to *Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent* (2005), it has been projected that, unless a catastrophe occurs, Francophone African countries can expect a boom in their population, especially in the sub-Saharan part. In fact, the population will almost double by 2050 in countries such as Togo (from 4 900 000 in 2004 to 10 million in 2050), Senegal (from 10 000 000 to 20 100 000) and Gabon (from 1 300 000 to 2 500 000). The expansion of the population could even be tripled during the same period in Mali (from 13 000 000 to 46 000 000) or Burkina Faso (from 13 000 000 to 42 400 000). This evolution will be sustained by the high rate of demographic growth, for instance in Niger (2.91%), Chad (2.85%) and in the DRC (3%).

The dynamics of Francophone African population are also characterised by the growing urban population and percentages of young people. The increase of the urban population brings more socio-economic challenges, which the authorities fail to meet,

such as services delivery in sectors such as education and health. Young people are more and more involved in migration, as they see it as the best chance of survival. Lumembu (2000: 88) shows how far desperate young Africans will go to escape poverty. In 1999, two young Guineans of 14 and 15 years old were found dead in the landing gear of a plane in Belgium.

#### **4.2.4 Socio-cultural context**

The socio-cultural variables that push Francophone Africans away from their countries of origin range from the culture of migration to the weakness of the state. These aspects also include urbanisation and working and studying conditions.

Among the six socioeconomic factors of the cumulative causation theory that Massey *et al.* (1993) describe in their analysis, the culture of migration is the one which explains the departure of people towards other regions as part of values that communities acquire over the years. As shown in Chapter 3, migration is a well-established social feature in the valley of the Senegalese River, for instance. In fact, migration is considered as one of the rare ways for disadvantaged social classes, such as women, young people and slaves, to gain respect in the society and to reposition themselves in the social strata, because of the wealth they can acquire by migrating. Because societies in the valley of the Senegalese River have experienced migration for many decades, more of their members will look for improved conditions elsewhere. As pointed out by Saint-Exupery (2005: 16), in the town of Somankidi in the northern part of Mali, 17.5% of the inhabitants have left for Europe or other African countries. The culture of migration had been established since World War II. Migration is vital and it has become the main activity providing incomes for the survival of the town.

The culture of migration has developed over the years in Francophone Africa because of the poverty gap between class factions. The socio-cultural context of migration can thus be described with reference to different social classes. Schraeder (2000: 150-151) grades African society into four social classes, with the *African peasantry* being the only rural one. In many countries, the rural population makes up the largest number of inhabitants. Indeed, the percentage of the rural population in countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, Burkina Faso and Niger is 90.4%, 83.4%, 82.6% and 78.4%



respectively (*Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent*, 2005). The agricultural sector provides food and livestock for its own consumption, for the urban, and sometimes the international, markets. However, rural peasants are often attracted to towns where they expect to make a better living. In most cases, new arrivals in the city end up in the lowest urban class: the *lumpenproletariat*. Unemployed people and street vendors, maids and cooks constitute that lower urban social class, and educated people, unable to find an adequate job, swell the ranks every day.

The *African proletariat* is just above the two lowest classes and forms the core of the manpower of urban industry. The earnings of the *African proletariat* are merely enough to survive on a daily basis. The *middle class* refers to a heterogeneous class of workers from shopkeepers to the lower ranks of the government bureaucracies, including teachers, soldiers and those in the private sector. However, the deterioration of living conditions has obliged them to find other ways to survive. Finally, at the top social strata there is the *African bourgeoisie*, a small elite of politicians and bureaucrats that retain the largest part of the wealth of the country. Migration is considered the only way to escape this social classification.

Another social-cultural variable of migration in Francophone Africa is urbanisation. The urban centres in Francophone Africa are homes to both rural and international migrants. These urban centres in Francophone Africa are mainly the creations of French colonialism, although large commercial and religious centres were observed in great empires such as Kongo and Mali in the pre-colonial era. With French colonisation, the structure of an urban centre was formed by the administrative area, which was clearly separated from the African areas. In most cases, the African areas were previously small villages like in Libreville in Gabon, Brazzaville in Congo or Abidjan in Cote d' Ivoire. Those African areas were viewed as reservoirs of the manpower needed by the colonial authorities. The biggest town in each colony became the capital of the new countries when independence was proclaimed. Capital cities in most Francophone African country became the most important cities in the countries, where political, administrative, economic, judiciary and academic activities were concentrated. The centralisation of all sort of activities in the main cities is one reason why both internal and international migrants are flooding in great numbers to Dakar in Senegal, Libreville in Gabon, Bamako in Mali, Brazzaville in Congo, and

Kinshasa in the DRC. The increasing population of the major Francophone African cities demonstrates the degree of urbanisation in those centres. The expansion of Abidjan in Cote d' Ivoire, for instance, is illustrated by the growth of its population over the years. In 1931, 10 000 people were living in Abidjan. By 1961, the city was a home for 180 000 people, the number reached 2 500 000 persons by the end of the 1990s (Schraeder, 2000: 121). However, that expansion of the population has been accompanied by social concerns such as poor education and health. Therefore, the urbanisation of many Francophone African cities has been associated with the spread of poverty, which is evident in large numbers of slums surrounding urban centres.

As far as working and studying conditions are concerned, people are pushed away from their countries of origin by low income, limited career opportunities, the poverty of tertiary institutions and the poor quality of education. The low income in some Francophone African countries is illustrated by Thiomiano's (2000) example of a Burkinabe student in France who earned 3 000 French francs monthly from his part time job. After his studies, the company wanted to employ him for 5 000 French francs whilst he could find a job in the administration in Burkina Faso for 1 600 French francs a month. Low income is reinforced by the high level of unemployment which compels those with jobs to take care of the extended family.

Career opportunities are also limited because many employers prefer a person with a degree from a French or American university rather than one with degrees from African or some European universities, particularly from former socialist countries. The continuation of their studies thus pushes many Francophone Africans away from their countries of origin. Universities in many African countries do not offer conditions required for a good education. Overcrowded classes, lack of financial resources and the absence of updated materials are some of the shortcomings of tertiary education in Francophone Africa. These difficulties accumulated for many years, hidden by the incapacity of the population to speak out due to the oppression of dictatorial regimes. With the democratisation of the 1990s, tertiary education collapsed (see Section 4.2.6). Strikes, inadequate curriculum, the lack of trust by employers and the politicising of universities were some of the reasons for the failure of Francophone African universities. For many young Africans, migration is the only means of getting a decent education and responding to job opportunities in the

globalised world. A student explains his desire to pursue his studies abroad as follows:

Today we are living in a world called a 'planetary village.' We are becoming more and more citizens of the world. For anyone to find himself/herself in such a world, he/she must have many landmarks; I mean a good academic formation and the mastering of international languages. As far as I am concerned, it is an international handicap if someone does not complete his/her academic formation in another system than the one used in his/her country of origin and if that person can just speak one international language (Gabonese student, Libreville, 23 July 2004).

#### **4.2.5 Environmental conditions**

The deterioration of the environment is also one of the factors behind the move of thousand of people in Francophone Africa. The deterioration of ecological systems partly depends on the composition of the physical geography. According to Adepoju (2004: 64), "the physical geography in Africa is heterogeneous, embracing fragile arid and semi-arid ecosystems that coexist with more stable rainforests and coastal low-lands." Francophone Africa stretches from the Sahelian region in the western part of the continent to the rainforest region in Central Africa. The climate of Francophone Africa also extends to the Mediterranean in the Maghreb and the tropical climate in the Indian Ocean. The movements and the settlements of the populations in these different regions are closely coupled with the nature of the evolution of the ecological systems. Environmental deterioration such as floods or desertification have obliged some populations to move from their settlements to safer ecological regions. According to Adepoju (2004: 64), at the end of the 1980s approximately 10 million people in Africa found themselves migrating due to ecological deterioration. Apart from the increasing population pressure on the environment in Francophone Africa, ecological constraints are mostly characterised by the combination of drought, floods and desertification in the Sahel region in particular.

The Senegal River is one of the most important rivers in the Sahel region. In Mali, for instance, the river flows across both "wetter" and "dry" Sudanese climate zones (Appleyard, 1998: 70). This double characteristic of the river allows the practice of

both sedentary agriculture in the former region and nomadic livelihood in the latter area. In the “wetter” climate zone, the river gains a surplus of water which flows down from the Fouta Djallon highlands in Guinea. Over the years, this region has been the breadbasket of the whole Sahel region, which has always attracted migrants (Boone, 2003: 282).

However, excessive rainfall results in floods. On the other side, the scarcity of rainfall has dramatic consequences on all kind of activities, because it brings droughts like in 1963, 1968-1973, 1983-1985 or during 1986-1988 in Mali (Appleyard, 1998: 71). According to Boone (2003: 305), from the beginning of the 1970s and for almost a decade, “the Senegal River’s floodplain was reduced to about 25% of its normal size.” Along with these inconveniences, desertification enhances drastic environmental conditions in the Sahel region. More and more useful lands disappear every year due to the advance of the Sahara Desert. This leads the populations to migrate southwards to overpopulate some regions that are already threatened by the sandbanks of the coast of the Atlantic Ocean for instance. In these narrow, overpopulated regions, the ecological system has deteriorated even more, deteriorated, mainly due to overuse of natural resources, the degradation of suitable lands for cultivation or wind erosion. At the end of the day, all these aspects make way for desertification. As a result and as pointed out by Findley *et al.* (quoted by Adepoju, 2004: 65), the deterioration of environmental conditions leads to “a massive loss of resources and the displacement of whole families and communities.”

#### **4.2.6 The collapse of the academic system**

Higher education institutions in Francophone Africa, like many other institutions of the Western state, were created following the example of the colonial ruler. However, France initially did not want to create higher education institutions in its colonies (Ade Ajayi *et al.*, 1996: 38). The colonial power encouraged few Africans to pursue their studies in the Metropolis, as France wanted to control a nucleus of *évolués* able to be assimilated into French culture while leaving the mass of the populations uneducated. The situation was similar in the Belgian colonies, particularly in the Congo. In the absence of higher education institutions in its colonies, France provided scholarships to Africans who obtained their baccalaureate to study in the Metropolis. These funds were deducted from each colony’s budget. However, the growing

number of African students in France and their anti-colonialist discourse pushed France to delocalise campuses to some cities in the colonies, especially Dakar in Senegal and Tananarive in Madagascar, with Dakar for instance set to receive students from all West and Central Africa (Ade Ajayi *et al.*, 1996: 56).

After independence, Francophone African countries created their own universities, viewed also as symbols of the newly gained independence and considered “as a key component in the development process of the continent” (Lindsay, 1985: 129). Full control of universities by Africans themselves happened gradually over the years. However, teaching programmes in these Francophone African institutions were mostly the replication of the ones used in France, even though some programmes did not sometimes take into account African realities. The former colonial power also provided manuals and technologies that, according to Alidou (Federici *et al.*, 2000: 38), the French academic system had rejected because viewed as inadequate.

Up to the 1990s, crucial problems encountered in Francophone African universities were kept silent because most of these countries were under dictatorial regimes. One of the features of the pressure from dictatorial regimes has been the lack of academic freedom. This includes the freedom of the members of the academic community, development and transmission of knowledge, research, study, discussion, documentation, production, creation, teaching, lecturing or writing (Diouf and Mamdani, 1994: 362). The pressure from dictatorial regimes was illustrated by a range of actions and decisions, from censorship of teaching to summary executions of academics and students. During those years, many staff members were forced to migrate outside their countries of origin due to the lack of freedom of expression. Apart from moving to European or American countries, Francophone African university intellectuals found refuge in other African countries, like Guinean nationals escaping from the Sekou Toure’s dictatorship to settle in Gabon (Pambou-Loueya, 2003: 339).

The crisis of Francophone African universities broke out at the beginning of the 1990s. At first glance, the Francophone African university crisis appeared to be institutional. After two decades, the African university had failed to implement the six social functions identified in a workshop in 1972 (Lindsay, 1985: 129):

(1) pursuit, promotion, and dissemination of knowledge; (2) research; (3) provision of intellectual leadership; (4) manpower development; (5) promotion of social and economic modernization; (6) promotion of intercontinental unity and international understanding.

Along with the political, economic and social situation, the university crisis was an illustration of the collapse of Francophone African states. In countries involved in armed conflicts such as the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, staff and students abandoned campuses to find refuge elsewhere. This obliged some universities in those countries to close down. However, armed conflicts alone cannot fully explain the Francophone African university crisis. The collapse of higher education in Francophone Africa system has deeper roots.

Ade Ajayi *et al.* (1996: 146) highlight three main points underpinning the African university crisis in general. Firstly, they point out the scarcity of financial resources. Universities suffered from the economic situation in Francophone African countries. Two decades after their creation, most Francophone African universities lacked funds to “sustain acceptable standards of instruction, research and service” (Ade Ajayi *et al.*, 1996: 146). The authors also refer to the restriction of grants provided by government. This has made it difficult for higher education institutions to find income to recruit foreign lecturers and researchers, to finance nationals’ training or conference attendance abroad as well as the purchase of books and other materials required for teaching and research. The lack of finances has put Francophone African research behind because the institutions have not been able to update their material, particularly in science. Financial scarcity has also had an impact on publication since most of Francophone African higher institutions do not have their own publishing facilities. Publishing abroad has become a real cause for concern, especially after the devaluation of the CFA franc.

Moreover Ade Ajayi *et al.* (1996: 147) note the “stagnation and deterioration of physical resources.” Many universities in Francophone Africa were built some years following the independence in 1960. Some were allocated to provisional structures acquired from the colonial period. Since their construction or their acquisition, the

maintenance of the structures has been neglected. Hence, the deterioration of the structures over the years has not been able to cope with the growing number of the students and staff populations. The deterioration of the structures has accelerated with the unplanned expansion of the infrastructures to respond to the increase of the number of students and staff. As a result, the shortage of lecture rooms and laboratories, student and staff housing, and staff offices are one of the main characteristics of Francophone African universities.

Apart from the points listed by Ade Ajayi *et al.*, the African university crisis has also been sustained by the implementation of the SAPs. These recovery programmes have reduced financial supplies and academic personnel and salaries (Diouf & Mamdani, 1994: 73). This have increased the demotivation of both academic personnel and students. Diouf and Mamdani (1994: 21) also acknowledge that the crisis of the African university has its internal reasons in the incompetence and negative competition among academic personnel.

Since the adoption of democracy in most Francophone African countries, the university community has expressed its hunger by strikes which often paralyse the academic calendar. Chronologically, the most notorious strikes in universities from 1990 to 1995 are summarised as follows (Federici, 2000, 118-150):

11-14 January 1990: Algeria. Students strike against reduction of grant, for an improvement of education and for better access to employment at the end of the studies. At least 50 people injured.

9 February 1990: Niger. Students strike against reduction of educational funding. Three to fourteen students killed.

11 May 1990: Zaire. Students strike against the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko: 52 students killed.

23 November 1990: Guinea. More than a month of demonstrations against the loss of grants and poor quality of education. Two students killed and three wounded.

16 April 1991: Benin. Students strike for the payment of grants and the improvement of studying and living conditions. One student wounded.

17 May 1991: Zaire. Demonstration of students. Two students killed, 20 students and the Secretary of State for Education wounded.

11 September 1991: Cote d'Ivoire. End of a two month strike by lecturers against government violation of academic freedom and police harassment on the campuses.

December 1991: Senegal. Two month strike of students demanding better living and studying conditions.

29 February 1992: Togo. Students protest over grants. Government has closed the university.

14 July 1992: The Minister and the Ministry's Secretary General were held hostage by students demanding the payment of their grants.

20-25 January 1993: Cameroon. Students strike against the increase of fees.

15 March 1993: Cote d'Ivoire. Students strike demanding a revision of their programmes and an improvement of their grants and housing conditions.

9 April 1993: Mali. Resignation of the government after a strike of students. One student killed and 45 persons wounded, including 20 from the security forces.

June 1994: Congo. President Pascal Lissouba cancelled the academic year because of a long students strike.

June 1994: Gabon. The university in Libreville is closed down due to a protest of students demanding the increase of their grants following the devaluation of the CFA franc.

November 1995: Mali. Crisis in the education system following a student strike demanding the payment of grants and an improvement of studying conditions.



The essence of the collapse of the academic system in Francophone Africa lies with the structure of the system itself and its relationship with the state in general as well as the nature of the state itself (see Section 4.2.13 of this chapter). Indeed, as shown by Diouf and Mamdani (1994: 18), the state in most African countries controls the intellectual production of the university because it provides wage labour that academics need to define or maintain their status in society.

#### **4.2.7 Summary of push factors in Francophone Africa**

The variety of migration configurations, such as labour, student, refugee and clandestine migration has a multitude of causes. In Francophone Africa, the causes of migration for the four categories of migrants considered in this study are a combination of the factors analysed above. Legal migrants and students justify their departure from their countries of origin with four main reasons.

Firstly, they chose to go abroad due to the economic, political, educational and social paralysis. These reasons are summarised by an interviewee as follows:

It is frustrating to realise that after a couple of years one's social or professional situation has not changed. Many Africans are formed in high profile Western universities where they are often majors of their promotions. Once back home, they rapidly realise the gap between their formations and the conditions of work. While their former Western or Asian former classmates climb professional grades and have career prospects, Africans see their social situation declining day after day. The only solution is to go to work or to study abroad, especially in developed countries with all advantages like career prospects, high salaries or good formation for students. Young Africans like their countries, their continent, but working and studying conditions are so disappointing. They do not have any choice. (Cameroonian, Libreville, 27 July 2004)

Secondly, students opt for migration because they want to pursue their studies. Most of the respondents reveal that their desire to pursue education is the principal reason that they leave their countries of origin:

Actually, my intention was to go to Germany. I came to South Africa to study because I did not want to stay at the university in Yaoundé, because the studying conditions were bad and it was difficult to complete an academic year without students or lecturers strikes. (Cameroonian, Cape Town, 22 October 2004)

Thirdly, legal migrants especially are keen to migrate in order to further their careers:

In Congo, due especially to the unstable situation in the eastern part of the country, it was not possible for me to undertake to complete my specialisation. I wanted to be a specialist surgeon but due to the war, there were no appropriate programmes implemented to help people to have real career prospects. (Congolese, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005).

Fourthly, legal migrants and students explain their move because of economic and job opportunities that their countries of origin cannot offer. These categories of migrants struggle to make a living despite their qualifications. These experiences do not encourage working in their countries of origin once they complete their education. Migration is viewed as a way to improve their earnings and their standard of living.

After obtaining my degree, I compared what I could earn in Cameroon and here. I realised that it was in my interest to stay working here. After completing my training, I accepted the job offer. (Cameroonian, Libreville, 27 July 2004)

Finally, a few respondents say they leave their countries of origin to travel around and to experience other cultures.

The two other categories of migrants considered are pushed away from their region of origin mainly by the seven factors described above. Armed conflicts and political crises are the most common reasons behind refugee and extra-legal migrations. A Rwandese national describes her arrival in South Africa as follows:

I left my country a long time ago because of the genocide. I did not have any other choice than running away from my country. I was young and we went to Tanzania, my mother, my two sisters and my brother. We were going from one refugee camp to another, looking for better conditions. Then, we succeeded to establish ourselves in Dodoma in Tanzania, but still the living conditions were not good at all. We could not go back home because of the war so we came to Zambia. From Zambia I came here in 2000. (Rwandese, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005)

Economic and social deterioration is the second most common reason pointed out by refugees and extra-legal respondents. These factors often push the migrants to cross national boundaries without required documents:

My friends and I decided to leave Congo to Gabon. We were five. We passed the border during the night for fear of being arrested by Gabonese soldiers. Two of our friends knew how to cross the border without being arrested because they often came to Gabon. After the border, we slept all day, we walked the night, we arrived in a village and we had a transport which brought us to Bakoumba. (Congolese, Libreville, 29 July 2004).

Social capital is the third main common reason given by refugees and extra-legals to justify their move. Some migrants have been heavily influenced in their decision by a friend or a relative already abroad.

My brother was here for a while. He invited me to come to join him and to see how life is going on. I have been in Nigeria, in Cote d'Ivoire, in Gabon and in Senegal. After, I went back home and then came here. (Guinean, Johannesburg, 22 2005)

Social capital is closely related to the achievements of preceding migrants. For people living in a region with a high culture of migration, potential migrants definitely make up their mind by the money send my migrants.

When I was in Cote d'Ivoire, I was living with a family which was regularly receiving money from one of their relatives who came to Gabon a long time ago. With part of that money he succeeded to build two beautiful houses. People were renting those houses, so he was making more money. The situation in Cote d'Ivoire was far better than in my country. I came to a conclusion that if an Ivorian could improve his situation by living in Gabon, therefore the situation could be better for me. This is how I had the idea to come to Gabon. (Malian, Libreville, 27 July 2005).

### **4.3 The reasons for choosing South Africa**

#### **4.3.1 South Africa and Francophone Africa**

The arrival of different categories of migrants from the rest of the continent also depends on the history of relations between South Africa and the sending countries. Since the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, South Africa has been a major importer of labour for the exploitation of the country's mineral wealth and for farms. South Africa has relied on its neighbouring countries, such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Malawi. According to Crush (2000: 14), between 1920 and 1940 the approximate number of foreign workers in the mines was 100 000 to 200 000. As noted by Southall (2006: 1), during the apartheid era, South Africa symbolised a white power nation which established its economic authority over the southern part of the continent. However, this sub-regional foreign policy was also based on its military objective to crush anti-apartheid fighters who found refuge in the surrounding countries. This foreign policy was simply focused on South African self-interest.

##### **4.3.1.1 South Africa's historical links with Francophone Africa**

During the apartheid era, the Pretoria regime also had military, political and economic relations with some African countries further afield, despite the ban of South Africa from the international community, with Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and the DRC, then known as Zaire, being the most notorious in Francophone Africa (Pfister, 2003). South African engagement soon after the Congo gained independence was mainly based on its involvement in the exploitation of mineral resources such as diamonds in Mbuji-Mayi by De Beers or South African mercenary involvement in the Kasai and Katanga crisis (Pfister, 2003: 78). South Africa viewed itself as playing the role of

containing the communist advance on the continent. The South African support of the Kasai and Katanga rebellions was considered the best way to show that commitment, although South African involvement remained limited because the Pretoria regime did not want to be exposed.

However, with the isolation of the apartheid regime, South Africa kept its relations with the rest of the continent through developmental projects. In reality, the country needed other African countries because of the international ban of South Africa. On the other hand, African countries were aware of South Africa's advanced technical standards. As pointed out by Pfister (2003: 91), relations with the rest of the continent were undertaken in four phases: Outward Movement, Dialogue, Secret Diplomacy and Détente. The Outward Movement was linked with the activities initiated after 1967 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) towards other African countries beyond the surrounding countries. Madagascar was the Francophone African country that benefited from the Outward Movement through mining and tourism investments until 1972, when President Tsiranana was toppled by a *coup d'état*. Francophone African countries were also used by France as stopovers to sustain its relations with South Africa.

Francophone African countries became the target of the Dialogue phase which started in 1966 for military reasons. These relations between South Africa and Francophone African countries were conducted with France's involvement, particularly under the influence of Jacques Foccart, the man once in charge of the African Affairs at the French presidency. It started with military assistance to Chad to prevent the spread of communism from Libya. South African military relations with Francophone African countries in the western and central part of the continent were broadened to Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire during and after the Biafra civil war. In Gabon, apart from military assistance, South Africa brought its technical cooperation in the agricultural sector.

During the Secret Diplomacy phase, South Africa took a further step by establishing presidential contact with Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, when Prime Minister Vorster visited Cote d'Ivoire in September 1974 and met Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Sedar Senghor (Pfister, 2003: 164). Apparently, the choice of these two countries lies with the charisma of their leaders. During the Secret Diplomacy phase,

South Africa succeeded in securing landing rights for South African Airways (SAA) in Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles islands. The president of Zaire, Mobutu, was also regarded as an influential leader in Francophone Africa, as he was viewed as a loyal ally of some of Western countries. Therefore, his support was fundamental. Although opposed to the Dialogue policy, Mobutu was linked with the South African government during the phase of *Détente*, when his attitude changed with the Angolan civil war. The two sides were backing the western-oriented National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) opposed to the communist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The cooperation between the two strengthened through economic interaction, developmental projects and military collaboration during the second part of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s.

However, these relations received harsh criticism, particularly from the rest of the African countries on behalf of solidarity with the struggle of Black South Africans against the apartheid policy. Beyond these military, political and economic ties, a selected migration from Francophone African countries to South Africa took place before the end of the apartheid regime. According to Bouillon and Morris (2001: 39-42), two waves of Francophone African migration occurred before 1994. The first wave happened between 1986 and 1991 and it was the direct outcome of South African diplomatic policy related above. Bouillon and Morris (2001: 40) point out that, in return for its technical assistance in Francophone Africa, South Africa was highly regarded as a destination of priority by political and economic elites. Those elites usually visited South Africa during that period. Apart from political and economic elites, the South African government allowed medical doctors and teachers, particularly from Zaire, to settle in homelands like Ciskei and Bophuthatswana where they filled up the skilled labour shortages.

In 1990, after the release of Nelson Mandela and with ongoing negotiations between the government and the liberation movements, South Africa had already established air links with other countries like Rwanda, Mauritius, Madagascar and Morocco, and had formal diplomatic relations with Rwanda, Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon (Bouillon & Morris, 2001: 41). The second wave of Francophone African migration to South Africa lasted from 1991 to 1993. During that period, the stream of migrants from Francophone Africa was dominated by victims of armed conflicts, with Zairians

being the most numerous. South African authorities were obliged to establish an expensive visa fee in order to curb the flow of Zairian nationals.

#### **4.3.1.2 South Africa leadership on the continent**

Since the readmission of South Africa to the international scene, the country has claimed a leadership role on the continent because of its economic and political status. The discourse of South African leadership in Africa has been undertaken through African Renaissance and NEPAD initiatives. The idea of a unified and strong Africa was first launched soon after the independence of most of African countries in the 1960s, with the likes of the former Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah as the initiators of Pan-Africanism. The motive behind this early attempt at African unification was to free Africa from both colonialism and neo-colonialism. The new idea of African unification at the beginning of the new millennium was to give the continent a fresh start after the failure of dictators to take Africa to the path of development. The rejuvenated concept was viewed as a symbol of the arrival of a new generation of leaders in the continental arena. Nelson Mandela, during the OAU meeting in 1994, criticised the way African states were running. He appealed for a “new birth” (Meredith, 2005: 677). Moreover, Thabo Mbeki made African Renaissance his most valuable concept on his crusade to give South Africa and the whole continent a place on the international scene. Mbeki urged that Africans themselves could resolve African problems. He wanted the rest of the world to see Africa not only as the theatre of plights like wars, corruption and HIV/AIDS, but also as a place of opportunities capable of reaching tremendous achievements (Gumede, 2005: 201). The concept of African Renaissance was drawn up around the implementation of a real democracy and good governance into a global map influenced by democracy and globalisation. Mbeki defines his vision of the African Renaissance as follows:

The African Renaissance, in all its parts, can only succeed if its aims and objectives are defined by Africans themselves, if its programmes are designed by ourselves and if we take responsibility for the success or failure of our policies ... We believe that it is important that the international community should agree that Africa constitutes the principal development challenge in the world (Meredith, 2005: 677).

In order to concretise the concept of the African Renaissance, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) project was officially launched during the OAU summit held in Lusaka in July 2001. Formerly known as the New African Initiative (NAI) until October 2001, NEPAD is basically a merger of two economic developmental plans proposed by the presidents of Senegal (Abdoulaye Wade), Algeria (Abdelaziz Bouteflika), Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo) and South Africa (Thabo Mbeki). The first president was the author of the Omega Plan, while the three others presidents were responsible for the Millennium African Plan (MAP). NEPAD promotes a partnership between international donors and African countries for the real development of the continent. The international community's support should not be viewed as a form of aid but as investment. In 2003, NEPAD became the economic part of the African Union. The ten themes which sustain the Nepad are good public governance, good economic governance, energy, infrastructures, education, health, technology of information and communication, agriculture, environment and access to developed countries' markets and the diversification of products.

The new concept of development on the continent urges cooperation among African states. At first glance, one notes that the Nepad in particular carries in itself the roots of a new form of migration in Africa. Indeed, NEPAD intends to develop communication and transportation infrastructures for better economic and political integration. This basically means more movements of goods and people across national borders, one the one hand, and, on the other, a cooperation of immigration laws and regulations to ease these movements. The response of each state to these measures of integration remains to be seen, as noted by Crush and Williams (2004: 4), who state that the impact of the implementation of NEPAD's recommendations on the "strident and xenophobic" South African migration policy remains ambiguous. As the first economic power on the continent, South Africa should expect more migrants' arrivals from all parts of the continent if the Nepad recommendations are fully implemented.

Beyond the marketing of the Nepad, particularly during the different G8 summits, South Africa has been active on the continental scene by its willingness to resolve conflicts. It has also extended its economic presence beyond southern Africa. Since 1994, South African foreign policy, particularly on the continent, has passed from the



unilateralism under the presidency of Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki's multilateralism (Southall, 2006: 4). If the former concept had a strong human rights orientation, the second one has brought new commitment to market-based economics into the picture. In Francophone Africa, South African peacemaking initiatives have focused mainly on Burundi, the DRC and Cote d'Ivoire.

#### **4.3.2 South Africans' pull factors**

The arrival of thousands of Francophone African migrants in South Africa is the result of the country's political and economic status. South Africa has attracted Francophone African migrants because of its educational infrastructures and its language factor. Finally, social capital could also be a factor in attracting migrants.

##### **4.3.2.1 Political achievements**

With the demise of apartheid in 1994, the country entered into a new era of democratisation. As indicates by Nest (1999: 76) the democratisation of South Africa after 1994 was characterised by the transformation of both state and civil society institutions. The transformation of state institutions is symbolised by changes in accountability and representativeness, while transformation in civil society is evident in the reversal of economic and racial inequality. Among the first major steps of this transformation was the adoption of a new constitution. The first draft of the new South African Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution of 1996 were designed under intensive mass political upheaval and violence.

The South African constitution distinguishes itself as taking into consideration South African realities, unlike most of constitutions of Francophone African countries, which are mainly the replicas of the French constitution, that of former colonial ruler (Rossantaga-Rignault, 2000: 83). The South African constitution is considered one of the most liberal in the world (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004: 235) because of its federal and unitary characteristics (Butler, 2004: 90). To avoid an accumulation of powers to one man or one institution, the principle of the separation of powers establishes three powers of government into the executive, the legislature and the judiciary at the national, provincial and municipal levels (Butler, 2004: 88).

The executive is the political body and it is represented by the President, the Cabinet and the senior public service. The president is the chief of the executive. Unlike in Francophone African countries in which he is directly elected by popular vote, the South African president is elected by the National Assembly as the head of his party or national list during the general elections. As head of the state and head of the government, he can appoint or dismiss ministers and directors general. The assembly can remove him from office by a vote of no confidence or after he has been the subject of impeachment. In assenting to laws and promulgating regulations, as well as having some authority in pardons, the president retains both some legislative and judicial powers. Cabinet is composed of 29 members. The ministers are collectively and individually responsible to the legislature, with the latter responsibility being predominant because ministers should defend government positions rather than individual ones. The South African cabinet system obliges the implementation of “a committed system based on clusters of related departments” (Butler, 2004: 94). Different departments have to organise and coordinate their actions as others departments can be affected by the actions of one or many.

The constitution has also established a number of independent offices with the duty to protest against illegal actions or abuses of power. Among these offices, there are the Auditor-general’s Office, the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality, the National Language Board and the Independent Electoral Commission (Butler, 2004: 94). The degree of independence of these offices confirms the liberal feature of the South African constitution in particular and its democracy in general.

The legislature consists of a bicameral system with the National Assembly of 400 members and the National Council of Provinces of 90 members. The members of the National Assembly are elected from both national and provincial lists. The members of the National Council of Provinces are the representatives of each province (ten per province) and are from the National Assembly. Taljaard and Venter (quoted by Van der Nest, 1999: 84) distinguish the roles, particularly their characteristic as “watchdogs”, of both chambers by pointing out that, on the one hand, the National Assembly is given responsibility to “monitor, investigate, inquire into and make recommendations relating to any aspect of the legislative programme, budget,

rationalisation, restricting, functioning, organisation, structure, personnel, policy formulation or any other matter it may consider.” On the other hand, the main duty of the National Council of Provinces is to watch over provinces’ interests at the national level of the government. In reality, the South African legislature system could be designed as a parliamentary system in the sense that the Cabinet depends on the parliament from which it is derived and because the Cabinet can be removed by the parliament. The South African parliamentary system is characterised by the fact that the president is also the head of government. It is clear that the leading party could easily pass projects and laws because the same party controls the executive and the legislature.

The judiciary system is in charge of the application of the law under which all citizens are equals. The judicial entities, i. e. different courts, ensure the resolution of conflict between the state, citizens and different institutions, and guarantee the constitutionality of some laws (Van der Nest, 1999: 98). There are two categories of courts of law in South Africa, with the lower courts, such as magistrate courts, and the higher ones, with the Constitutional Court being the apex of the judiciary system (Butler, 2004: 97).

#### **4.3.2.2 Economic opportunities**

For many decades, the economic opportunities offered by South African farms and mines attracted thousands of migrants from various regions, around the whole southern part of the African continent. The farm and mine industries were the main features on which the South African state modeled its labour policy, with the recruitment of non-South African workers at the core of that labour policy.

The ANC, the ruling party, has focused its economic policy on the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR), which followed the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was released before the 1994 elections and was conceptualised by the ANC and its allies, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The RDP highlights colonisation and apartheid as the main causes of political, economic and social injustices that South African society suffers. The RDP also single out five major points to correct those injustices through the adoption of

programmes, including the implementation of programmes to meet the basic needs of the poorer part of the population, to develop the neglected human resources of the population, to stimulate a fundamental restructuring of the economy, to democratise society and the state and to implement the RDP.

However, GEAR has been viewed as a move forward, as its macroeconomic characteristic enhances industrial policy, as well as providing more sufficient welfare systems, as the intervention of the state has been more effective (Butler, 2004: 50). The main policies of GEAR are listed in three major categories, including the improvement of macroeconomic balance and fiscal discipline, the increase of competitiveness and greater openness to the international flows of goods and services and the implementation of greater market liberalisation (Roux, 2002: 235). While GEAR expectations are still to be fully realized, and despite some threats such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the spread of poverty, the South African economy has shown “a great deal of progress since the country’s full first fully democratic election in 1994” (Roux, 2005: 172).

The first sign of success of the implementation of the economic policies by the ANC government has been the significant economic growth from 1994. Prior to that year, South Africa’s economic growth declined from the 1970s. As the figures in the UNDP report (2003: 12) show, the average annual real *per capita* growth was 2.9% during the 1960s and 0.7% during 1970s. The decrease continued in the 1980s with 0.6% before becoming negative (-1.5%) between 1990 and 1994. However, the average annual real *per capita* growth was positive soon after the arrival of the ANC to power. Over the first decade of the ANC government, the South African economic growth has an average of 2.7% annually (Roux, 2005: 172). Ironically, the trend of economic growth contrasts with the evolution of the economic and social wellbeing of the population. During the first decade post-apartheid, South Africa had moved down from the 90<sup>th</sup> to the 119<sup>th</sup> position according to the Human Development Index (HDI). Moreover, the South African index (0.666) is below the average of the index of developing countries (0.684).

The success of the South African economy is characterised by the combination of three factors (Maurice, 2004: 280). The first major factor is the abundance of

agricultural and natural resources, which are the consequences of a variety of climate and the capacity of human beings to transform those natural resources. The influence of a tropical climate in the north and the northeast regions of the country explains the exploitation of some products such as tropical fruits and vegetables, as well as sugarcane in KwaZulu-Natal. A Mediterranean climate in the Western Cape for instance supports the wine industry. South Africa also has one of the most important mineral deposits in the world, as the country detains respectively 80% of manganese, 56% of platinum, 35% of gold and 68% of chrome of world reserves (Maurice, 2004: 282). The South African economy is also sustained by a high level of industrial transformation, unlike the rest of the continent. This is ranged from the extraction and transformation of mineral resources as well as the production of energy and other resources such as aluminum, iron ore or steel. Along with these industrial activities, economic sectors such as tourism have witnessed a genuine growth since 1994.

Human resources are the second major factor explaining the success of the South African economy. The high profile of human resources in South Africa is illustrated by the importance of the tertiary sector, which more or less represented, as pointed out by *Jeune Afrique* (2004, 232), about 65.2% of the GDP in 2004. Financial services, for instance, are the best on the continent. Indeed, they are well developed and contribute approximately 20% of the GDP (Maurice, 2004: 288). Three major institutions lead financial activities. Firstly, there is the JSE (Johannesburg Securities Exchange), the financial market. Secondly, the South African Reserve Bank, which is in charge of containing annual rates of inflation and to maintain the stabilisation of prices. Finally, there is a well-developed banking network. Most of banks' resources come from savings or investments from both local and foreign companies.

The last major factor behind South African economic achievement is the quality and the quantity of economic infrastructure. The country possesses a good communication network with roads, railways, ports and airports nationwide, which link to the rest of the world. Telecommunications are also developed, with actors such as telephone and internet operators and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which has expanded its coverage beyond South African borders.

The South African economy has performed better than the rest of the continent. Described as a great nation in the making (*Jeune Afrique*, 2005: 232), South Africa is an economic giant on the continent. Its GDP represents 40% of the whole continent. Likewise, of the 50 first African companies, 40 are South Africans. In reality, South Africa appears to be an island of prosperity within an ocean of destitution, in contrast with the disastrous economic features of the rest of continent. Unlike the rest of African countries whose economies still depend heavily on the exportation of raw materials, South Africa presents a more diversified economy, although for some scholars (Butler, 2004; Castells, 2000; Roux, 2002) mineral resources remain at the core of the economy. According to Butler (2004: 49), the diversification of the South African economy is illustrated by the domination of the services sector (65% of the GDP), followed by the secondary and the primary sector with respectively 20% and 13% of the GDP. The South African economy is viewed as a combination of both a low-wage dependent economy and a high-skilled, competitive emerging economy (Castells, 2000: 122), with high technology business contrasting with extreme poverty. Because of these performances the South African economy was ranked the twentieth largest economy in the world (Roux, 2002: 2003).

Furthermore, South African economic indicators and environment have increased foreign investors' confidence. As regards evaluation of investment risks, South Africa was considered in the same category as Thailand and Malaysia (*Jeune Afrique*, 2004: 232). However, South African economic growth has yet to be accompanied by large-scale jobs creation. It is estimated that the unemployment rate is more than 25%, if one considers the strict and official definitions (Butler, 2004: 62). Unemployment rates are different from one province to another and from one race to another, as well as gender specific. One of the consequences of this lack of job creation is the importance of the part played by the population involved in the informal sector (20% in 2004, according to *Jeune Afrique*).

#### **4.3.2.3 Academic reasons**

After the demise of apartheid, South Africa had a double task as far as education was concerned. Apart from redefining a new academic system by bringing all racial components of the society into it, the ANC government was obliged to draw up an academic system able to allow the country to respond to the challenges of

globalisation and able to be the driving force behind the economic development. It was a question of designing and implementing research and teaching programmes with the main objective of producing a competitive labour force in the globalised world. By doing so, the country would also be able to commercialise its academic system in the global market and to attract international students.

Higher education in South Africa is a national government competency that the 1996 Constitution puts under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education (DoE). The DoE is also mandated to lead the higher education institutions to complete national policy goals by ensuring and providing those institutions plans and funding as stated by the Higher Education Act of 1997 (Cloete *et al.*, 2004: 5). Along with the DoE, the Council on Higher Education (CHE) is also a major actor in higher education. It is a statutory and independent advisor to the DoE. The CHE has constitutional missions, including “monitoring the achievements of policy goals, reporting to the Parliament the state of higher education, ... contributing to the development of higher education generally, and ensuring quality assurance (programmes accreditation, programmes reviews institutional audits and quality promotion” (Cloete *et al.*, 2004: 6).

The South African higher education system nowadays comprises public institutions, including universities, universities of technology and comprehensive universities, as well as private institutions. The number of public universities and technikons has been brought down as a consequence of the merger of higher institutions. The merger of higher institutions was one of the major measures undertaken by the government to allow students from all social origins to gain access to higher education, and to enhance opportunities for research and responsiveness for higher institutions. As a result of the merger, the country counts eleven universities, five universities of technology and six comprehensive universities.<sup>13</sup> The country also has a number of private higher institutions.

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<sup>13</sup> The new institutions after the merger are: eleven universities (University of Cape Town, Rhodes University, University of the Free State, University of KwaZulu-Natal, University of Limpopo, North-West University, University of Pretoria, University of Fort Hare, University of Stellenbosch, University of the Western Cape and University of the Witwatersrand), five universities of technology (Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Central University of Technology, Durban Institute of Technology, Mangosuthu Technikon, Tswane University of Technology and Vaal University of Technology) and six comprehensive universities (University of Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, University of South Africa, Walter Sisulu University of Technology and Science, University of Venda for Science and Technology and University of Zululand)

The government has committed itself to ensure and maintain a financial backup to enable higher institutions to achieve their mission. Government spending for higher institutions was about 2.6% (approximately ten billion rand) of its total budget for the academic year 2004-2005. Generally, universities' funds come from three different origins. Firstly, there are government allocations, which represent about half of their resources. Secondly, there are students' fees which count for about 25% of their income. Lastly, private funds are provided by investments, fund-raising donations or entrepreneurial activities. However, government has redefined its funding framework which is both goal-oriented and performance related. It is goal oriented in the sense that government looks at the universities which are keen to achieve national policy goals. The new funding framework is also performance related because it emphasises teaching and research outputs. The teaching output grants are awarded for the numbers of full-time students, their field of study and their course level, whilst the research output grants are set to encourage research and publications.

South African higher institutions are a key factor within the government policy on research development. Multidisciplinary fields of research aim to overcome the challenges on the path of South African development. Those fields of research are generally "characterised by excellence and generation of high-quality fundamental and applied knowledge for scientific publishing in local and international publications" (Cloete *et al.*, 2004: 20). Research fields are roughly framed into four main sectors: higher education (21% of the total of the research is undertaken in this sector), the private sector (56%), the government sector (22%) and the non-profit sector. Government spends approximately ten million rand on research and development or 0.81% of the GDP for 2003-2004. Because research and development spending is considered as one of the indices to appreciate an economy's competitiveness, the South African government has targeted to increase the country's research and development expenditure to one per cent by 2008. The percentage of research and development of the South African GDP is below the percentage of the wealthiest countries (approximately 2.3%). Furthermore, out of the 72 countries most advanced technologically, South Africa was rated at the 39<sup>th</sup> position in 2001, as far as the technology achievement index is concerned, ahead of the countries such as Brazil and China. Moreover in the same year, researchers in higher education in South Africa realised 5 311 publications. Another increase as far as research is concerned



has been the amount of income from contract research, which increased from 288 millions rand to 637 million between 1996 and 2000. However, South Africa still lacks researchers. As a matter of fact, the 14 129 registered in the country represent a number of 2.2 researchers for 1 000 people. In comparison, Sweden has 10.6 researchers for 1 000 people and Russia 7.4. However, the South African average is superior to the Brazilian or the Chinese ones.

In contrast to most countries on the African continent, South African higher education is characterised by its ability to produce highly rated graduates, with knowledge, competencies and skills (Cloete *et al.*, 2004: 20). South African higher education is likely to play a central role in the satisfaction of political, economic and social needs of the country and the continent. South African higher education institutions have proven themselves at the international level with new forms of information and communication technology and are part of the international higher education market. One of the other distinctions of South African higher institutions on the continent is their reputation. The first four African universities according to the Academic Rankings of World Universities are on the continent South Africans.<sup>14</sup> The reputation of South African universities is the reason given by some students to explain their choice of South Africa as a destination to study: “My parents knew that UCT was internationally recognised and they wanted me to have more options” (Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004).

These are the reasons why foreign students have been increasingly enrolled at South African public universities and private institutions. Foreigners come to teach and

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<sup>14</sup> Alumni and staff winning Nobel Prizes and field medals, highly cited researchers, articles published in Nature and Science, articles indexed in major citation indices and the *per capita* academic performance of an institution are the academic or research performances that the Academic Rankings of World Universities considers criteria to rank the top 500 universities. For the 2004 edition, the first African universities are University of Cape Town, University of Witwatersrand, University of Pretoria and University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Aduda and Matumba (2005) point out another university ranking by Intern Lab, a European organisation on science, technology and higher education. The Intern Lab ranking takes into account university's outputs, quality of graduates, facilities and general contribution to new knowledge, as well as the level of application of science and technology, the universities' presence on the internet and their use of information and technology. The top 10 of the ranking lists 9 South African universities with the University of Cape Town, the University of Stellenbosch, the University of Pretoria, the University of Rhodes, the University of Witwatersrand, the University of Western Cape and the University of South Africa occupying the first 7 places.

conduct research in South Africa because of the quality and the quantity of the infrastructure the country possesses.

### **4.3.3 Summary of pull factors in South Africa**

#### **4.3.3.1 Language factor**

Along with the reasons already mentioned, Francophone African migrants often point out the language factor as the motive for their arrival in South Africa. Many migrants believe that mastering an international language, particularly English, other than French is a major boost toward satisfying the demands on the international market:

My mother left Congo twenty years ago with my father to Japan because my father got a bursary in Japan to finish his doctorate. And now he is working there. And the reason why we came here, my mother, my sister and me, it is because she wanted us to be able to speak another language rather than Japanese because we could only speak Japanese. It was either between Belgium and South Africa. Because it was difficult to start studying in French, we chose to come to South Africa where English is used, it was quicker to adapt (Congolesse student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004).

#### **4.3.3.2 South Africa as a stopover**

The choice for coming to South Africa could be interpreted to a lesser extent as a consequence of failure to move to Europe or America. South Africa is viewed as an alternative to European or American countries. The country is considered a stopover because South Africa is closer in terms of transportation and communication links to European, American and Asian countries. In the meantime, migrants can make and save money for future moves elsewhere. In a few cases, arrival in South Africa is unexpected:

My focus was to leave Congo and to go to a refugee camp in Malawi. And eventually from there, look at green pastures. Probably thinking of the United States or going to Australia or something like that. But while in Zambia, I was presented an opportunity for going to Mozambique rather than Malawi. This is why I went to Mozambique. I got another opportunity for coming to South

Africa. This is why I came to South Africa. Of course with no intention to stay at all, just to move on (Congolesse refugee, Cape Town, October 30 2004).

#### **4.3.4 Perceptions of potential migrants about South Africa**

For many Africans who are outside the country, South Africa is well known because of its political history. The country became famous in Francophone Africa during the apartheid era, when news and images received from Western media portrayed South Africa as the place where the Black majority was oppressed by the White minority. For many Francophone Africans, South Africa therefore remains primarily, the country of apartheid:

I heard about South Africa when I was at primary school. On the blackboard of our classroom in Saint Louis the schoolmaster had written: Apartheid is a crime against humanity, especially in South Africa. Since then, it has stayed in my mind (Senegalese man, Libreville, 21 July 2004).

South African history is perceived as showing political resistance to the penetration of Europeans. The broadcast in the 1980s of the movie *Chaka Zulu* in most Francophone Africa countries popularised the country's history in Africa. Nowadays, the country is seen through the struggle history of the country:

South Africa is a great country which has a long history with great names like the king Chaka Zulu. It is also a country which has a great culture with beautiful traditional dances like the Zulu dances. But people of South Africa have suffered a lot because of the policy of apartheid. Fortunately God gave them sons like Nelson Mandela to free them. And the destiny also helped them a lot because at the right moment on the other side, Whites had an outstanding leader, who wanted the well-being for his country, De Klerk (Malian man, Libreville, 27 July 2004).

Migrants' perceptions about South Africa rely on the media and social capital. From the media, South Africa is seen as a new and growing economic powerhouse on the continent, a country able to show other African countries the path of development: "South Africa is a good country according to what I get from media. It is a country with more opportunities than here." (Nigerian migrant, Libreville, 23 July 2004).

Friends and family members who are already in South Africa often confirm the idea of South Africa as a country of opportunities more than most of the other African countries. The idea of migrating to South Africa is a real possibility for some, but many factors are taken into account:

I must sufficiently prepare myself, to see if first I must go alone and thereafter to call my family. These are all the questions that it is necessary to solve before undertaking any departure. Going to South Africa will be useful for me in that sense that I will go to perfect my speciality in better conditions. I believe that they have good hospitals because many Gabonese who have money go there to be looked after. I will also go to learn a new language, because mastering English almost becomes an obligation in these days of globalisation. Finally the other reason of going to South Africa will be to discover a new culture (Cameroonian, Libreville, 27 July 2004).

However, South Africa is also perceived as a home for xenophobia and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As far as these issues are concerned, media and social capital also play a major role in building popular perceptions. These issues therefore contribute to consideration of South Africa as somehow not an ideal destination:

Frankly, I hate South Africa because some of brothers who are there tell us that people are racists and xenophobes. I think that racism is not over yet and even through the media we see how dogs are let loose on foreigners. How can Black leaders of an African country tolerate such things on Black brothers of other African countries, who also helped them when they were struggling against apartheid? And there is much AIDS there. It is not a good country (Senegalese man, Libreville, 21 July 2004).

Lack of social capital also is viewed as inconvenient for migrating. Few people outside South Africa consider coming to the country if they are not part of a community network:

South Africa appears to be a good country, but I do not know anyone there who can help me. This is why I prefer to go to France. And France is more

developed than South Africa. Otherwise if I knew people, I could first go there to have more money and sure that from there, it may be easier to go to Europe than here (Congolese, Libreville, 29 July 2004).

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

The departure of Francophone Africans from their countries of origin relies on a combination of several factors. The evolution of political life since independence in Francophone Africa with some consequences such as the implementation of the single-party regime, the arrival of soldiers as heads of state, the long-term reign of some presidents, the expansion of numerous conflicts, the collapse of the economies of these countries, the spread of poverty, socio-cultural context, environmental catastrophes and the collapse of academic system have also created a range of migrants to various countries, including South Africa. South Africa attracts people from other parts of the continent and beyond by its political achievements with the organisation of democratic elections, freedom of the press and the implementation of several institutions of regulation, as well as the country's economic leadership on the continent and its academic infrastructures. These push factors in Francophone Africa and pull factors in South Africa define the features of migrants and their modes of arrival, which are different from one category to another as well as from one migrant to another within each category.

## **Chapter Five**

### **THE ARRIVAL AND THE LIFE OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICANS IN CAPE TOWN**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

The prime focus of this chapter is the analysis of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town, especially their modes of arrival and living conditions in the city. In so doing, the chapter identifies the categories of migrants considered for the study and discusses their differences and singularities; where relevant, aspects of South African state policy towards migrants are described with each category. This chapter first summarises the cosmopolitan quality of the city as a consequence of various historical flows of migration. Secondly it gives a profile of legal migrants, students, refugees and extra-legals. The profile of refugees and extra-legals is less detailed quantitatively than the profile of legal migrants and students because less official data is available.

#### **5.2 The arrival of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town**

In this section, the relation between Cape Town and the arrival of Francophone African migrants is considered. Firstly, the section outlines Cape Town as a city with a historical legacy of migration. Secondly, the section discusses the reasons why migrants view Cape Town as a destination of their extended migration. Lastly, the profiles of the categories of migrants considered in this study are presented.

##### **5.2.1 Cape Town a city of migration**

Considered the oldest city in the southern part of the continent, the mother of cities has seen itself transformed from a mere station supplying goods for sailors during the exploration era at its beginning in the middle of the seventeenth century to a multiculturalist city at the beginning of the third millennium. Cape Town is primarily the outcome of the history of the migration of people from various regions.

The station at the Cape, created after the arrival of Jan Van Riebeck on 6 April 1652, was viewed first of all as a stopover for the supply of fresh water, fruit, vegetables,

and meat, as well as for ship repairs for ships en route to Asia. The station was the property of the *Vereenigde OostIndische Compagnie* or *VOC* in other words the Dutch East India Company. Although the Company allowed independent settlers to establish themselves beyond the limits of the station area, due in part to the overpopulation within the station area (Terreblanche, 2002: 155), the supplies in agricultural products were not sufficiently forthcoming. The arrival of European settlers was followed by the arrival of the first forced immigrants to the Cape, slaves needed by both the Company and the private farmers to be used as farm workers and domestic servants.

Terreblanche (2002: 157) defines three phases of the arrival of slaves in the Cape. During the initial phase (from 1652 to 1717), slaves already outnumbered the settlers as the slave population counted for about 2000 people. Up until the second phase, the slave population kept growing and reached 29 000 when the British suspended the slave trade. The need for more slaves during the last phase (which ended in 1838) was dictated by economic expansion. The slave population in the Cape was particular because of their cosmopolitan composition, as the slaves were from such diverse origins as Western Africa, Angola, Mozambique, the Indonesian archipelago and the Indian subcontinent. Martin (1999: 51) notes that 26.4% of the slaves in the Cape came from the African continent (except Madagascar, which supplied 25.1%) and of 25.9% were from the Asian continent.

Over the years, the Cape was transformed by a “creolisation process” because of “extensive miscegenation between slaves and whites, and between slaves and Khoisan” (Terreblanche, 2002: 158). The creolisation process resulted in a mixed society within which each part brought its own culture and interchanged it with another to build a unique one. That mixed society also distinguished itself from the world of the masters of the slaves. Language, religion and music were among the cultural elements which characterised the creolisation of the Cape society. Apart from the language used by the Khoikhoi people and the Dutch spoken by Europeans settlers, other European languages such as French, Portuguese, Portuguese Creole and various Asian languages were also spoken in the Cape (Martin, 1999: 57). Dutch also became creolised and a new language emerged known as Afrikaans.

As pointed out by Martin (1999: 55), Christianity was not fully adopted by slaves or the Khoikhoi populations because European settlers decided not to Christianise the slaves. The Asian slaves developed and spread Islam across the Cape under the guidance of Sheik Yusuf of Macassar (Martin, 1999: 55).

The interaction between different cultures resulted in a large repertoire of music and dances. European settlers developed a habit of having slave orchestras. Apart from entertaining their masters, the slaves also played and danced for their own pleasure in the taverns or on the streets. Later, the expression of joy, celebrated through music and dances, particularly during the New Year, gave birth to Cape Town's New Year festival (Martin, 1999: 64).

The evolution of Cape Town has been characterised by its transformation into one of the main entries of European imperialism into the continent. Thereafter, the city was remodelled according to apartheid policy which separated areas according to races. Relocations were undertaken through legislative tools such as the Native Land Act of 1913, the Group Areas Act of 1948 and the Natives Resettlement Act of 1954 (Hofmeister, 2001: 1819). The redeployment of the population of District Six to the Cape Flats is one famously tragic relocation. In 1966, District Six which was considered too close to the centre of the city was declared a white area according to the law. District Six was viewed as the epicentre of the coloured culture, with coloured secondary schools and high quality intellectuals (Ross, 1999: 136).

The configuration of Cape Town is still dominated by the legacy of fragmentation and segregation (Turok, 2000: 4). Cape Town, like other cities in the country, was organised along racial lines to keep the population separated. As pointed out by Planact (quoted by Liebenberg, 2002: 36), the apartheid city was characterised by "racial division of residential areas, buffer zones between residential areas, racial separation of amenities, separation of the poor from social facilities, informal settlement on the urban fringe and urban sprawl." One of the major consequences of apartheid city planning is the importance of physical mobility, especially for low-income workers from their zones of habitation to their workplaces. Considering the results of the 1996 census, Turok (2001: 6) points out that "The Cape Town CBD, together with the northern and southern arms, houses some 37% of the population but



contains over 80% of all jobs in the CMA.” A real urban integration has been proposed as one means to develop the city. In fact, the construction of low- income housing closer to established employment centres and the development of an economic base in the township are ways to a solid integration of the city.

The economic development of Cape Town has been dominated by important investments in economic zones such as Tyger Valley, Milnerton, the Waterfront, the CDB and Claremont. According to Turok (2001: 14), decentralisation, deconcentration, northern drift and differentiation are the four keys points of those operations of investment. He argues that decentralisation has been effective by moving away some economic activities from the CDB to the suburban centres. Although not a new pattern of development in the city, decentralisation has in the last twenty years been prominent by its acceleration. Decentralisation has also been effective for office rents, which is lower in some zones such as Tyger Valley or Claremont than in the CDB. Turok also admits that through deconcentration economic activity has been moved away from established centres to a more dispersed pattern of development. Service providers such as accountants, lawyers and IT suppliers have established their offices in higher-residential areas, mainly in the northern suburbs. This has put them closer to suburban customers. Deconcentration has also been illustrated by siting business parks and office buildings on under-utilised land outside the economic zones. That is the case for parts of school playgrounds in Camps Bay and Rhodes, the racecourses in Kenilworth, golf courses and sports clubs.

As far as northern drift is concerned, property development has allowed private investment, jobs and resources to move northwards. Between 1999 and 2001, 72 major projects were undertaken in the northern suburbs with 35 in the central city districts, 24 in the southern suburbs and nine in the southeast. Finally, Turok points out that differentiation has seen “economic centres to specialise in different market segments.” Environment, prices and residential segregation are the driving forces behind the targeting of specific groups of the population by retailing and consumer services. Shopping malls such as Sanlam Centre in Bellville and N1 City in Goodwood are close to lower income and mainly non-white consumers, while Cavendish Square in Claremont and the Waterfront are upmarket shopping malls.

Differentiation can be viewed as an obstacle to integration of the city since it enhances segregation and spatial separation.

Since 1994, the administrative boundaries of Cape Town have also changed. The first change occurred in 1999, when the 39 local authorities and 19 administrations were transformed to seven councils. After the local elections of December 2000, the seven councils were demarcated into a unique council called the Cape Metropolitan Area (Eva: 2002: 1). According to the 2001 census, the racial makeup of the city was represented by 48.13% Coloured, 31.68% Blacks, 18.75% White and 1.43% Indians. Meanwhile, the most spoken language at home was Afrikaans with a percentage of 41.4%, followed by isiXhosa with 28.7% and English 27.9%. According to Eva (2002: 1), the population of the Cape Metropolitan Area was approximately 3 million in 2002, a number expected to rise to 3.4 million by 2005.

South Africa in general and Cape Town in particular have been reintegrated into the world economic and political arena after the demise of apartheid. The city, as well the whole country is now part of the integrated and globalised world, mostly because of the technological innovations and information technologies which have made the world a shrinking place. Within the integrated world, some cities, called world cities, play a pivotal role as they are hubs of international finance and business, corporate and communication services, as well as carriers of mass information and culture (Van der Merwe, 2004: 1). World cities, because of infrastructures, facilitate the flows of capital, people, information and commodities, and focus on the relationships and connections between them. According to the seven hypotheses described by Sassen (2001: 1810), Van der Merwe proposes to take into account the unique context of historical, geographical, cultural and developmental settings before conceptualising, analysing and integrating any global feature in Africa. He has come out with a recommendation that puts Johannesburg as the strongest contender in sub-Saharan Africa to satisfy international recognition as a world city. Two other African cities, Cape Town and Nairobi come behind Johannesburg.

These cities attract highly skilled people to satisfy the needs expressed by the role and profile of world cities which also are favourable destinations for thousands of unskilled workers to be domestic servants, waiters or drivers of the highly skilled

people. If one considers Cape Town a world city regarding Africa or as a contender to be a world city according to international expectations, it will become obvious that Cape Town is also attracting thousand of migrants, especially from all over the continent.

## **5.2.2 The reasons for coming to Cape Town**

### **5.2.2.1 Cape Town as an alternative**

Johannesburg has been the main South African gateway to the rest of the world since the readmission of the country into the international arena. The arrival of thousands of foreigners in Johannesburg did not begin with the reintegration of South Africa into the international community, because Johannesburg had in fact been one of host cities for mine workers since the discovery of gold when the Witwatersrand main reef was uncovered in 1886. The creation of the city itself was the outcome of the need of migrant workers. In fact, one of the constraints on the gold industry in the Transvaal was that the price of gold was fixed in London. It was therefore vital to minimise the costs, especially wages, as low as possible in order to maximise profits. The outcome was the recruitment of thousands of unskilled and cheap workers throughout the southern part of the African continent.

Nowadays, Johannesburg in particular and the Gauteng Province in general remain the primary destination for migrants within South Africa as showed by the Figure 4 and as illustrated by Jacobsen and Landau (2003: 3). Of the population of the Gauteng Province, 5.4% was foreign born in comparison to 2.3% for the whole country. For many people, as for its Executive Mayor, Amos Masondo in 2004, Johannesburg has been considered as a lure for South African nationals as well as for people from the rest of the African continent and beyond (Landau, 2004: 13).

Johannesburg is the first African city likely to be considered a global city (Landau, 2004; Van der Merwe, 2004) offering economic, educational and cultural possibilities to a diverse, dynamic and heterogeneous population. Johannesburg is also the most well known city outside South Africa (Bouillon & Morris, 2001: 35). It is therefore the first choice of Francophone Africans coming to South Africa. “Honestly speaking, the only city I knew before coming here was Johannesburg. “When I came to South Africa, it was to Johannesburg” (Cameroonian man, Cape Town, 22 October 2004).

By being the most well known city in South Africa for many Francophone Africans, Johannesburg is considered the first choice to satisfy their reasons for arrival in the country. In comparison, in many Francophone African countries, most economic, cultural and educational activities are centralised in the main cities, especially the capitals. This is the case of Dakar in Senegal, Libreville in Gabon, Bamako in Mali and Brazzaville in Congo. In Gabon, for instance, more than half of the total population lives in Libreville (Pambou-Loueya, 2003: 334). Many Francophone African main cities have transportation links with Johannesburg, as Francophone African airline companies have considered Johannesburg to be the main South African city to serve. In this case, the choice of Johannesburg, the biggest the South African city, as port of entry into South Africa is merely a matter of convenience .

For many Francophone African migrants the choice of coming to Johannesburg is an individual initiative.

I did not have any choice because the most important thing to do was finding any kind of way to make a living. While in Zambia, we paid money to someone to organise the trip for us and we did get help in Johannesburg when we arrived. This is why we came to Johannesburg; we did know that much about South Africa (Rwandese refugee, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005).

The choice of coming to Johannesburg by Francophone African migrants also depends on social capital implemented by migrant communities in Johannesburg to enhance further arrivals. Various familial, religious and trafficking networks are the main reasons why many Francophone African migrants prefer Johannesburg as port of entry into South Africa:

Fortunately for me, I had a friend who was also a student. He arrived two years before my arrival in Johannesburg. We kept in touch by exchanging letters and he told me about South Africa, about the situation here. When I came, I already knew what I was expected (Cameroonian man, Cape Town, 20 October 2004).

However, migrants often do not reach the objectives they expected before their arrival in Johannesburg. In general, African migrants are confronted with several obstacles. One of these is the lack of economic opportunities. Many migrants are unable to find a decent work position despite their level of education. In Johannesburg, the migrants' first experience in South Africa is their inability to make a livelihood or achieve their expectation due to "prohibitions on work, lack of identity documents or papers demonstrating professional qualifications, and discriminatory hiring practices" (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003: 6).

It is almost impossible to find a descent job when you are a refugee. They will ask something impossible of not hiring you such as a South African ID or a work permit. How a foreign refugee can have a South African ID? I know some friends of mine who had a chance to get a job. Yes there are some refugees who are working and earning money allowing them to live decently, but the percentage is too low (Congolese refugee, Johannesburg, 28 March 2005).

In Johannesburg, migrants are also confronted by administrative hurdles from the Department of Home Affairs, particularly regarding the issue of acquiring documents. Although the fact that possessing required documents does not guarantee social integration, documents could facilitate migrants' lives by giving access to social or banking services for instance. The waiting period often lasts longer than the six months stated by law:

When I arrived, I went unsuccessfully to Home Affairs for two months to try to get proper documents. Then I was introduced to someone, an interpreter, who could help me. I gave him money and few days later I got my documents. And we get the documents for a month or three only. When your documents are expired, you have to go back to Home Affairs. But you do not often get a chance to have the documents through the official channel; you do not have any choice than going to see the same person who helped you before. And to get the refugee status, the process is even longer and difficult. You have to give more money (Congolese refugee, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005).

The last major obstacles faced by migrants in Johannesburg are safety and the issue of xenophobia.

One of the reasons I found myself here is because South Africa is an African country. I told myself better going to an African country than going overseas because there, people make your life more difficult. This is an African country but the police make you like you do not belong here. My worry and my questions are: why they only arrest black illegal migrants, black Africans? What about Chinese, European, Arabs? Why only Black Africans? This is where xenophobia comes out because they look at the colour of your skin to judge you (Cameroonian man, Johannesburg, 28 March 2005).

One of the main reasons behind the interest in Cape Town was the growing number of foreigners in Johannesburg, which was already considered overpopulated by foreigners. Considered, along with the Nigerians, as the most important African community in Johannesburg, Zairians were estimated by Bouillon and Morris (2001: 70) to be around 23 000 in 1995. The search for other cities with better opportunities was therefore the cause of the move of thousands of Africans down to the Western Cape. By being a port of entry, Cape Town gave the opportunity to some migrants to take the first chance and start their settlement in the city before moving around the country.

The growing number of Francophone Africans in Cape Town could also be viewed as the consequence of the first settlements in the city. Arrivals might have been encouraged by the success of “the pioneers” who thereafter either asked others to join them or motivated others to do so. In this case, “the pioneers” contribute to spreading knowledge about Cape Town back to their own countries or their last residence. Therefore, as pointed out by Olaleye (2000: 133), “the information becomes crucial in understanding the factors underlying the decision of African immigrants to move to Cape Town.” The search for a safer place could be the reason, at first glance, for the increase in the number of migrants in Cape Town between 1996 and 2001.

#### **5.2.2.2 Cape Town as the first choice**

Some migrants interviewed arrived in Cape Town straight from their countries of origin. As far as the categories considered, mostly legally employed migrants and students consider Cape Town the first choice when they migrate to South Africa. The outcomes of this study reveal that the choice of Cape Town is made when the migrants are still in their countries of origin. By applying for work and student permits in their home countries, these two categories of migrants are aware of Cape Town before their arrival in South Africa.

Yes I knew back home that I was going to Cape Town and I came straight to Cape Town. I just spent one night in Johannesburg because when I landed it was very late. So, I took another plane to Cape Town the following morning (Ivorian man, Cape Town, 19 October 2004).

Apart from the reasons mentioned above, the choice of Cape Town as a destination in South Africa is because of its reputation and the opportunities the city can offer. It must be emphasised that the preference of Cape Town by some migrants over Johannesburg does not mean that the Mother City offers more economic or academic opportunities than Johannesburg. The number of the foreign population is larger in Johannesburg than in Cape Town, if one considers the results of the 1996 and 2001 censuses or other figures on Francophone African migrants in South Africa (see Appendix). However, for many interviewees Cape Town could offer a better chance of getting a job than Johannesburg:

When I arrived in Johannesburg for the first time, I succeeded to get a job. When my contract expired, I decided to go to Cape Town because people had been saying that it was easy to find a job there. I left Johannesburg by train on Friday night. On Saturday I arrived in Cape Town and on Tuesday I found a job (Congolese, Cape Town, 29 March 2005).

The arrival of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town can also be interpreted as a no-choice situation. Students who are already in the country especially fall into this category because they generally go where their applications are accepted:

First I contacted some Congolese who were already at UCT for a while but things did not go well because they wanted to spoil my money. Fortunately for me, my uncle helped me a lot. And I was in touch with a German lecturer who agreed to supervise me. Then I decided to come down. After a discussion with the head of the department, everything seemed fine. However, with the rest of the staff of the department, it was difficult because they wanted to be sure that there would not be a lack of funding as far as my sponsorship is concerned. Then I chose another department and my uncle step up as my sponsor (Congolese student, Cape Town, 22 March 2005).

The comparison of some indicators between Johannesburg and Cape Town can also help to better understand some of the reasons why some migrants prefer to move to Cape Town. The indicators give some benchmarks of conditions and performance over time. The indicators outlined here are those considered by the South African Cities Network, which aims to define a City Development Index (CDI). The index is intended to measure the state of the development of cities through five sectors: education, health, waste, infrastructure and city-level gross geographic product (South African Cities Network, 2004: 174).

**Table 9: Comparison of the population and employment rates between Johannesburg and Cape Town**

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Johannesburg</b>	<b>Cape Town</b>
<b>Percentage of population growth between 1996 and 2001</b>	<b>22.33</b>	<b>12.86</b>
<b>Percentage of employed people</b>	<b>70.85 (1996) 62.65 (2001)</b>	<b>80.45 (1996) 70.84 (2001)</b>

**Source:** South African Cities Network. 2004. *State of the Cities Report, 2004*.



As shown by the table above, the growth of the population is more prominent in Johannesburg than in Cape Town between the two years considered. One could conclude that the availability of resources then becomes rare, especially if the creation of wealth does not follow the same path as the growth in the population. The percentage of the employed population could corroborate this trend. The percentage of employed people is larger in Cape Town than in Johannesburg in both 1996 and 2001, although there is a decrease in both. However, the decrease is even more evident in Johannesburg. Although Table 5 does not specifically highlight the features of migrants, it nevertheless gives an indication of the situation in the two cities and could in some extent justify the belief that there are more chances to get a job in Cape Town than in Johannesburg, although the latter city has more job opportunities.

### **5.3 Profiles of Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town**

Legal African migration to South Africa was remodeled soon after the demise of apartheid. As far as the labour market is concerned, for instance, South African companies have been able to recruit further afield and outside the framework of contract migration which had regulated the arrival of the mine and farm workers from surrounding countries. The numerous migration acts have given a legal framework for Francophone Africans to enter South Africa. As described in Chapter 3, entering South Africa legally occurs through the various permits issued by the DHA as stated by the Immigration Act of 2002.

As defined by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2004: 20), legal migrants refer to documented people and their families authorised to enter a specific country, to stay and, if applicable, engage in a remunerated activity in the state of stay. Legal migration in South Africa is characterised by the dichotomised features of both emigration and immigration.

#### **5.3.1 Legal migration to South Africa**

Along with the emigration of thousands of South Africans (shown in Section 3.7 of Chapter 3), the other side of the dichotomy of legal migration in South Africa is the position adopted by the government towards immigration by strengthening the immigration policy since 1994. By choosing to restrict its immigration policy, South Africa has not attracted as many skilled migrants as possible. The dichotomy of legal

migration in South Africa is therefore illustrated by the departure of skilled South Africans overseas, while these departures have not been compensated by a large number of immigrants.

The country has not fully compensated for the departure of thousands of people abroad by the arrival of a more competitive or innovative labour force which South Africa desperately needs. Meanwhile emigration, along with the shortcomings in the education system, has allowed the country to face a shortage of higher skilled workers. The lack of skills is the main concern for the South African economy, as argued by the Minister of Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin: “in every sector of our economy, highly skilled labour is in demand and vacancies cannot be filled” (CDE, 2002: 7). The labour market is threatened by the rapid spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which creates more questions than answers, particularly concerning the future of labour force in South Africa. According to the United Nations estimations quoted by Akokpari (2002: 237), South Africa will lose approximately 25% of its labour force by 2020 as the bulk of this labour force, i.e. young people aged between 20 to 30, are either infected or at risk of being infected. Thus, in order to avoid facing a labour crisis in the near future, the South African government should reshape its immigration policy and making the country a more attractive place for thousands of migrants. South Africa could be a home for skilled migrants among the 7.1 million Africans who are economically involved in other countries on the continent (IOM, 2005: 40). Surely Africans will be more interested in coming to South Africa because the country is among the few that can offer more opportunities on the continent. However, foreigners could be reluctant to invest in a country with such a shortage of skilled workers.

Since 1994, South Africa has witnessed the arrival of thousands of foreigners who come to the country mostly for tourism, business or visits. According to Crush (2003), it is estimated that from 3.7 million of people entering to the country in 1992, the number has increased to 9.9 million in 1999. Apart from people entering South Africa for the reasons mentioned above, data realised by *Statistics South Africa* gives an insight into documented immigrants entering South Africa annually over a decade as shown below.

**Table 10: Documented immigrants in South Africa from 1993 to 2003**


<b>Years</b>	<b>Number of immigrants</b>
<b>1993</b>	<b>9 824</b>
<b>1994</b>	<b>6 389</b>
<b>1995</b>	<b>5 064</b>
<b>1996</b>	<b>5 407</b>
<b>1997</b>	<b>4 103</b>
<b>1998</b>	<b>4 371</b>
<b>1999</b>	<b>3 669</b>
<b>2000</b>	<b>3 053</b>
<b>2001</b>	<b>4 832</b>
<b>2002</b>	<b>6 545</b>
<b>2003</b>	<b>10 578</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>63 844</b>

*Source: [www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)*

The data does not take into account migrants who have regularised their situation despite entering into the country previously under another status. Nevertheless, the table highlights the decrease of documented immigrants in the country up to 2000. This could be explained by doubts raised outside the country following the taking over by the ANC government in 1994. Another reason might possibly be violence and safety, which have put Johannesburg among the most violent cities worldwide for some years. The HIV/AIDS pandemic and the low levels of the country's currency could complete the reasons which demotivate many people about possible to South Africa. However, the trend was reversed from 2001 to 2003, when the number of immigrants was greater than in 1993. The increase in the flow of migration is caused by the combination of several factors. The success in tourism has boosted the South African image worldwide. The success of the South African economy, the value of the currency, which is one of the strongest on the continent, and South African opportunities have also attracted foreigners. One can expect more newcomers in the future, especially with the forthcoming Soccer World Cup in 2010.

For a better understanding of the types of migrants coming to South Africa, it is important to establish their origins, especially the origins of African migrants and the places of their settlement inside the country.

**Figure 3: Percentage of foreign African migrants in South Africa in 1996 (N= 271 943) and 2001 (N= 345 151)**



*Source: statssa.gov.za*


According to both the 1996 and the 2001 census, a large number of Africans migrants in South Africa comes from the neighbouring countries of the SADC region. Despite a slightly decrease from 96.27% to 92.76% from 1996 to 2001, the bulk of immigrants still come from the sub-region. Besides the geographical proximity, South Africa has been the main destination in the southern part of the continent since the nineteenth century. Since 1994, the country has also attracted Africans coming from further afield. The table clearly shows the increase of people coming from outside the SADC region from 3.73 to 7.24% between the two years.

The end of apartheid opened the country's doors to many immigrants, especially Africans, because the number of mine and farm workers recruited throughout the sub-

region has decreased. Consequently, the percentage of people coming from the neighbouring countries has also decreased relative to the flow of African migrants coming from further afield. The end of armed conflicts in some countries such as Angola and Mozambique has also contributed to the decrease in the number of immigrants from the SADC countries. SADC countries are still the main providers of African migrants in South Africa, but other African migrants coming from outside the SADC region have increased between 1996 and 2001.

The results of both the 1996 and 2001 censuses provide an indication of the residence within the country of foreign African migrants as far as provinces are concerned, as described by the two figures below.


**Figure 4: Provincial percentage of foreign African migrants in South Africa in 1996 (N=271 943)**



**Source:** [www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)

The figure clearly shows Gauteng as the main receiving province in South Africa with regard to the residence of foreign African migrants in 1996. Gauteng is followed by provinces located on the borders of the country (with the exception of Northern Cape), namely Free State, North West, Northern Province and Mpumalanga. With 2.4 %, Western Cape is among the least attractive provinces as far as the foreign African migrants are concerned.

**Figure 5: Provincial percentage of foreign African migrants in South Africa in 2001 (N=345 151)**



**Source:** [statssa.gov.za](http://statssa.gov.za)

The overall trend shows an increase of the percentage of foreign African migrants in all provinces, with the exception of Free State and Northern Cape. These two provinces are also the least attractive border provinces. North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga followed Gauteng in hosting foreign African migrants. Although its percentage increases between 1996 and 2001, Western Cape remains among the least attractive provinces as far as the foreign African migrants are concerned.

The prominent economic role of Gauteng, particularly the importance of Johannesburg and the country's capital city (Pretoria) are among the reasons Gauteng

hosts most of foreign African migrants. Moreover, the proximity of neighbouring countries, including Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho could be a major factor behind the importance of North West, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Free State (in 1996), in hosting foreign African migrants.

### **5.3.2 Francophone African legal migration to Cape Town**

In this sub-section, I will focus on two types of migrants to describe the arrival and the lives of Francophone Africans in Cape Town, legal migrant workers and legal economic migrants. The term legal migrant worker is applied to those who occupy a remunerated activity in a private or public company. These are professionals such as doctors, lecturers, accountants and administrative assistants. Legal economic migrants are those who are self-employed by running their own businesses, especially in the informal sector, those considered in this study are mostly street sellers.


#### **5.3.2.1 A demographic profile of Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town**

As is the case at national level, an attempt to quantify Francophone African migrants in Cape Town is not an easy exercise. Several estimations have been released without giving the exact number. Roughly, Boaden (2002) points out a scale estimation from 30 000 to 50 000 foreign Africans living in the entire Western Cape.

The demographic profile of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town will be analysed through two categories of sources. I firstly consider the official data based on the 1996 and 2001 censuses.




**Figure 6: Repartition of the foreign African population in Cape Town in 1996 (N=6683)**



**Source:** [www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)

As far as Cape Town is concerned, the large number of foreigners in Cape Town came from the neighbouring countries, while Nigeria is the provider of migrants coming from the rest of the continent. At 5% Francophone Africans were the least populous migrant community residing in Cape Town, according the results of the 1996 census. Only a few years after South African readmission into the international political arena, Cape Town found itself invaded by Africans coming from further afield, some without any knowledge of the city. As illustrated by the figure below, the bulk of Francophone African migrants came from the countries that are members of the SADC, such as Mauritius and the former Zaire. The rest of the migrants were from the two countries involved in armed conflicts.


**Figure 7: Percentage of Francophone Africans in Cape Town in 1996 (N=353)**



**Source:** [www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)

Zaire (now DRC), surely and due in particular to political, economic and social problems, coupled with geographical proximity, was largely the provider of French-speaking Africans in Cape Town. The same problems plus armed conflicts which occurred after the implementation of democracy in Congo could be viewed as the motives behind the arrival of many Congolese in Cape Town. The presence of Algerians and Mauritians could be explained primarily by political and religious tensions (for Algerians) and geographical proximity (for Mauritians).


**Figure 8: Percentage of African migrants in Cape Town in 1996 (N= 6 683) and 2001 (N=12 103)**



*Source:* [www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)

Although the SADC countries remain the main source of foreign African migrants in Cape Town between 1996 and 2001, the percentage of migrants from these countries drops significantly between 1996 and 2001. This is mainly because the portion of foreign African migrants coming from the rest of Africa increases from 17.04 % to 35.78% between the two years.


**Figure 9: Repartition of the foreign African population in Cape Town in 2001  
(N=11914)**



**Source:** [www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)

The change between the two dates is due to the increase in the number of Francophone Africans in the tally of African migrants. By 2001, they represented 22% of African migrants, even more than migrants coming from the rest of African countries. However, the percentage of French-speaking Africans in Cape Town remains far less important than the percentage of people from the SADC countries. As far as their nationalities are concerned, from five countries in 1996, by 2001 migrants were coming from 13 different countries on the continent, as shown the figure below. It is also interesting to note that countries involved in armed conflicts, such as Congo, DRC, Rwanda and Burundi were the greatest suppliers of Francophone African migrants to Cape Town in 2001. Francophone African countries, such as Senegal, Mali and Cameroon, known as countries of emigration, were also represented.

**Figure 10: Percentage of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town in 2001 (N=2462)**



**Source:** [www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za)

Overall, Francophone African migration to Cape Town followed the general trend of African migration to South Africa between the years considered. As far as the volume of migrants is concerned, the flows of Francophone Africans, including migrants from the rest of continent, increased tremendously in Cape Town, Gauteng Province and the entire country. Although their volume also increased, the value of migrants from neighbouring countries dropped in the tally of African migrants in Cape Town, Gauteng Province as well as in the whole country. Except from the countries in the southern hemisphere of the continent, French-speaking Africans also came from Central and Western Africa and the northern part of continent.

I would like now to give a guesstimate the demographic profile of Francophone Africans in Cape Town by considering the data realised by three non-official sources, which highlight Francophone African migration to South Africa. Bouillon and Morris (2001), Fall (2004) and Letourneux and Zemmouri (2005) estimate that there were respectively 20 000, 250 000 and 110 000 French-speaking Africans in South Africa. From these figures, and as detailed in Appendix 2, I estimate the number of Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town was 13 500 in 2005.

### **5.3.2.2 The lives of Francophone Africans legal migrants in Cape Town**

Studying Francophone African migration to Cape Town primarily involves looking at the reasons behind their decision to leave their respective countries and their migration histories, i.e. their trip down to the southern tip of the continent. Despite being on the African continent, Cape Town is for many another world in the sense that it is far away from their home countries in distance and in their minds. For instance, it is easier for Moroccans, Algerians, Senegalese and Malians to reach Paris than Cape Town in term of distance.

As far as both legal migrant workers and legal economic migrants are concerned, there are two ways of reaching Cape Town. For 66% of the interviewees, their journey was straight from their countries to Johannesburg. “I took a flight from Dakar and we make a stop over in Libreville in Gabon for four hours before coming to Johannesburg.” (Senegalese man, Cape Town, 22 June 2004). For others, the trip to Cape Town looks more like multiple adventures. Here is the journey of a Cameroonian who spent almost three years between Buea in his country to Cape Town:

I left Cameroon in 1994, the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December. I went to Gabon where I was repatriated because I did not have a visa. They asked me to pay 175 000 F CFA but I had only 100 000 F CFA. I went back to the border, where I was beaten about two days. After three days in Yaoundé, I went to a town called Sangmalima. I travelled by foot about 600 kilometres from Sangmalima in Cameroon to Ouessou in Congo with two other guys during two weeks. One guy was sick on the way and he died in Brazzaville. In Ouessou, in the north of Congo, we travelled for a month to Brazzaville. I was locked up about seven

days because I did not have visa. I gave all money I had in my pockets, my last 25 000 F C F A. Because of the police I ran away to Pointe-Noire and I could not go to Luanda because in Angola there was a civil war. I was selling some dresses or bread just to survive. I stayed in Congo until 1997 when the civil war in Congo broke out. Finally, I took a visa and I came as a Congolese citizen and I arrived in Johannesburg on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November 1997. (Cameroonian man, Cape Town, 9 November 2004).

A small portion of legal migrants interviewed applied for the work permit in their home countries of origin before coming to Cape Town. The others obtained a work permit once in South Africa and after finding a remunerated job. For those in that latter category, some were obliged to find a way of making a living after their arrival. Despite their qualifications many sold curios on the streets while looking for a job. Most of these migrants found a job through networks established by those in Cape Town before them or through their own connections. The common point for all legal worker migrants is their level of instruction. All interviewees in this category have a tertiary education degree and some have long professional experience in their respective countries or in Europe. "I worked for almost 10 years in Belgium before coming to Kinshasa where I stayed for two years. Finally I came here" (Congolese men, Cape Town, 5 October 2004).

For legal economic migrants, there are two sub-categories. The first sub-category is represented by those with qualifications and who arrived in Cape Town hoping to find a decent and remunerated job. Unable to do so, they sell curios on the streets or work for another "brother" migrant. After a certain period and if they are still unable to find a remunerated job, they will consider their involvement in the informal trade as their permanent economic activity. They will then become self-employed and diversify their businesses to create more sources of money. Besides looking for a decent job, 75% of the respondents came to Cape Town to pursue their studies.

In 1999, I had only R300 when I started selling on the street. While selling, I gathered to open my shop. My aim of coming to South Africa was to continue studying. I thought that South Africa is like European countries where you can

study and work, where you can have part time job (Cameroonian men, Cape Town, 9 November 2004).

Many cannot fulfil their desire of pursuing their studies because of a lack of sufficient financial support. Not well informed, they discover the realities of the South African educational system as a shock.

The second sub-category of legal economic migrants is those who do not have a specific qualification or have none at all. They are the ones who encounter more difficulties after their arrival. Determined to find a way of making a living, their businesses grow after difficult moments and long periods of patience or loans from compatriots or other connections. They are the largest sub-category of legal economic migrants because many do not have another way of making a living. Most of them enter South Africa as students, refugees or asylum seekers before regularising their status. Many of them also spent several years in other countries before arriving in South Africa:

I came here to follow my husband. By the time I came, I had the status of refugee. But since last year I had a legal status and I decided to open this business in order to increase our incomes because my husband cannot afford all our needs by his own (Congolese woman, Cape Town 26 December 2003).

Not only migrants' objectives and arrivals different, but their choice of Cape Town also depends on the category to which each belongs. For legal migrant workers, especially those who came straight from their countries, Cape Town gives them the opportunity to work in the same conditions as their colleagues in Europe. However, for those who succeed in obtaining a work permit once in South Africa, as well as for legal economic migrants, their arrival in Cape Town could be interpreted as the result of their failure to reach their objectives in Johannesburg. Of the interviewees, 75% of the respondents did not have any idea of Cape Town, or what exactly the city could offer in terms of opportunities when they arrived in South Africa. Many of them learnt about the city once they arrived in the country. "Honestly I did not know anything about Cape Town. I found myself in Cape Town by accident." (Senegalese



man, Cape Town, 22 June 2004). Therefore, Cape Town represents a new destination in their sojourn in South Africa.

### **5.3.2.3 Explaining Francophone legal migration to Cape Town**

In their analysis of theories of migration, Kok and his counterparts (Kok *et al.*, 2003: 18) describe one of the reasons perpetuating migration through the institutional theory. The fundamental reason is the imbalance between the large number of people seeking to enter into capital-rich countries and the limited number of immigrants' visas these countries typically offer. One of the consequences of these imbalances could be the creation of niches in developing countries from which entrepreneurs will recruit. Therefore, developing countries are viewed as perpetual suppliers of migrants. On the other hand, the neo-classical economics theory highlights "geographical differences in labour supply and demand and by the resultant wage differentials" as the cause of the individual movements (Kok *et al.*, 2003: 13).

Considering these theoretical frameworks, it seems that migration in South Africa conforms to that explained by the institutional theory. Firstly, South Africa is a highly rated destination for thousands of Africans. However, an imbalance is evident by the decrease in the number of work permits granted to foreigners over time due to the restrictive policy on migration adopted by the government. Thus, although having a potential supply of workers, South African entrepreneurs cannot recruit freely in the African labour market. Some respondents admit that the hurdles encountered in the process of acquiring a work permit discourage many employers from recruiting foreigners.

The move of Francophone Africans to Cape Town is therefore based on individual decisions taken after measuring differences, especially the wages, between Cape Town and the areas where the migrants come from, on the one hand, and between Cape Town and Johannesburg, on the other hand. Considered as "human capital" (Stalker, 1994: 22), migrants move to Cape Town by expecting higher financial returns through remuneration because they offer their skills. Cape Town offers more job opportunities, not that there are more jobs in Cape Town in comparison to Johannesburg in terms of volume, but in the sense that the Francophone African migrants population is less significant in Cape Town than in Johannesburg. Therefore,

it could increase the chances of getting a job, especially if their French abilities are required. The reason for moving away from Johannesburg to Cape Town because of security appears to be a secondary aspect.

However, in some cases an individual initiative for moving to Cape Town is possible only if it coincides with the community context. Many migrants have moved down following the advice of countrymen who have requested that specific people help in Cape Town. It is the case of a Rwandese who came to Cape Town after having a harsh time in Johannesburg:

In Johannesburg it was very difficult. I was sharing the same flat with my sister and our mother. All of us were doing all kinds of jobs like plaiting hair or selling goods to survive despite having qualifications. Then, a countryman who was aware of our situation and my qualifications gave me the address of another Rwandese woman here in Cape Town who told her boss was looking for someone with my profile for the job. Obviously, she looked within the Rwandese community here before sending the news to Johannesburg (Rwandese women, Cape Town, 12 November 2004).

A well-organised community network is important to spread news around the country or abroad in order to integrate as many as possible into the community by helping them to settle. The community network then creates channels for further movements. One of the well-known community networks among French-speaking African migrants is without any doubt the *Mourides* Brotherhood, which is well-established in Cape Town and some of its members are sellers at the Cape Town train station.

The economic impact of Francophone migrants on Cape Town is a challenge to measure due to the lack of data. However, an attempt of estimating the benefits of legal Francophone African migrants for the city can be described, followed the interviews held with migrants.

One of the issues for migrants is the fear expressed by native citizens of losing their jobs to foreigners. At first glance, the expression of that fear could be real in the sense that many Francophone Africans in Cape Town have high educational degrees,

accompanied by experience. In theory, they could compete or come ahead of many South Africans to some extent by fulfilling the needs expressed by enterprises. But in reality, things are quite different. Because of the education implemented in almost all Francophone African countries, people who studied Arts are not specialists yet up to the Honours level. Besides, English proficiency is often required. Many are fluent in English only after spending a couple of years in the country, attending intensive language courses. Therefore, getting a decent job is a difficult task for them. Some migrants explain that difficulty by referring to the difference in the academic systems. They find that the academic system implemented in many English-speaking countries is more practical than the one in French-speaking countries, which emphasises theory. For former scientific and technical students, the situation is a bit different because of the more practical aspects of sciences. Potential fear of native citizens of losing out to foreigners can also be contested in another way. It is widely acknowledged that a job acquired by a migrant does not necessarily mean a job lost by a citizen of the host country.

One also could point out that a job offer in Cape Town does not necessarily go to Francophone Africans. Two reasons can explain that argument. The first reason is the hurdles imposed by legislation. A document released by the Centre for Development and Enterprises (CDE, 2002: 13) shows how difficult it is for a foreigner to obtain a work permit in South Africa. The Immigration Act of 2002 sets up a system of both quotas and qualifications in order to get a work permit. Annually, numerical quotas based on skills and qualifications are created by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Labour in collaboration with the Department of Home Affairs. Foreigners are invited to apply for work permits under those quotas. If anyone fails to fit those quotas, her/his application can still be examined through skills certification of the Aliens Control Act of 1991. These procedures of legislation take a long time and sometimes the bureaucratic hurdles amplify the slow pace. At the end, the work does not guarantee that work is ensured. Anyone else can get the position while the migrant is still busy looking for a work permit. The affirmative action policy implemented in South Africa is another hindrance for foreign African migrants seeking a decent job.

In general, the contribution of migrants is underestimated in Cape Town and throughout the country. Legal migration is frequently confused with other types of migration in the sense that they are more a burden than a resource for the South African economy. Meintjies (quoted by Maharaj, 2004: 13), defines the contribution of migrants to the economy of their host countries as follows.

Studies have shown that immigrants are, in fact, net contributors, not parasites. Immigrants are, on average, healthier, more energetic and better educated ...Consequently, they draw comparatively less on social welfare and other social services. Many pay tax and, through their entrepreneurship, make a positive injection to local economic development.

So, how could the contribution of Francophone African migration to the Cape Town economy be acknowledged? The contribution of Francophone African migrants appears to be the same than other categories of African migrants involved in the same activities.

The contribution of legal migrants can be appreciated through the various taxes they pay and money they spend in the city. A rough estimate of the contribution made by Francophone African migrants, with acknowledgement of limitations imposed by the uncertainty about the exact number of migrants (from the 2001 census) and guesstimate made in Appendix 2, could give some indication. I must also note that all migrants are not legal migrant workers.

Considering for instance that a migrant earns approximately R10 000 monthly (like one of the respondents) and his/her salary is cut down by 20% to pay taxes, his monthly contribution will be R2 000 as far as paying taxes is concerned. Considering that in 2005 there were 13 486 Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town, this means that their contribution as far as taxes are concerned was R26 972 000 monthly and 323 664 000 annually. Moreover, here are the monthly expenditures of an employee:

Rent: R2 500

Electricity: R300

Car maintenance: R700

Miscellaneous: R2 000

The tally is more than R7 000. The migrant has some R3 000 left that he might save or send back home.

It is difficult or impossible for migrants, upon arrival, to have access to credit from local banks without being an employee of a public or private company and without spending some time in the country. The bulk of the migrants' capital is made by money they brought from their origin countries. Another part of their capital comes from loans provided by their fellow countrymen or different associations. Lastly, there is a part that stems from their first earnings in South Africa. Therefore, from the beginning when they launch their activities, legal economic migrants inject more money into the local economy than they earn in the city.

Once their business is set up, legal economic migrants obviously earn a lot of money, sometimes more than those who have a remunerated activity. Even though they start selling on the streets with the purpose of finding a way of making a living while they are looking for a remunerated job, many remain in the informal trade because they are earning a lot of money from such businesses.

Their earnings are managed according to two main aspects: the profit and what they call the turnover. The turnover is part of the money they must reinvest to keep on running their activities. The profit is the sum of what they have to keep for themselves after all expenses. As argued by a Cameroonian, the two aspects, profit and turnover, are defined according to the influx of customers:

Weekly, I make about R24 000 for the turnover. It means that is good, because for the street business, a month and a week are different. For example, this week there is no customers. The turnover is going to be about R3 000. It means I can expect a profit of R15 000. I must also include costs (Cameroonian, Cape Town, 22 October 2004).

It means that when there are many customers, some legal economic migrants can make R12 000 profit weekly. The whole sum of turnover is to buy goods and to compensate for needs of the business. As far as the profit is concerned, they must

deduct money to pay the daily tax, which is in general R20 for street traders. Thus, they contribute R120 weekly if one considers that most of them are off on Sundays, their contribution is about R6 580 annually.

Apart from taxation, all street traders are unanimous that their contribution is more important than people think because they have brought employment opportunities. “I get a business which I employ South Africans and somehow, I have changed their lives. And they are not the first. I encourage some to study and their lives also have changed” (Cameroonian, Cape Town, 22 October 2004). When they start their business, migrants often employ their fellow countrymen. After a short period and when their business starts growing, they will open another one to give an opportunity to a countryman to find a way to make a living by being in charge of the first business. In some cases, they keep the same business and begin to employ South Africans. The number of employees can vary from one to ten according to the size of the business and the profitability.

A trader at the Cape Town station, who also attends some courses in at a local college, summarises his financial expenses as follows:

Tax: R20 daily

Employees: R50 daily

Fuel for the car: R20 daily

Rent: R700 monthly

School fees: R8 000 a year

Books R3 000 to R4 000 a year

We must also include expenses for food and clothes

By paying taxes, spending the bulk of their earnings locally and especially employing South Africans, the contribution of migrants is a real source of wealth for the local economy. However, this contribution is quite overshadowed by the fact that foreigners are viewed as a threat to employment for local citizens.

There is a kind of distribution of occupation according to nationalities, although this distribution of occupation is not rigid. Indeed, it appears that many migrants are involved in the selling of curios of various sorts, with Senegalese oriented towards leather products and watches from Asia, Congolese to skin-lightening creams and

cassette and video tapes of Congolese music, as well as parking-lot attendants and car guards (Sichone, 2003: 131).

#### **5.4 Profiles of Francophone African students in Cape Town**

Students have become a large part of people flows worldwide. The movements of international students have gradually increased and in 1997, it was estimated that 1.5 million people travel overseas for educational reasons (Ramphela, 1999: 10). In 2000, the number of people who were outside their countries of origin for educational reasons was 1.8 million. Estimates project the number of 7.8 million international students (OECD, 2001: 111). The increase of the number of students has been accompanied by the rise of economic benefits generated by students' flows. In the United States alone, the enrolment of foreign students engendered \$7 billion in 1997 (Ramphela, 1999:10).

More and more, students' movements are also regarded as a new form of migration, which can be framed into the internationalisation movement. Internationalisation is a movement which includes not only students but also the exchange of higher qualified personal.

The purpose of students' movements is to acquire knowledge and professional experience of countries other than their countries of origin. Furthermore, the movement of many African students is to acquire knowledge and professional expertise in better educational conditions. Moreover, the comparison between costs of studies and the conditions offered might explain the reasons for the arrival of many Africans to pursue their studies in South Africa, which offers almost the same conditions as some European and North American countries. Students therefore represent an important part of migrants in South Africa. For instance, according to the Gabonese embassy, 96% of Gabonese citizens in South Africa are students (Gabonese official embassy. Pretoria, 22 February 2004).

##### **5.4.1 Conditions of studying in South Africa**

For this study, all tertiary institutions in the Western Cape, including the three universities (University of Cape Town, University of Western Cape and Stellenbosch University) and the two technikons (Cape Peninsula and Peninsula Technikons) that

have merged into a unique institution called Cape Peninsula University of Technology, have been considered. After the demise of apartheid, the new government reformed higher education to an equal system for everyone to address historical inequalities. It was a question of shifting from an elitist and exclusionary system to a mass one, by allowing as many students as possible to enter higher educational institutions. By enrolling as many students as possible, the government was expected to support the extra charges (Ramphela, 1999: 17). The two strategies implemented by the Department of Education (DoE) and described by Goastellec (2005: 13) were, on the one hand, the amalgamation of higher educational establishments in order to reduce their number and, on the other hand, the redefinition of the access to universities and technikons. The outcome of the DoE strategy has allowed South African tertiary education to keep the balance between elitist and open doors. The elitist feature mainly focuses on the formation of the best students and the pursuit of excellence. Meanwhile, the government has to increase its commitment as far as financial support is concerned. The elitist features of South African higher education, as well as its search for excellence, have made South African tertiary education attractive on the international scene. From 1994 to 2004, the number of international students at the University of Cape Town (UCT) alone has increased by 34%. Goastellec (2005: 13) argues that this increase of international students has been made possible by the commitment of some institutions to go beyond the level of 10% of international students required to be registered in some courses.

Two categories of international students, as described by Ramphela (1999: 8), comprise the clientele of South African higher educational institutions. On the one side, there are students from developed countries who are supposed to be more financially secure because some currencies used in their countries are stronger than the rand. On the other hand, there are students from developing countries with relatively less financial security due in particular to the weakness of currencies used in their countries in comparison to the rand. However, both these categories still have to satisfy a number of criteria to be admitted to study in South Africa.

In 1995, South African policy on the admission of foreign students in tertiary institutions was revised, allowing undergraduate or pre-diploma students to study in South Africa (Ramphela, 1999: 11). The change was significant because it became



possible for some international students to come after completing high school. However, the quota of 10% restricted the admission into South African tertiary establishments for foreign students of the total admitted in specialised or selected courses. But in some cases, this quota is not implemented. At Stellenbosch University, for instance, because of the language policy of the institution which made Afrikaans the first language particularly at undergraduate level, the requirement of 10% of international students in specialised or selected courses is difficult to reach (International Office administrative, Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005).

International students are permitted to enter on one of the 14 temporary permits allowing foreigners to enter into South Africa. It is the duty of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to also deal with international students. The DHA defines international students as those who are not South African citizens, not permanent residents and do not have any diplomatic exemption. They are required to apply for a study permit while they are still in their own countries by providing a letter of pre-admission from the institution they want to study at, as well as proof of medical coverage. Besides, students from certain countries have to pay repatriation fees at South African embassies in their countries of origin. Proof of support funds during his/her sojourn in South Africa and proof of one year's tuition fees are also required. Visa costs vary from one country to another. As far as fees are concerned, all international students registered for a full a degree pay the same amount of tuition fees as South Africans. However, international students are required to pay an additional premium fee; which amount differs from one country of origin to another. For students coming from the SADC region, the amount is R1 600. Rwandese students are included into and pay the same amount as students from SADC because of a South African educational policy which treats Rwanda as a SADC country. For students coming from outside the SADC region, the amount of the additional fee is R2 750. The amount differs from one institution to another. The examples given here are from Stellenbosch University (International Office administrative, Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005).

#### **5.4.2 The reasons for coming to the Western Cape universities**

The principal question asked in this section is the same as the main problem considered in this thesis, which is to ask why Francophone African students come to

study in a non-French-speaking country and why they choose institutions in the Western Cape.

The reasons for the arrival of French African students in South Africa in general and the Greater Cape Town in particular are divided into two categories according to the types of students in the higher tertiary institutions. The first category is composed of those coming under the sponsorship of their governments. The agreements signed between their governments and the tertiary educational institutions are the outcome of political ties established between different governments and their South African counterpart. The standard of South African infrastructure represents an alternative to the European or North American universities in the sense that it is cheaper for African governments to send their students to South Africa. South Africa is widely viewed as the leading African country, not only economically, but also in other sectors including the level of education. For the sending countries, the aim is also to have qualified specialists in specific disciplines, since the domestic supply of such disciplines is unable to reach the critical mass needed to achieve a satisfactory quality of education.

The second category of African students in South Africa is composed of students who come on their own; they have to support financial charges by themselves. The reasons for the arrival of individuals in this category are more complex and various. The first reason is similar to the one behind the arrival of students sponsored by their governments. For many students, coming to South Africa is a better option financially than pursuing their studies elsewhere in the developed countries.

Apart from the fees, the proximity of South Africa to their respective countries, especially those within the SADC region, is a bigger factor in their choice of South Africa. "My parents decided to send me to study to South Africa because it is the place they can afford while I am studying in good conditions" (Burundian Student, Pretoria, 29 March 2005).

Furthermore, the arrival of many French African students in South Africa is mainly explained by the language factor. The desire to learn and master English is one of the principal reasons given by the respondents explaining their arrival.

The reason why we came here, my mother, my sister and me, it is because she wanted us to be able to speak another language. It was either between Belgium and South Africa; we chose to come to South Africa where English is used (Congolesse student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004).

For many Francophone African students, studying in South Africa means being able to master another international language, especially English, which is widely regarded as the most used language in administrative, corporate and, to a large extent, academic circles. For many students, mastering of both English and French is a major advantage for those students to be capable of responding to the requests formulated in companies anywhere within the globalised world. In these conditions, Francophone African students are motivated by economic reasons, linked to exploiting language skills once they will be on the labour market. The language barrier therefore will be turned into a professional advantage (OECD, 2001: 111).

Another reason explaining the arrival of French-speaking African students in South Africa is the academic system used in the country. In many Francophone African countries, the higher educational system used is duplicated from the French system. The two first years are rewarded by obtaining the *Diplôme d' Etudes Universitaires Générales* (DEUG), then the following degrees are *Licence* a year later and *Maitrise* at the end of the fourth academic year. The standardisation of the higher educational system of the European Union countries has obliged many Francophone African countries to do the same. Fortunately, it is the same system implemented in South Africa.

The impossibility of going elsewhere is another reason for the arrival of Francophone African students in South Africa. It has become more and more difficult for many young Africans, even students, to get visas to go to Northern countries, especially France, due to restrictive policies on migration. The choice of South Africa as the second option is described by a student at Cape Town University of Technology as follow:

“I did try to go to France, even to the United Kingdom, but they actually refused me. Then, I tried South Africa; it was easier than the other ones. This is why I decided to come here (Ivorian student, Cape Town, 28 October 2004).

The choice of South Africa becomes clear when these factors are combined with those related to finances and the hope to study in good conditions. South Africa appears to be one of the few countries on the continent to offer good education, apart from those in the Northern part of the continent, which are however not highly regarded by some students because they are not English-speaking countries.

Lately, the desire to escape from the French influence also pushes Francophone African students to come to South Africa. France is considered by many Francophone Africans to be responsible for the underdevelopment of their countries due to its backing of many dictators who did not care about the populations, but rather about the protection of French interests. French influence extends even to academic circles. Therefore, for many Francophone Africans, studying in South Africa means being outside the French influence and being able to bring alternative vision and ideas to the development of their countries.

Within South Africa, the choice of Cape Town higher educational institutions is also the outcome of students' own research as far as individual initiatives are concerned. Generally, students apply to many institutions at their arrival. After comparing the conditions set by the institutions, such as financial issues, they make their decision by choosing which university they would like to go to. In this context, the reputation of Cape Town's tertiary establishments is a major factor. A Congolese explains her arrival at UCT following her parents' knowledge about the university's internationally rated reputation.

I applied for both University of Witwatersrand and UCT because my parents knew that they are internationally recognised and they wanted me to have many options once I will finish (Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004).

The choice of Cape Town educational establishments is also made according to the specialisation that the student would like to pursue. The highly rated reputation of Cape Town as a tourism destination was the motivation which pushed an Ivorian student to come to study at Cape Town University of Technology.

For me doing tourism, it is about learning more than one or two languages. And I wanted to be trained in a very good city with a very developed tourism industry (Ivorian student, Cape Town, 28 October 2004).

However for many, the choice of Cape Town and the city's tertiary educational institutions is made after their arrival. Due to the lack or the shortage of money, many migrants are firstly preoccupied with a way to make a living. After a certain period, when they are more financially secure and more aware of the educational system and the access to institutions, they finally register for special courses, especially if their aim of coming to South Africa was to further their studies. After arriving in South Africa as a refugee and working in different restaurants in Cape Town, a Congolese migrant is now a student at UCT:


It was quite funny because my first aim was looking for a job. So I went to UCT, I was looking from one door to another saying that I was looking for a job. And then I met a lady with whom I had a chat. She realised that I had some academic trainings. And then they opened a door for me by giving me that opportunity of studying (Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004).

Many Francophone African students, especially those from the DRC, Rwanda or Burundi, arrived in South Africa as refugees and applied thereafter for higher education institution.

Despite the willingness expressed by many Africans from all over the continent to study in South Africa, students coming from the Francophone African countries are largely the least populous category of students in Western Cape tertiary educational institutions.

### 5.4.3 A demographic profile of Francophone African students in Cape Town


**Figure 11: Evolution of Francophone African students at UCT, 1994-2004**



**Source:** Planning Department, University of Cape Town

Globally, the numbers of Francophone African students at UCT increased from 1994 to 1998 by 7.82%, with a considerable jump between 1996 and 1997 which is confirmed in 1998. This increase of foreign students at UCT between these years was made possible by the enrolments of a large number of Mauritian students. However, a diversification of countries of origin is noticeable from 1999.

**Figure 12: Percentage of Francophone African students at UCT, 1994-2004 (N=2053)**




**Source: Planning Department, University of Cape Town**

The dominant nationalities at UCT over the period considered are from the SADC region, with students from Mauritius and the DRC leading the numbers. The proximity and the advantages granted to students from the SADC countries are the main reasons for this fact. Besides, the large number of students from Mauritius could be explained by the desire of wealthy Mauritian families in for better private education to send their children abroad. Many of those Mauritian students hold the highly rated International Bachelor Qualification, which allows them to apply for better tertiary establishments abroad. The choice of UCT is also an alternative to universities in Europe, especially in France and the United Kingdom. The enrolment

of students from countries that are not members of the SADC appears to be spontaneous individual initiatives from year to year.

**Figure 13: Evolution of Francophone African students at Stellenbosch University, 1993-2004**




*Source:* International Office, University of Stellenbosch

Considered over a longer period, the enrolment of Francophone African students has increased over 10 years. From 1994 to 2004, the number has gone from 4 to 154 students. Overall, the general trend shows an increase over the 10 years considered, despite a small drop between 1995 and 1996. The countries of origin have also increased and diversified with students coming from four countries in 1994 to nine countries ten years later.



**Figure 14: Percentage of Francophone African students at Stellenbosch University, 1994-2004 (N=521)**




**Source: International Office, University of Stellenbosch**

Over the decade considered, the origin of Francophone African students has diversified. The origin of Francophone African students at Stellenbosch includes all parts of the continent. Contrary to UCT, where many students come from the SADC countries, at Stellenbosch University, Gabon is the main provider of Francophone African students and was the second African country, behind Namibia, with a large number of students at Stellenbosch in 2004. After Gabon, Niger and Rwanda have

been other providers of Francophone African students to Stellenbosch University. The arrival of a large number of students from Francophone African countries which are outside the SADC region could be explained by the different types of agreements between the University and its counterparts in these countries. In the case of Gabon, for instance, an agreement reached between the International Office of the university and the Gabonese government allows students from Gabonese universities to further their studies at Stellenbosch. The Rwandese government, via its Ministry of Education, also sent sponsored students to Stellenbosch University over a short period (International Office administrative, Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005). The arrival of students of other nationalities is likely to be viewed as individual initiative.

**Figure 15: Evolution of Francophone African students at CPUT, 1994-2004**




**Source: International Office, CPUT**

The extent of the evolution of Francophone African students at Cape University of Technologies (CPUT) can be really perceived from 1998. Since that year, the enrolment of students has increased continuously. Indeed from 1994 to 1997, the

evolution of the enrolment of students from Francophone Africa was fluctuating between one and zero annually. However from 1998, the number of Francophone African students rose from 3 to 236 in 2004.

**Figure 16: Percentage of Francophone African students at CPUT, 1994-2004 (N=648)**




**Source: International Office, CPUT**

During the ten years considered for this study, the origins of students from Francophone Africa can be divided into three parts according to the importance of students. The first group of countries is represented by Seychelles, Benin, Mauritius and Chad with a percentage less than 2%. For these countries, more than 3 students have not been registered in the same academic year. Central African countries, namely Burundi, Rwanda, Gabon, Congo and Cameroon, make up the second group. The third group of countries of origin of Francophone African students at CPUT is

represented by the DRC, which is the main provider of Francophone African students at CPUT.

**Figure 17: Evolution of Francophone African Students at UWC, 1996-2004**




**Source: Planning Department UWC**

Like in the other three main tertiary institutions in the Western Cape, the number of Francophone African students has increased over the years. The presence of students from French-speaking African countries became significant 1996. From that year, with three students registered, the number increased gradually and reached the tally of 83 in 2004. However, one must note that the number of Francophone African students at UWC is less important than the other three tertiary institutions. This is because of

the reputations of Stellenbosch University or UCT. Indeed, students start by applying in those universities and if their applications are rejected, they turn to UWC (Cameroonian Student, Cape Town, 12 September 2005).

**Figure 18: Percentage of Francophone African Students at UWC, 1996-2004**  
(N=276)



**Source: Planning Department UWC**

Rwanda is the main provider of Francophone African students at UWC. This is mainly because of the agreement between the institution and the Rwandese government. However, the presence of Cameroonians, Congolese or Burundians is a result of individual initiatives.

Lastly, the African Institute of Mathematics and Science (AIMS) in Muizenberg has also become a provider of students to universities. AIMS recruits students throughout the continent and trains them for nine months focusing on postgraduate courses. At the end of the nine months, some students do not return to their respective countries, but apply to South African universities, mostly those in the Western Cape, i.e. UCT, UWC and Stellenbosch University. Over the period 2003 to 2005, 30 Francophone African students have arrived at AIMS; with 33% and 23%, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon are the Francophone African countries best represented.

#### **5.4.4 The lives of Francophone African students in Cape Town**

The first concern of students is the difficulty encountered in their enrolment at different institutions due to the non-equivalence of degrees between the South African tertiary education system and the one used in most of the Francophone African countries. At the end of their secondary education, in most French-speaking countries, students pass the final exam called *Baccalaureat*. The successful completion of this exam opens the doors to tertiary education. However, it does not guarantee entry to Francophone African students who want to enter higher educational establishments in South Africa for the first time. Many students have seen their applications rejected by universities merely because they have never been at the higher education level before.

When I arrived after my baccalaureate I first did English courses then I applied to UCT in the department of Economics. But I was refused because I was coming from another country without any South African degree (Cameroonian student, Cape Town, 25 October 2004).

Following their refusal at universities, they do not have any other choice but to apply at the different universities of technology. For those who are already at universities, although being quite different, the situation remains complicated and complex because of the different policies applied in each university and the autonomous features of each department. At their arrival at Stellenbosch University in 2001, many Gabonese with the same degree found themselves registered at different degree levels from department to department (Gabonese student, Stellenbosch, 22 July 2005).

Overall, students are not well informed about the South African educational system while they are still in their respective countries. Some find out only when they have finished their English courses. In many cases, the most important thing for some students is to study abroad, whatever the difficulties, because they consider the difficulties back home harder to handle. The hurdles encountered on the way to admission into the universities are a price they are willing to pay.

The language issue is also relevant to the admission to institutions. As far as Stellenbosch University is concerned, English is not an admissions criterion at the undergraduate level except for students wanting to register at the Law and Education faculties. This is because of the language policy implemented at the University. However, the lack of proficiency in English can be an obstacle to admission. On the other hand, for postgraduate students, a proficient level of English is required. Students are guided through their admission process by the International Office, which according to an internal policy, recommends students to different departments and faculties (International Office administrative, Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005). In other higher education institutions, a good proficiency in English is recommended before any application is admitted.

In general, once they have been admitted to different departments, Francophone African students have to adapt as quickly as possible. In the beginning they struggle as they find it difficult to follow in classes. Many lecturers do take into account the fact that they are French speaking, especially at the undergraduate level. More than others, Francophone African students at Stellenbosch University encounter a dual language struggle due to the use of Afrikaans in lectures, especially at the undergraduate level. By being foreigners in another language environment, they feel the pressure to work harder than South Africans.

Here is a kind of competition between foreigners and South Africans at school. This is not really a disadvantage because you will push yourself to work hard and to get a better mark than them (Ivorian student, Cape Town, 28 October 2004).

In order to help each other, especially newcomers, to settle into the new educational environment and also to build and keep strong ties with fellow countrymen, students from different nationalities have created associations. A member of the Congolese student association at UCT explains the aims of the Congolese association named Congosoc:

Congosoc started, I think three years ago. The main reason was because there were many student associations from other countries except from Congo. There were quite a lot of Congolese but it was no chance for us to get together, to enjoy our music, our food and so on. So we decided it was time to make Congosoc. It was tough in the first year. People did not want really to join together; we wanted to do separate things. That was the main problem, but now we have about sixty members (Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004).

The existence of student networks through such associations reduces the uncertainty involved in the arrival of newcomers and facilitates their integration. Beyond the desire for togetherness, the associations play an important academic role. In their duties, the executive members also play a transmission role between the students and the International Office of each institution and between students and departments where their members are registered.

The living conditions of students depend on their status. In other words, the living conditions of those who are sponsored by their respective governments and those paying for their studies are quite different. Students sponsored by their governments mostly live in university residences as a result of the clauses of agreement between the institutions and the government. The rent is often included in the tuition fees. A small number of sponsored students rent in different areas. Students who are paying for themselves, mostly stay outside the campuses, apart from a small number who can afford to rent on the campuses. The sponsored students in their large majority receive a stipend from their government although the amount varies from one country to another. Students who are registered as refugees get help from charitable organisations, which pay for their studies and provide assistance to them as far as social life on the campus is concerned.



In its desire to offer more opportunities to South Africans, the government has implemented a policy which does not allow international students to be employed in areas that do not have direct bearing on their studies. Some of the international students are thus employed in their respective departments. However, wages and the number of offers are quite limited. Students view the policy as discriminatory because it is based on the nationality criterion. Contrary to other countries such as France with a large number of Francophone African students where they have proper jobs despite being students, some international students in South Africa in general and in Cape Town in particular rely on non-declared jobs to earn money to afford their living and to pay for their studies. Overall, as far as living conditions are concerned, there are two types of students, described as follows:

There are people who are struggling for survival; there are also people who have a kind of good life. In a sense that there are people who are working in restaurants, in shops and find time to study. Life is kind of easy for them because they can provide for their own needs. And on the top of that, you get a bursary to pay for your academic fees, and then life becomes happier. But for those who do not have any support at all, it is a problem. I know a number of students, who are studying during daytime and they are working as security guards in various places. Some of them told me that the security job is a conducive one because when they are working at night, they can also read their courses and prepare for assignments for the next day (Congolese student, Cape Town, 27 October 2004).

The sojourn of Francophone African students in academic institutions is viewed overall as a benefit for both migrants and for South African citizens. By studying and living on the campus, Francophone African students have allowed young South Africans to discover another cultural dimension to that “unknown Africa” further afield which is different than the ones they are used to in the SADC region. Some South Africans have been able to improve their knowledge about the continent, which is not often in the academic programme. At this time, nobody can tell exactly or give an accurate measure of the capacity of both former and current Francophone African students in South Africa to be a helpful asset to South Africa in spreading its economic and political influences on the continent. Many factors could explain that

feature. Firstly, some of the students interviewed were disappointed because France refused to grant visas to further their study there. Secondly, many students regard France as being responsible for the underdevelopment of their countries in comparison to former English colonies and their wish to escape from France's influence has pushed them to come to South Africa. Thirdly, links and networks that students have established in South Africa will be maintained and reinforced once they join the labour market. Lastly, students could reflect South African culture in their respective countries.

Students could also be a potential source of qualified workers through recruitment after their studies. The integration of world trade is encouraging student mobility, allowing them to absorb the cultural and social customs of their host country and then to act as ambassadors both for their host and their own countries.

The financial aspect is another sector where the arrival of international students in South Africa provides a good opportunity for the economy of the country. It has been estimated that foreign students contribute about R1, 7 billion to the country annually in foreign exchange (Kabeli, 2005). This is one of the outcomes of the study conducted by the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) which reveals that international students spent almost R57 000 each a year on food, travel, accommodation and tuition (Kabeli, 2005). If we try to apply this number to the Stellenbosch context, it will be interesting to see how much Francophone African students contributed in 2004. During that year, 758 Francophone African students were registered at the four major tertiary institutions considered in this study, which means that they spent approximately R43 206 000 on tuition fees, accommodation and other expenses.

However, Francophone African students acknowledge that those tremendous financial expenditures are well spent because education is one of the best investments. Besides, the result of coming to study in Cape Town is described as being more lucrative for their countries of origins:

It all depends on objectives. In my case, it is not too bad to come and study here. More than that, it is good because you will learn another experience,

another language, another academic research, another way of thinking and so on. So coming here to study, it will be a real advantage when those Francophone Africans will go back to their countries in terms of training and the background as well (Ivorian student, Cape Town, 28 October 2004).

## **5.5 Refugees**

A refugee might roughly be considered to be a person who is forced out of his country of origin due to any kind of persecution or conflict. Then, he/she receives material assistance and protection from the international community and the host country. In this new environment, he/she will face issues such as citizenship, race, ethnic origins and economic, social, academic and political background (Blavo, 1999: 12).

After the demise of the apartheid regime, South Africa has successfully implemented its democracy and has become a home for those who are persecuted in their countries of origin. The government has ratified international treaties and improved its own legislative tools, with a particular accent was put on human rights (Schreier, 2006: 42).

### **5.5.1 International refugees' legislation**

The movement of refugees has a long history. Indeed, the various armed conquests over the centuries drove millions of people away from the regions of residence (CIMADE, INODEP and MINK, 1986: 11). However, it is during the twentieth century that it became a recognised phenomenon that warranted lasting solutions. Some international instruments were adopted in the 1920s and 1930s and applied to people who needed international assistance. For instance, under the auspices of the League of Nations, a High Commissioner for Refugees was created in 1921 under the tutelage of the Norwegian statesman Fridtjof Nansen. Although the High Commissioner was mainly set up to give assistance to the Russian refugees under the direction of Nansen, it was also used as an administrative and legal tool to help people displaced from Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey (Zolberg *et al.*, 1989: 19). The “Nansen passport” was considered as a legal document which gave refugees a recognisable status (Knox & Kushner, 1999: 9). From the “Nansen passport”, other documents were released later on to improve the protection and assistance to refugees,

particularly the 1951 Geneva Convention and the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969 as far as African refugees were concerned.

#### **5.5.1.1 The 1951 Geneva Convention**

The 1951 Geneva Convention was a consequence of several international efforts under the auspices of the United Nations seeking to solve the problem of refugees after World War II. The War and its aftermath forced the movement of at least 40 million persons in Europe (The United Nations, 2004: 167). In order to tackle the phenomenon, the international community firstly created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943 followed by the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) in 1947. It was the IRO which improved the definition of refugees in order to specify these types of migrants. According to that organisation, a refugee was “any person who, in complete freedom and after receiving full knowledge of the fact ... expressed valid objections to returning to his/her country of origin” (Klaaren, 1999). Although limited in Europe, these organisations were the first to provide protection, assistance and the pursuit of durable solutions for refugees.

International attention spread from Europe with the displacement of thousands of people, mostly Palestinians, following the conflicts between the Arabic countries and Israel. In December 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations mandated the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) to find a lasting solution to the conflict as well as to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and the economic and social rehabilitation, including the payment of compensation, of the refugees. Some twelve months later, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created, initially for three years, to grant refugees legal protection. Following this statement, in 1951 the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted. The 1951 Convention distinguished itself from the previous instruments in that it extended the concept of refugees from the mass displacements to individual cases. Additionally, the 1951 Convention expanded the term refugee to apply not only people from Europe and the Middle East, but also those in other parts of the world. The Convention has since been considered the regime governing refugee protection.

The 1951 Convention was adopted a few years after the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This has resulted in the shift from the individualisation to the generalisation of the definition of the term refugee. The IRO's definition of 1947 was replaced by the one included in the 1951 Convention and which situates refugee law as part of international human rights law. Accordingly, a refugee is seen as any person who,

...as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political option is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it.

The convention was criticised for being an excessively Eurocentric document because of its focus on the refugees in Europe traumatised by World War II (Klaaren, 1999; Solomon, 2003). It is only with the implementation of the 1966 Protocol to the 1951 Convention that the protection of the rights of refugees was universalised. By the end of 2004, approximately 140 countries have accepted the 1951 Convention and the 1966 Protocol (The United Nations, 2004: 170).

The definition in the 1951 Convention on refugees revolves around four core legal principles. The first is the principle of *asylum*, which entitles anyone under the definition of refugees to be granted shelter anywhere. The second principle is *non-refoulement*, which forbids states to return refugees out of their frontiers or into their countries of origin where they might be persecuted. The third principle is *non-discrimination*, which requires that refugees should be accorded equal treatment. Lastly, it is the principle of *protection* which grants refugees protection according to international legal instruments and international laws. The 1951 Convention also considered the notion of burden-sharing between the states (Boswell, 2003). It is a principle of international solidarity and of sharing responsibilities with the states receiving refugees. The notion of burden sharing has been illustrated by financial

assistance to countries confronted by a mass arrival of refugees and has also assisted in the dispersal of refugees over many countries.

#### **5.5.1.2 The OAU Refugee Convention of 1969**

Many African countries adopted the 1951 Convention after their independence in 1960. Displaced people were a major preoccupation for those newly independent countries due in particular to the wars of national liberation from colonial powers, which forced thousands of people to escape from the zones of conflict and look for refuge elsewhere.

However, because of the Eurocentricism of the 1951 Convention and the shortcomings of its 1966 Protocol relating to the singularities of African refugees, African countries decided to update the framework for the protection of refugees according to the African context. They implemented the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention was adopted on 10 September 1969 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The first task was to reconsider the concept of refugee. If on the one hand African countries took into account the definition of the 1951 Convention they on the other hand updated it by adding the concept of African forced migration to it. The definition of refugee was reshaped and viewed as follows:

The term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

The OAU definition emphasises the consequence of African calamities, such as civil conflict, bilateral wars, famines and insurrections, which were not taken into account at the time the 1951 Convention was set up. The 1969 OAU Convention arose from the continental historical experience with colonialism and the traditional hospitality and solidarity of Africa. As described by Mulugeta (2002), African leaders did not hesitate to adopt an ‘open door policy’ to people fleeing their countries due in

particular to the struggle for liberation that many of them were involved in. The enthusiasm of the adoption of the Convention was perceptible in the sense that this first generation of refugees in an independent Africa were not even called refugees. However, Muguleta (2002) also recalls that:

The responses and reactions to the refugee crisis were based on an almost euphoric African solidarity and political collective identification often embellished with pan-African rhetoric, and were distanced from judicature and legality. Although the Convention was designed to systematise and institutionalise earlier ad hoc African responses, it failed to guarantee predictability and coherence in the way refugee problems have been dealt with. It was only in the political arena that the Convention was forceful and coherent.

Forced migration has always been one of the main components of people movements in Africa. Zlotnik (2003: 7) highlights the evolution of the number of refugees on the continent since 1960. During that year and following the riots in Congo, the country was hosting 95% of the 79 000 refugees on the continent. A decade later, 95% of refugees in Africa were found in eight countries, whereas in the 1980s the number of countries hosting refugees increased to 11. In the 1990s, the number of countries increased to 15 and then to 18 in 2000. The evolution of the number of host countries was accompanied by the growth of the population of refugees. The number of 79 000 African refugees in 1960 increased by 92.04% ten years later. The next decade saw the numbers rising by 75.50% from the previous decade, followed by 32.58% between 1980 and 1990. However, the number of African refugees decreased by 49.71% from 1990 and 2000.

Over the years, Eastern, Central and Western African have been consecutively the main provider regions of refugees. The 1980s and 1990s were the decades that Southern Africa counted the most important number of refugees in its history, but it represented only two to three per cent of African refugees. Refugees in this region were essentially escaping from the repressive governments, such as in South Africa, or they were victims of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. `

### **5.5.2 South African legislative instruments**

After its readmission into the international community, South Africa rapidly ratified the international instruments relating to the protection of refugees. This is also to give an international legislative framework to thousands of South Africans who were returning to the country after years of exile. On 15 December 1995, South Africa ratified to the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969. This was followed by the adherence to the 1951 Convention and its 1966 Protocol on 12 January 1996. At the regional level, within the framework of SADC the country, reaffirmed regional commitments to the 1951 Convention and its 1966 Protocol, as well as the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969. The regional organisation undertook to seek regional solutions to the flow of refugees inside this part of the continent.

Apart from adopting the definition of refugee inscribed by the 1951 Convention and the OAU 1969 Refugee Convention, South Africa drew a distinction between people recognised as refugees and those seeking asylum although the two categories were placed under the term “forced migrants”. The difficult task was to distinguish genuine refugees and asylum seekers from other types of migrants. As pointed out by Harris (2001), these definitions of refugees are characterised by two levels of consideration of the status of refugees. First, the individual level involves assessing whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution in the home country, without much consideration of social and political conditions in his/her country of origin. Second, the collective level involves assessing the refugee status of those who come from a “refugee-producing country” engaged in civil war or general mass violence.

Prior to 1994, the whole Southern Africa region was already a home for thousands of displaced people. One of the reasons for these forced movements was upheavals caused by the apartheid government. Ocaya-Lakidi (quoted by Kotze and Hills, 1997: 11) singles out three categories of refugees at that time. Firstly, there were South African refugees pushed out of their country by the apartheid policy. Secondly, there were refugees from other Southern Africa countries fleeing their homes due to the involvement of South Africa in civil wars. Lastly, there were economic refugees who were the outcome of the deterioration of the economic system throughout the region. If the two first categories of refugees fit into the definition of the 1951 Convention,



the last category of refugees is taken into account by the definition of the 1969 OAU Convention.

After the collapse of apartheid, fear of persecution has been emphasised as far as the definition of refugee is concerned. However, it remains difficult to draw a major distinction between involuntary migrants who are forced to flee from persecution or serious disruptions to public order and voluntary migrants who want to escape economic difficulties in their countries of origin (Landau, 2004; 16). The difficulty is to determine the kind of persecution behind the movement of refugees.

In 1998, South Africa endorsed the principles of a national instrument to protect refugees. The Refugees Act, also known as the Act 130 of 1998, became an effective law in April 2000. Since then, the Act has been the country's primary piece of legislation relating to refugees and has replaced the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991, that used to deal with refugees.

The aims of the Refugees Act were highlighted by Lindiwe Sisulu (Majodina, 2001: 7):

Among other things, it (The Refugees Act) gives effect to international legal instruments, principles and standards relating to refugees. It also provides for the reception of asylum seekers into the Republic; regulates applications for and recognition of refugee status; and provides for the rights and obligations which emanate from such status.

The Refugee Act (passed in 1998) is generally considered to be a more progressive piece of legislation and has been extensively revised since its first drafts were completed. The Act allows any person to apply for asylum and states that no person should be denied the right to apply for an asylum-seeker's permit or "Section 22", as it is known. This document grants newcomers the right to study and work legally while their applications for permanent refugee permits are processed. A Section 22 is issued free of charge, but the process can take weeks or months. The document also gives refugees legal status as it protects them from being arrested. Without a Section 22 they face the constant fear of being arrested on charges of being in South Africa illegally.

Since its transition to majority rule in 1994, South Africa has become one of the main destinations on the continent for refugees who have arrived by tens of thousands from the continent and even beyond. According to Crush and Williams (2000: 2), one of the peaks of arrivals was registered between 1995 and 1998 with an average of 20 000 people annually. The sending countries were mainly the DRC, Congo, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Fewer people came from countries such as Nigeria and Cameroon. Senegalese and Ivorians completed the list of nationalities of those looking for asylum in South Africa.

From 1994 to 2003, according to Landau (2004: 39), the Department of Home Affairs had received 152 414 asylum applications. The number of applications approved went exponentially from 383 in May 1995 to 17 198 in April 2001 (Crush & Williams, 2002: 3). As far as Francophone Africans are concerned, the asylum seekers were mainly from the Democratic Republic Congo (7 677 applications), then Senegal (4 507), Burundi (2 031), Congo (1 618) and Rwanda (1 203). In the same period and from the same applications, the most approved were of Congolese (DRC, 68.90% of Francophone Africans), Burundians (13. 27%), Congolese (Congo-Brazzaville, 9.32%) and Rwandese (8.52%) of approximately 7 092 applications approved. However, some 3 686 applications of Senegalese were rejected.

It is interesting to notice that a large number of asylum seekers were from countries involved in armed conflicts in the 1990s and 2000s decades, with the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo and Rwanda leading the numbers. The geographical proximity of South Africa and its standards of protection of refugees have been seen as the reasons behind the arrivals of those refugees in South Africa. Besides, fewer Francophone African refugees were coming from countries which had political trouble, such as Cameroon. The reasons explaining the rush of Francophone African refugees to South Africa could therefore be related to the fear of persecution for political reasons, as stated in the 1951 Convention. Francophone African refugees were also forced to leave their countries, which the OAU took into account with its broader definition of refugees.

### **5.5.3 The settlement of Francophone African refugees in Cape Town**

The first path of the process of the settlement of a refugee, and as outlined by the Refugees Act of 1998, is the acquisition of proper documentation. As described by Schreier (2006: 45), an asylum seeker is granted a temporary permit valid for fourteen days within which the holder must present himself or herself at the Refugee Reception Office. After the two interviews (the first to determine the identity of the interviewee and the reasons for his application, while the second interview is to establish the refugee status), the applicant can be granted the Section 24 permit and the ID document that Francophone African refugees in Cape Town called “the gounda”.

However, that process of settlement and thereafter of integration is handicapped by several hurdles relating to the difficulties encountered in acquiring proper documentation. Among these hurdles, Schreier (2006: 45) notes the incapability of Home Affairs to address the issue of backlogs because of insufficient resources. Apart from appointment slips on which there are no names, some newcomers do not receive any other document legalising their stay in the country, and a non integrated system does not allow applicants to renew or extend their permits elsewhere than at the office where their the permits were issued. Therefore, applicants are subject to arrest, detention, deportation and they cannot gain access to social services, work or study.

The Francophone African refugee population in Cape Town is a heterogeneous group as far as nationalities, skills, level of education, experience or language abilities are concerned. It appears that there are two types of Francophone African refugees in Cape Town. On the one hand, there are some who can be considered economic refugees. Many of them are not from countries genuinely involved in armed conflicts. Some were not obliged to flee their countries because of natural disasters nor were they victims of political or religious discrimination. At their arrival in the country, they applied for the refugee status because they took advantage of the ignorance of Home Affairs officials on the situation of African countries and because it is the easier way to be in the country legally because of the difficulties to get a work permit:

Many South Africans do not know much about the rest of continent, even some people from Home Affairs. Many of them think that all African countries are involved in wars. So during interviews, some people lie about the

situation of their countries of origin and the reasons they come to South Africa or why they are applying for refugee status. At the beginning it was common. There are even some people who came down to Cape Town because in Johannesburg and Pretoria officials had started to be aware of the situation. (Cameroonian refugee, Cape Town, 22 February 2005)

According to some of the respondents, the lack of information about other African countries of Home Affairs officials is evident by the types of questions during the interviews. The respondents have to demonstrate for instance that they belong to specific group suffering from any kind of persecution, not that they have suffered individually from that persecution.

On the other hand there are “genuine migrants”. Most of them are from countries involved in armed conflicts including the DRC, Congo, Rwanda or Burundi. According to the results of this study, genuine Francophone African migrants in Cape Town are mostly war related victims.

Although Francophone African refugees have not specifically been targeted for killing like the Somalians, they still encounter numerous problems with regard to their settlement, mostly in accessing and exercising fundamental rights. Among these problems, there is the language barrier. Indeed, at their arrival many of applicants for refugee status who are still waiting for the regulation of their status are unable to attend English classes. Their inability to speak English makes their search for jobs even harder. The lack of knowledge of refugees’ rights by employers is another problem facing migrants. In their search for jobs, employers are often reluctant because they are not aware that refugees have the right to work or study.

One of the refugees summarises the problems encountered as follows:

There are difficulties every day and all the way for a refugee in South Africa. Here in Cape Town, it is a bit easier than Johannesburg or Pretoria. For the welcome at the Refugee Reception Office is quite better in Cape Town, although myself I have never been in those offices in Johannesburg or Pretoria, but my friends always tell that in Cape Town is better. Nevertheless

there are still difficulties for refugees in Cape Town. It all starts with the papers; you spend a lot of time trying to have them. Once you have them, especially the gounda, you must come to the office every month to renew it. That means you can miss your work for days. Even to find a job itself, it is difficult because many employers just want to see a work permit, for them the refugee status does not allow to work. And for those who cannot speak English properly, it is even harder. Above all of that, many refugees waste their talent and experience by being for instance car guards in order to find a way of living (Rwandese refugee, Cape Town. 24 February 2005).

Nevertheless, there are many positive aspects regarding the settlement of Francophone African refugees in Cape Town. First, there is a crucial interest on the part of the City of Cape Town to provide and ensure constitutional and humanitarian treatment of refugees. By signing a Declaration on Refugees rights, the City of Cape Town acknowledges “to agree and to undertake within its legal and constitutional mandate to uphold and recognise the rights of refugees, to strive – within its means – to give effect to these rights, and, to support refugees’ local integration into society” (Omar, 2006: 82). The city has therefore decided to work in collaboration with refugees’ organisations such as the UNHCR or Tutumike (a group of rights organisations) to develop programmes of cooperation.

Other organisations also provide assistance to refugees which range from counselling regarding legal protection to the integration into the local society. The assistance also includes skills training, education or health services. Here are some organisations in Cape Town visited during the fieldwork:

- University of Cape Town Legal Aid Clinic offers free legal advice and litigation to asylum seekers and refugees, which are illustrated through all legal matters, asylum application matters, appeals, interviews on behalf of UNCHR, and assistance with family reunification, voluntary repatriation or resettlement.

- The Scalibrini Centre tries to give basic assistance to refugees by providing food, clothing, shelter, and counselling. The centre has also launched English and computer classes, as well as a platform for artists to expose their paintings.

-The Cape Town Refugee Centre proposes to improve the quality of life of refugees by meeting their short-term needs and to facilitate them to become self-reliant and self sufficient through capacity building.

-The Trauma Centre is a human rights organisation specialising in the healing of survivors of violence and torture.

-The Institute for Healing Memories presents workshops on individual, communal, national and international levels to find psychological, emotional and spiritual healing which is able to show the way to reconciliation and transformation of relationships between members of society. The Institute has also a programme which intends to improve the knowledge of youth in particular encouraging them to understand and get more involve in the shaping of human rights.

-ARESTA intervenes on refugee rights, providing lobbying and advocacy, and offers awareness and education, English classes, income generation activities, vocational training, and self-sustainability programme initiatives.

The implementation of the Refugees Act of 1998 which followed the ratification of international legislation on refugees, notably the 1951 Geneva Convention and the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969, guarantee refugees protection according to international norms by taking into account the South African context. However, the implementation of these laws encounters several problems, due in particular to lack of resources by Home Affairs. This has lead to difficulties for a number of refugees in Cape Town (see Appendix). Nevertheless, a network of organisations in Cape Town provides assistance to refugees regarding integration and the protection of their human. Their settlement could be easier to a large extent by tackling the issues of xenophobia and the use of refugees' skills.

## **5.6 Extra-legals**

Illegal immigration is a major concern in South Africa. Illegal flows to the country already occurred during the apartheid era (Hough & Minaar, 1996: 33). During that period, repatriation was one of the means considered to combat illegal entries. The new authorities also adopted repatriation after 1994. According to Adepoju (2004:

71), 91 000 illegal immigrants were deported from South Africa by the new government soon after the arrival of ANC to power. However, repatriation has not been successful since then, as the number of illegal immigrants in South Africa seems to have increased over the years.

Neighbouring countries, especially Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as well as other African countries further afield, Nigeria in particular, are viewed as providers of extra-legals to South Africa (Hough & Minaar, 1996; Bouillon and Morris, 2001). From these sources, it appears that Congolese form the largest group of illegal Francophone African immigrants in the country. The issue of illegal immigration in South Africa is, in many cases, related to the numbers of extra-legal foreigners living in the country. It has been estimated by some sources that up to eight million undocumented immigrants were already living in South Africa just a few years after the demise of apartheid (Hough & Minaar, 1996: 126). Speculation on the number of undocumented immigrants simply indicates the impossibility of measuring exactly how many extra-legals are in South Africa. It is a question of “playing the numbers game” (Solomon, 2003: 90). Indications are often given by the reports of the South African Police Service (SAPS) on the numbers of deportation of illegal immigrants or the numbers of the overstayers. The former method is used following simple control routines or bigger deployments of police forces in the likes of Operation Crackdown.<sup>15</sup> The numbers of deported illegal immigrants has grown over the years. According to Bouillon and Morris (2001: 30), more than 700 000 people were deported between 1988 and 1996. In 1994, the DRC and Senegal were the most notorious Francophone African countries with 20 and 69 deported nationals respectively. The figures have kept on growing. South Africa deported 173 000 illegal immigrants in 1997 at the cost of R200 million (Solomon, 2001: 108), while the 2000-2001 and 2003-2004 annual reports of the Department of Home Affairs point to the number of 156 123 and 164 294 foreigners removed from South Africa respectively. Some illegal immigrants are overstayers. Bouillon and Morris (2001) argue that some 724 897 foreigners extended their sojourn in South Africa unlawfully between 1990 and 1995. However the guesstimate made in this study points out that

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<sup>15</sup> Operation Crackdown was launched in Hillbrow, Johannesburg, in March 2000. More than 1 000 police and military forces were deployed and some 10 000 suspected illegal immigrants were arrested, before being taken to Lindela Repatriation Centre for deportation.

the number of Francophone African extra-legals in Cape Town could be between 20 940 and 37 714 in 2004/2005 (see Appendix 2).

It appears that the more restrictive measures are taken, the more people movements have become more clandestine and spontaneous. Many Africans do not hesitate to risk their lives to find a refuge with better economics opportunities. Every year, people die in the Mediterranean Sea because they want to join Europe from Northern Africa.

The modes of entry into the country are various, including entering the country with false papers, staying in the country beyond the time set out by visas or crossing the border without papers. The porosity of South African borders is viewed as one of the major indirect causes of the illegal flows of migrants to South Africa. The removal of electrified fences on the northern border after political and human rights organisations pressure following the demise of apartheid made it a challenging task to control people's movements. Sabela (2000: 111) argues that the borders between KwaZulu-Natal and southern Mozambique are the longest open section of the South African northern border. He describes the 21 kilometres separating Kosi Bay and Tembe Elephant Park as containing several "infiltration routes and well-defined footpaths." Moreover, some points at the Komatipoort border and on the Crocodile River are used by migrants to cross illegally to South Africa. Sabela describes the frequency and the success of illegal crossings: as follows:

In a staged demonstration by the South African Defence Force ... a fence jumper was timed at one minute seventeen seconds for crossing an eight-foot-high game fence, under the three layers of razor coils by means of forked sticks pushing the coils up, and over the second game fence.

Illegal entries to South Africa also represent a lucrative activity for transporters and smugglers. A well-developed network, which includes officials at the border points, has been developed from the sending and stopover countries to South Africa. "I did not have documents such as visa or a specific permit to come to South Africa. I paid around \$300 for my trip up to South Africa. People were helping me to travel by their cars" (Congolese extra-legal, Johannesburg, 21 March 2005).



One could argue that Francophone African extra-legal immigrants who enter South Africa unlawfully by road are mostly Congolese because of the geographical proximity. To a lesser extent nationals from countries further afield consider neighbouring South African countries as stopovers. The lack of financial resources and bureaucratic hurdles in their home countries are the two main reasons pointed out by extra-legals to justify their entry into South Africa with no documents or with false ones. In the DRC, for instance, someone living in Lumumbashi in the south of the country needs to go to the capital Kinshasa to obtain a passport and to apply for a visa at the South African embassy. The trip to Kinshasa from Lumumbashi sometimes lasts longer and it is more costly than travelling to Johannesburg, which is 2000 kilometres from Lumumbashi. Therefore, the choice of coming illegally to South Africa is often based on the availability of financial resources and migrating illegally is then the only solution, as explained below:

Back home, getting a passport is not easy at all. You must have many documents and it will take many weeks to get a passport. Then you must apply for a visa at the South African embassy. There the conditions are draconic as well because there are many obstacles and you have to pay a caution of \$1 000 at the embassy to be sure that you will come back and collect your money. This is the official procedure. Here is an unofficial procedure which you have to pay people who would organise the trip for you (Congolese extra-legal, Johannesburg, 22 March 2005).

The porosity of the borders of other SADC countries and the bribery of officials at different border posts are also encouraging factors to migrate illegally to South Africa. Crossing some points at the border between the DRC and Zambia is explained as follows:

Yes, officially people need documents but it is easy to cross without having the official documents. For instance if someone goes for the first time, he/she must show a document that customs will just stamp on it. Now, someone told me that people have to pay but it is not that much (Congolese, Johannesburg, 26<sup>th</sup> March 2005).

The journey to enter to South Africa mainly depends on financial resources and the degree of connection. Apart from the plane, in the case of those who later become overstayers or those who use false documents, road, train and even foot are the common means used by extra-legals to enter South Africa. As far as these latter means of travelling are concerned, the DRC plays a pivotal role in the illegal migration to South Africa, as shown by Cabane (205: 51) and which corresponds to respondents' stories:


- The first itinerary highlights the key role played by the city of Lumumbashi. From that point, migrants are conducted by bus or private vehicles to Zambia, Zimbabwe or Namibia.

- The second itinerary links the eastern part of the country to some countries eastward, particularly Tanzania, Burundi or Malawi.

- The last itinerary from the DRC leads to Angola in the Southwest of the country.

The second part of the journey is organised from the main cities in the stopover countries, including Windhoek in Namibia, Maputo in Mozambique and Lusaka in Zambia.

**Map 3: Southern African migration routes**



**Source:** Cabane, 2005: 51

The reasons behind the move of many extra-legal migrants from Johannesburg to Cape Town are almost similar to the ones described above for the other categories, especially legal migrants and refugees. However, the issue of police harassment seems to be more prominent in determining why extra-legals end up in the Mother

City. As far as police harassment is concerned, a Congolese who has lived in both Johannesburg and Cape Town compares the two cities by stating:

I did not come across with police officers during my stay in Cape Town. The police did not bother at all. In Johannesburg it is completely different. You have to carry your documents every time. Police officers are everywhere. You can get arrested anytime and anywhere in Johannesburg, then being deported. I was living with other foreigners who did not have documents in Cape Town, and nothing happened to them. Home Affairs is almost the same thing than police. When I went to Cape Town, my documents were expired six months ago. But I did not have any problem when I went to Home Affairs; they renewed them and extended it for two years. It cannot happen in Johannesburg (Congolese, Johannesburg, 29 March 2005).

## **5.7 Settlement and social capital**

This section examines the strategies used by Francophone African migrants to facilitate their integration in Cape Town. The section therefore sets out to identify the means of the integration and the exchanges of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town through the language factor and the transnationalism issue.

### **5.7.1 The determinants of the settlement**

The settlement of migrants into a new environment is often related to a whole process, which includes the steps of adaptation, acculturation and assimilation. There are some disagreements among scholars concerning the process of settlement of migrants in a new environment. According to DeFay (1998: 18), the settlement of migrants in a new environment starts with the process of acculturation. For Martin (1986: 24), the process of the settlement in a new destination is the consequence of the process of assimilation. She refers to Johnston and separates external from subjective assimilation. As far as external assimilation is concerned, migrants accommodate themselves within the receiving countries as time goes on, while the subjective assimilation entails the identification of migrants with the members of the group of the same countries or regions of origin. The concept of assimilation is the latest stage of the processes of adaptation and integration by which migrants are included into the culture of the receiving countries (DeFay, 1998: 18). The process of assimilation

therefore includes cultural or behavioural assimilation, marital assimilation, identification assimilation, attitude receptional assimilation and behavioural receptional assimilation.

In her study, Martin (1986: 27) distinguishes two ways of assimilation in a host country. On the one hand, she admits that migrants who leave their countries of origin due to harsh economic conditions and on a voluntarily basis are keen to settle down and be assimilated easily in the receiving regions. On the other hand, she points out that those who are forced to migrate encounter the most difficulties in the regions of arrival. In involuntary departures, migrants suffer from problems such as family disorganisation, mental disorders, delinquency or extreme level of poverty. In their first months or years in some cases, the latter category of migrants often encounters serious social and psychological problems.

The other means to ease assimilation at the time of arrival include the level of education and the degree of qualification, family ties and migrant associations, age and language differences. The level of education and previous training experience, as well as age, could be a major factor for migrants responding easily to challenges such as learning a new language. Family ties and friendship provide a variety of assistance which ranges from sources of economic security to mutual aid or moral support, which nevertheless have shortcomings such as the slowdown of the process of socio-economic assimilation due to intensive interaction.

Some schools of thought have framed the explanation of the settlement of migrants in a new environment in theoretical models. Early theoretical models of assimilation were developed through examining the massive immigration to the United States of America at the beginning of the twentieth century (DeFay, 1998). One theoretical analysis is the Anglo-conformity version of assimilation. It highlights that migrants at one stage or another abandon by force or through the process of assimilation their ethnic and national allegiances. One of the most notorious illustrations of the Anglo-conformity was “Americanisation”, whereby migrants from Germany for instance were forced to adopt American identities, following World War I (DeFay, 1998: 14).

Another school of thought sums up two groups of theories of assimilation (Martin, 1986: 32). Firstly, segregationist and conservative models of assimilation outline the early modes of assimilation through the melting-pot theory. The massive immigration to the United States of America is also used as a good example to describe this theoretical model. New arrivals isolated themselves from other groups and formed ethnic enclaves which allowed them to keep their traditions and cultures. Migrants found their assimilation difficult because they were excluded from some spheres of activities and this resulted in the creation of norms and differences between new arrivals and communities already established. The melting-pot theory considers the full adoption of behaviours, beliefs and practices, particularly in the United States of America later on (DeFay, 1998: 15). Secondly, cultural pluralities theories mention that the greater the gap between local communities and migrants, the longer the process of assimilation will take. The later generations of arrivals are keen to easily incorporate the norms of the receiving countries.

As mentioned by DeFay (1998: 17), a new and contemporary orientation on theories of assimilation is given by Portes and Rumbaut (1996) and Portes and Zhou (1993) in the debate focusing on the outcomes of the process of assimilation with a regard to the dynamic of process of migration. The mastering of the language of the receiving country is one of the main tools used to explain the whole process of assimilation (DeFay, 1998). At their arrival, migrants are at the stage of acculturation which allows them to get used to the cultural behaviours and beliefs of the receiving country. During that stage, their language abilities as far as the language of the new environment is concerned distinguish them clearly as migrants. This stage is often composed of the first generation and the first wave of new arrivals. The second stage sees migrants, often children of the first generation born in the receiving country, mastering the language very well. However, they retain the cultural characteristics of their parents, and their countries of origin. The third stage sees migrants fully assimilated to the culture of the host country.

Along with language abilities, the process of assimilation can also be determined by socioeconomic success, their mode of incorporation into the host society and the economic and cultural factors offered by the receiving country.

Transnationalism is regarded as one of the fundamental factors in the current patterns of migration (DeFay, 1998). In the contrast to the theoretical model of assimilation described above, which point out that migrants either abandon or lose their original cultural characteristics gradually, transnationalism puts a particular focus on the fact that migrants maintain, sustain and enhance social and economic relationships with their countries of origin, and also with other migrant communities in other parts of the world from the same countries of origin. As mentioned by Portes and emphasised by DeFay (1998: 28), the development of the means of telecommunication, the modes of transportation, the restriction of the psychological distances which previously separated both the regions of departures and arrivals have enhanced the rise of transnationalism. In the new patterns of migration, migrants create a dual cultural identity which sees them not fully embracing the culture of the host country. Instead, migrants appear to be members of the cultural identities of both the countries of departure and the countries of arrival. Therefore, according to DeFay (1998: 23), the essence of the assimilation paradigm becomes meaningless as migrants do not utterly abandon their original cultures. Transnationalism is illustrated by regular visits of migrants to the countries of origin, the periodical sending of remittances back home or the involvement in the development of projects in local communities in the countries of origin. It has been shown for instance that the amount of money from the cash remittances of migrants in developing countries is more important than economic aid received from international donors (DeFay, 1998: 25).

### **5.7.2 The language factor and the settlement in Cape Town**

If one considers the theoretical analysis of the central-pluralists theory, the different stages of assimilation through language can only be applicable to two groups of Francophone African migrants. The first group is mostly made up of people from Francophone African countries close to South Africa, for instance Mauritius. The Mauritian migration to South Africa was already well established before the end of the apartheid era. Martin (1986: 115) demonstrates that there was already an established Mauritian community in the late nineteenth century. The reasons for these early arrivals included environmental catastrophes such as cyclones and the lack of arable land, which forced people to look for better opportunities elsewhere. Economic reasons, particularly job opportunities, underline the reasons for the arrival of Mauritians in South Africa. Along with the search for job opportunities were political

changes which led to the end of the French colonial rule and the independence of the country in 1968. Many white people left the country as they could not accept working under other races' domination or they lost their jobs with the arrival of the socialist party in power in the 1980s. Other reasons such as family reunification, academic reasons, medical treatment or personal adventures also contribute to Mauritian migration to South Africa other the years.

Migrants who settled in the former homelands, particularly from the former Zaire (Chapter 3), are the second group of Francophone Africans in South Africa that the cultural-pluralist point of view in language can be applied to.

The first generations of these two groups arrived more than two decades ago at least. The following generations have been able to incorporate themselves into the South African society as far as language is concerned. For many of those who have been arriving since the demise of apartheid, the proficiency in English remains problematic.

The linguistic background of Francophone African migrants plays an important role in their settlement. Although these migrants are from French speaking countries, for most of them French is not their first language. In some of these countries, local languages are widely spoken by major parts of the populations. In the DRC for instance, Swahili is even used beyond the borders of the country. In Mali, Bambara is used in academic and corporative circles, even though in an unofficial way. In sum, these migrants can justify their "African Francophoness" by their capability to speak French and/or by being nationals of French speaking countries, despite the point raised by Bouillon (1996: 10) who admits that it is difficult to consider all those migrants as Francophone due in particular to the level of literacy in French in the countries considered. Bouillon's argument is emphasised by some specialists in linguistics who wonder whether the fact that migrants speak French can warrant the assumption that they belong to the same linguistic entity (Vigouroux, 2001). One therefore could ask whether it is possible to talk about a Francophone community in Cape Town. In her findings, Vigouroux (2001) points out that Francophone African migrants in Cape Town feel they belong to a "Francophone world". That deduction



seems to justify the preference of Francophone African migrants to gather together in comparison with those from other linguistic families.

Francophone Africans like to be together because of the language. People who speak the same language they usually stay together. But they are not afraid of others because we are all foreigners and all Africans. It is also depends on your location or your work. If you have to stay with people from other countries, what are you going to do?" (Ivorian student, Cape Town, November 2004).

However, on the other side, the findings of this study reveal that it is difficult to talk about a sole organised Francophone African community in Cape Town. Indeed, people gather together according to the same interests, especially economic ones, even though they are not from the same linguistic background. Instead, migrants from the same countries illustrate their citizenship in Cape Town through political, regional or national associations and religious organisations. *L'Association des Ivoiriens de Cape Town* (The Association of Ivorians of Cape Town) is one of the examples of the numerous associations that exist in the city. The main principles of the association are to recognise being Ivorian in a foreign territory and knowing each other. The association also aims to facilitate the integration of new arrivals in Cape Town. It works in collaboration with its counterparts in the cities where there are many Ivorians, such as Durban or Johannesburg. Overall, the main objective of such gatherings is to promote the national identity abroad. This is illustrated for instance during the organisation of the independence day of each country. However, such organisations do not exclude the differences among its members. The ideal to achieve is to reflect the social and political lives back home. As far as Ivorians are concerned, these differences can be considered through the representations of political parties such as the *Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire* (Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire) and the *Rassemblement des Republicains* (Republican Rally).

Apart from national organisations, some migrants from the same country group together according to their regional or provincial origins. The aim is to narrow down the objectives and the purposes of development at the regional or the provincial level

back in the country of origin. Some Cameroonians for instance are members of multiple associations.

Cameroon is a bilingual country. There are French-speaking and English-speaking people, but the French are more dominant. Here in Cape Town, there are a French Cameroonian association and an English Cameroonian association. Then, you know that Cameroon has a lot of tribes; so there are also tribal associations. There are some people who belong to all of them (Cameroonian man, Cape Town, 23 October 2004).

Before national pride, the language defines belonging to a social community. Consequently, these regional or national associations are primarily pointed out before some Francophone African migrants acknowledge being part of a “Francophone world”, as admitted by Vigouroux. I therefore prefer to argue that there are several distinct Francophone African communities in Cape Town. These distinct communities are linked by religious, academic and corporative interests.

The second explanation of the degree of importance given to French by Francophone African migrants can be viewed through the category of the migrants and the reasons for their arrival in Cape Town. For the legal migrants and the students, French is first and foremost an indispensable tool, which goes beyond a mere means of communication. It is fundamental to their occupations and studies. Among the variety of reasons for leaving their countries of origin, there is the expressed need to add another international language to French, which could empower them in the globalised labour and academic markets. The capacity of some legal migrants to master French, for instance, is one of the major reasons for their recruitment by companies in need of their bi- or multi-linguistic abilities. However, for a few extra-legals particularly the degree of importance of using French is not high. This is because they do not really rely on French to determine their living in Cape Town. The circumstances are even more dramatic for those who were not fluent enough in French before coming to South Africa. They find themselves in a situation where their proficiency in French as well as in English is considered poor. Some migrants justify their carelessness of using French as a response to French policy in Africa and towards Africans. France is regarded as responsible for the underdevelopment conditions of

Francophone African countries through its support of dictators who ruled those countries. France is also accused of being disrespectful to Africans by erecting unnecessary laws and measures to stop African immigration to France. They therefore do not see any need to maintain the importance of French, especially since they are in a non French-speaking country.

The integration of Francophone African migrants, as far as the language factor is concerned, is also linked to the mastering of languages spoken in Cape Town, with a particular focus on English. Of the eleven official languages in the country, the Western Cape in general is the home of English, Afrikaans and isiXhosa. This linguistic fragmentation is one of the challenges facing Francophone African migrants on their arrival in the city, especially some of those coming straight from their country of origin. This linguistic fragmentation is also illustrated by the linguistic geography of Cape Town (Vigouroux, 2001). In the CBD, English is the prominent language as academic, administrative and economic activities are conducted in that language. The legacy of the apartheid era has made Afrikaans the dominant language in the Cape Flats and isiXhosa in the sprawling Black townships of Gugulethu, Nyanga, Langa and Kayalitsha. Despite the national characteristic, these three languages do not have the same impact and influence on the city's society. English remains the main language migrants are willing to learn.

Few Francophone Africans are able to cope in English at their arrival. They are mainly those who studied English at the tertiary level in their countries or professionals who attended English courses. Some Cameroonians are also able to handle English because English is the second official language of the country. They are particularly those from the northern part of Cameroon, where English is widely spoken, sometimes more than French. Except for students and some other migrants who attend English classes, the language is assimilated on contact with the local population. South Africa in general and Cape Town in particular are for most Francophone African migrants, especially those who have never been to another English-speaking country, the first places where they are in continuous contact with English. However, most of our respondents acknowledged that the accent used by South Africans is something unexpected that they have to deal with beyond the fact of learning a new language. According to some respondents, South Africans who speak

“proper” English, with a good accent are those in contact with other English-spoken people from different backgrounds. For the rest of the local population, their accent is heavily influenced by Afrikaans and other African languages, isiXhosa in particular. But these deductions by migrants about the different accents of the local populations are influenced by their comparison with and consideration of the European or American accents that they are in contact with in their countries of origin or through different medium.

Learning the other two languages used in Cape Town besides English, particularly isiXhosa, has been considered for many as a useful mean of the integration into the local society, although it does not guarantee professional and economic insertions. For some Francophone African migrants, particularly those from the central region of the continent, learning isiXhosa is not a very difficult task since it has similarities with some languages from that part of the continent. However, Francophone African migrants who have managed to speak isiXhosa and who have settled in the townships for example are generally still regarded as foreigners by the local population.

### **5.7.3 Transnationalism and the settlement in Cape Town**

Crush and Williams (2002b) believe that the importance of transnationalism in research on migration in South Africa should get further attention, apart from the definition of the concept, as already highlighted in this section. They mention that transnational activities are part of internationalisation and globalisation, since transportation facilities have made the world labour market smaller and enhanced the movement of workers. Transnationalism is also viewed as a new approach to explain migrant identities in the receiving countries. The authors argue that transnationalism, through cumulative causation, perpetuate migration, before suggesting that the new components of globalisation such as transportation and communication, plus the importance of social capital, offer migrants better legal opportunities to challenge their exploitation.

My analysis of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town considers particularly the concept of transnationalism as one of the more adequate means to understand the perpetuation of migration in South Africa in general and in Cape Town in particular after the demise of apartheid. As far as Francophone Africans in Cape Town are

concerned, and considering the above guidelines offered by Crush and Williams (2002b), the continuous arrivals of these migrants in a relative new destination is also a consequence of the participation of South Africa in the globalised economy. This is justified by the perceptions of people living outside the country, who consider the South African pull factors a major determinant of their choice of destination. The revolution of tools of communication and transport allows Francophone North-Africans to prefer to come to South Africa rather than going to other destinations closer to their countries of origin and enables them to keep in touch permanently with their family back home.

As demonstrated for the language factor, it will be difficult to affirm that Francophone Africans totally abandon or progressively lose their cultural identities to utterly embrace the South African culture. As already mentioned above in this section, migrants promote their national and regional identities in Cape Town. The mere fact of a Senegalese restaurant at Cape Town's train station, which is always patronised by Senegalese nationals and migrants from other countries, is one among many other illustrations of a growing replica of migrants' cultural elements in Cape Town. Another example to point out is the existence of several "foreign shops" throughout the city which offer foreign products. The running of these shops facilitates permanent exchanges between the owners in Cape Town and people in their countries of origin for the supply of products.

Moreover, some migrants consider Cape Town as a pivotal and transitional point for their business. South African transport facilities, for instance, are used for exporting goods from Asia, before being sent to main Francophone African cities such as Abidjan, Dakar, Libreville, Brazzaville, Kinshasa and Lumumbashi. In reality, some migrants in South Africa in general and in Cape Town in particular have found themselves in worldwide business networks described by Ebin in Koser (2003: 99):

Senior traders travel to New York, Jeddah and Hong Kong to buy wholesale goods, generally electronic and beauty products, which they re-sell, both wholesale and retail, in Senegal and in other countries. Those with less means work as street peddlers and whether in Dakar, Marseilles or New York, they deal in whatever they can sell.

My findings also reveal that running and development of such networks need more committed and trustworthy people. Family members and friends in the countries of origin or elsewhere in the world are thus called on, and migration is perpetuated. This leads to another major pattern of transnationalism between Francophone African migrants in Cape Town and their countries of origin.

One of the major patterns of transnationalism in Africa in general is the importance of remittances (Adepoju, 2006; Ghosh, 2006; The United Nations, 2004; Ramamurthy, 2003). Migrants' remittances in any Francophone African countries are nowadays viewed as a factor of development. In Senegal, for instance, the importance of remittances is acknowledged at government level with the *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et des Sénégalais de l'Exterieur* (Department of Foreign Affairs and External Senegalese). Indeed, Senegalese migrants like many of their counterparts from other countries, contribute a lot to the development of their communities in their country. The town of Touba is a typical example in this regard (see section 3.4.1.2 of Chapter 3). In many countries, the impact of migrants' remittances is equal to or even more important than export earnings or Overseas Development Assistance (Adepoju, 2006: 30).

However, the extent of remittances has many limitations. Indeed, Ramamurthy (2003) poses some shortcomings of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa. She argues that the scale of the flows suffers from the methods used to collect data. In some countries, remittances are considered as part of "service payments and receipts", while others they are included in "factor income from abroad" like in Botswana and Lesotho. The external and internal sources of flows in Africa are not often separated. And more importantly, the figures available do not capture the full amounts transferred, as the flows take place outside the official channels. As a matter of fact, many people prefer sending their remittances by hand to avoid paying the transfer fees. Other means such as informal networks are used, like the Senegalese bank described in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6. Lately, remittance flows are also sent as material goods. Nevertheless, an estimation of remittances sent by Francophone African migrants in Cape Town can be made. As described in section 5.3.2.3 of chapter 5, a legal migrant can send home R3 000 monthly. Considering that in 2005 there were 13 486 Francophone African

migrants in Cape Town, it appears that they would have sent home approximately R485 496 000 in that year.

### **5.7 Conclusion**

The arrival of Francophone Africans in Cape Town broadly occurs into two ways. On the one hand, Cape Town is the first choice for some migrants when they arrive in Cape Town. This is the case for most students and some legal migrants. On the other hand, the city is the second choice of migrants if they do not succeed to settle in other cities in the country, Johannesburg in particular. For many, the success of their settlement depends on their categories and their modes of arrival in Cape Town. However, the differences between categories are not clear because overlaps and complexities allow migrants to change categories and alter the degree of success of their settlement.

## **Chapter Six**

### **THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE LIVES OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN MIGRANTS**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the complexities of living in Cape Town for Francophone African migrants. The chapter emphasises the migration lifetime of some interviewees and the challenges presented by Cape Town as a host city. The case studies present each category considered in this study and the four case studies describe the process of the migration of Francophone Africans, from their reasons for leaving their home countries to their settlement in Cape Town, including their arrival in South Africa and in Cape Town. The chapter roughly answers the following questions: Why do Francophone Africans leave their countries of origin? Why do they choose to come to South Africa? And within South Africa, why do they decide to settle in Cape Town? The case studies also reveal some issues related to the discourse on migration in South Africa, such as the gender issues and xenophobia. For each of these four examples, the role of social capital through organisations such as churches, students associations, refugees' organisations or marriages are significant in the overlapping of categories.

#### **6.2 A legal migrant**

Samson A. is the owner of a curios crafts shop in Cape Town. He is married to a South African woman with whom he has a daughter. He has been entitled to permanent residence status and one could consider him as a typical example of a success story for a Francophone African migrant on Cape Town. However, his settlement and his integration in Cape Town were the outcome of a long and unpredictable journey through the southern hemisphere of the African continent.

Samson A. left his native Cameroon with the purpose of pursuing his studies in any other country which could offer him better studying conditions than Cameroon. After his baccalaureate (the exam which completes high school in most of Francophone



African countries), he entered the University of Buea. Although in the central part of Cameroon, he was familiar with the northern part of the country, where English is widely considered the country's other official language, along with French. However he did not complete his first year. In 1990, Cameroon, like others in Francophone Africa countries, witnessed the demise of the single party political system, dominated by the RDPC, the *Rassemblement Democratique du Peuple Camerounais* (Cameroonian People Democratic Rally) of President Paul Biya. The higher education system was not spared the political, economic and social turmoil of demands and freedom of speech. Consequently, the credibility of the Cameroonian university was shaken as parents and students particularly did not trust its capability to deliver a convincing education. People were not sure that the academic calendar could reach its end without disruption or discredit. An example of strikes at the universities, pointed out in Section 4.2.6 of Chapter 4, illustrates the crisis of Cameroonian higher education. The recurrence of those political, economic and social demands left serious damages in tertiary education. It was that crisis which pushed Samson A. to leave his country of origin in 1994 to look for places where he could pursue his studies in better academic environments.

Apart from the recurrence of the political, economic and social crisis, the lack of financial support is also pointed out as the second main reason justifying the decision of Samson A. to leave his country of origin. As a matter of fact, his parents were not able to afford his fees anymore, because they were victims of the collateral damage of the notorious structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) imposed on Cameroon by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1990s to alleviate the country's economic performance (presented in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4). Up to 1994, his father was a member of the plethoric Cameroonian administration that the government had to reduce to satisfy the requirements of the IMF to become eligible to benefit from international aid. Samson A's father found himself unemployed after serving his country for more than two decades, and the family was obliged to survive from his wife's earnings as a domestic worker. A "logical choice" was made between trying to afford Samson A's fees and the survival of the whole family. The situation was even more dramatic because Samson A. was not the only child. For him migrating to pursue his studies elsewhere was a suitable solution.

Some questions could be raised regarding his decision to continue his studies in another country, and the incapacity of his parents to afford his fees. The explanation goes beyond the push and pull factors. Indeed, how is it possible for someone to decide, due to financial reasons, to pursue his/her studies outside his/her country of origin where the fees could be more expensive for him/her because he/she is a foreign student? It appears that the academic reason is one of the common reasons given by the interviewees to justify the cause behind their departure. Indeed, many of the interviewees justify migration by their desire to continue their studies, although they have found themselves involved in other activities and have forgotten about studies even though some have had opportunities to do so.

Nevertheless, Samson A. succeeded in saving a certain amount of money after working in a garage and later on as assistant mechanic. The remainder of the money necessary for his trip was loans from other people, including his parents and some close friends who trusted him and they received his guarantee to be refunded. The choice of the country of destination depended on the amount of money at his disposal and the academic opportunities he could have in the country of destination. It is obvious that he had preferred to migrate to European, North American or some Asian countries which have the necessary infrastructures. But he did not have enough money and time to apply for a study permit and to satisfy to all the requirements to be accepted by those countries. He had no other choice than opting for a country close to Cameroon.

A combination of three factors contributed to his decision to go to Gabon as the first step. His plan was to enter the country first and then to apply to the Department of Economics at the Gabonese main university once in Libreville, the capital. He was not quite sure that his application could go through while he was still in Cameroon. As described in Section 3.4.2.2 of Chapter 3, Gabon presented relatively good economic opportunities, which attracted people from the Central African region and beyond. Gabon also offers the same academic system as Cameroon and the geographical proximity could be viewed as the last factor explaining the choice of Gabon by Samson A. as the first country to migrate to. However, he entered the country unlawfully because, for financial reasons; he did not first go to Yaoundé, the Cameroonian capital to apply for a visa at the Gabonese embassy.

He does not have a pleasant recollection of his stay in Gabon. He witnessed the horrors of migration when his money was stolen, he was arrested and deported to the south of Cameroon, far way from his region of origin. He nonetheless attempted migration abroad rather than returning to his hometown. He then was driven into an illegal migration network, and he found himself in the northern region of the neighbouring Congo after several days of walking through the Equatorial forest. During the trip, one of his fellow travelling companions lost his life due to the combination of hunger, fatigue and malaria. The crossing of borders between Central African states is easy; the immigration officials of these countries are insufficient and unequipped to watch over the few border points. However, without an appropriate guide, it is also easy to get lost in the forest.

At this point, the idea of looking for a better environment to further his studies could be challenged. Indeed, without the required documents to enter Congo and without considerable financial resources, Samson A. could have opted to return to his hometown. A critical consideration suggests that, although the main aim of many migrants like Samson A. is to further their studies, the push-pull factors at this point seem to involve only a straightforward search for a better life.

His sojourn in Congo lasted almost three years. After encountering a lot of problems, like a short stay in prison in the capital Brazzaville because of his illegal status, he decided to move to Pointe-Noire, a coastal city in the South-West of Congo, which has a reputation of presenting less harassment from police and which is also regarded as the economic capital of the country. In his mind, Congo was always viewed as a stopover where he could make enough money to continue “his journey”, wherever the destination, but with better opportunities than Congo, Gabon and Cameroon that he had already experienced. In Congo, he was unable to achieve his objectives because the country, like his country of origin Cameroon, was hit by a severe economic crisis. Samson A. found himself trapped, as he was not ready to go back to his country without making enough money for himself to invest back home. He also saw himself trapped because he did not have enough financial resources to attempt to migrate to Europe or North America. He did not even see himself moving to Angola due to the civil war which was tearing that country apart for many years. The situation was even more dramatic for him, as he was witnessing Congo nationals leaving their own

country due to political, economic and social difficulties. With a small capital, he succeeded in getting into the informal sector and selling all sort of products, including clothes and bread on the streets.

One of the main causes of migration in Africa pushed Samson A. away from Congo. In 1997, a rift surfaced between the main actors in the Congolese political arena, including Pascal Lissouba, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Bernard Kolelas and Yombi Opango. Each leader established his domination over a specific region, controlled by his own militia. According to Samson A., he had no choice but to look for greener pastures elsewhere. He enquired about the illegal channels that Congolese were using to get out of the country. He spent almost all his savings to organise the trip. In reality he paid people of a specific network to organise his departure.

For Samson A., the choice to come to South Africa was made according to the circumstances of that time and the availability of destinations presented by the network in charge of his departure. Unlike previous departures, the ones arranged after the beginning of the civil war made things easier for the organisers, because they used the armed conflict in Congo as the main reason why Congolese were obliged to leave their country. Samson A. received proper documents stating that he was a Congolese refugee, forced to look for a safer place. South Africa was viewed as the nearest place, able to guarantee protection to thousands of refugees. He travelled with other “Congo nationals” by road from Pointe-Noire in Congo to Luanda. In the Angolan capital, they were introduced to another intermediate that they paid to drive them to Namibia. Finally, by bus they ended up in Johannesburg.

His only knowledge of South Africa was from press releases. He thought before arriving in South Africa that the country was at the same level of development as most European countries. He was convinced that the South African standard of living, comparable with Europe, would change his fate rapidly. He also believed that in South Africa, he would be able to work, as possibilities were certainly present and he would be able to sponsor his studies with his salary. He did not expect any problem as far language is concerned, because he is from the northern part of Cameroon where the use of English is common and his bilingual aptitude could only be an advantage for him. His objectives before arriving in South Africa were clearly defined. It was a

double objective, as on the one hand he was looking forward to completing his studies and on the other hand he would be able to save enough money to migrate to the United States.

He arrived in Johannesburg in December 1997. He used his “double nationality” to settle in Johannesburg. After spending three years in Congo, he was able to speak Linguala, a language spoken by most of Congolese. He used his language proficiency in Linguala, his knowledge of Congo and his “official documents” to be inserted into a part of the Congolese community in Johannesburg. He was also welcomed by some countrymen into the Cameroonian community. With the help of those intense social capital links, he did not encounter difficulties to get documents confirming his refugee status. He was renting with a “colleague” in Yeoville. They contributed equally to pay the rent, electricity and food. Above all, using social capital, he replaced another “brother” as security guard. However, his sojourn in Johannesburg lasted less than a year. The principal reason for his departure from Johannesburg was safety. The area where he was renting was cheap but also insecure due in particular to gunshots. Everyday he was anxious for his life, especially on his way to or back from work. He left Johannesburg and first went to Durban. Unfortunately, he could not settle down in Durban and he decided to move to Cape Town. At the time he arrived in the country, Samson A. did not have any idea about Cape Town. He knew more about the city once in the country. Other migrants told him that Cape Town was the safest big city in South Africa. It is the main reason he decided to move down to the Mother City after he left Johannesburg and Durban.

Samson A. arrived in Cape Town by train, not so convinced that Cape Town would not be disappointing like Gabon, Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire in Congo and Johannesburg. He spent his first day walking around and sleeping in the train station. During that time he met two security guards from the DRC and he easily introduced himself as he was able to speak French. He settled down faster than he did in Johannesburg and he also found work as a security guard. After some time, he saved some money and with that little capital Samson A. started his own business. In the beginning, he was selling on the street. In comparison with his experience of selling on the streets acquired during his stay in Pointe-Noire in Congo, he could easily

manage to save money, especially because he was earning more in Cape Town and the suppliers were around the corners.

In the meantime, Samson A. met his future wife, who was one of his habitual customers. They got married a year later, just a couple of months before the birth of their daughter. Finally, Samson A. was convinced that his time had come, as a combination of factors, particularly the amount of money he managed to save and his marriage, facilitated the opportunities for him to open and to grow a serious business. Being a South African citizen, his wife did not have any problem using her name to register the shop on her behalf. Since then, Samson A. has changed his status from entering the country with false documents and being considered a refugee to becoming a permanent resident. He proudly recognises that his marriage and the birth of his daughter have helped to change his status. However, he did not give many indications of the process of acquiring the permanent residence permit. They rent a place on Long Street where they sell crafts and curios.

Samson A. has opened another shop in Cape Town train station and he has brought his younger brother to manage the second shop. He employs five South African women in his two shops and he is hoping to extend his business to other sectors, particularly informatics with the opening of two or three *cyber-café*s. Samson A. does not view himself merely as a foreigner who takes advantages of South African opportunities, but as someone who has made many sacrifices and efforts to be where and who he is today. And he thinks that his contribution to the country's economy is illustrated by his expenditures and job positions that he provides to South African nationals. He will proudly encourage his fellow countrymen or other fellow Africans to come to South Africa, but only if they have a concrete plan, are ready to work hard and are well prepared academically and financially. Now that he is financially secure, Samson A. thinks of achieving the first reason why he left his country. He would like to get a degree in Management from any tertiary institution in Cape Town.

Although when he left his country he never thought about coming to Cape Town, Samson A. concludes that he has learnt more during his experience of migration than in school. He sees himself in a couple years, after his degree, managing his own

business in his country of origin. He does not think that Europe or America could offer him more without jeopardising what he already has.

### 6.3 A refugee

Laurent D. is a refugee from DRC and he is a student at UCT. He is married to a Congolese woman since 2001. The case of Laurent D. illustrates an example of a forced migrant who ends up in Cape Town “accidentally”, because his reasons for leaving his country of origin, those explaining his choice of South Africa and Cape Town as destinations were not made according to his wishes. His case is interesting in the sense that his status can be used for both refugee and student categories. He was passionate about English since his early years in high school. It was because of that passion that he opted to study English at the tertiary level, before receiving a training programme to become an English teacher. Laurent D. had always believed he could only leave his country legally and if he was entirely convinced of having a decent job to further his teaching career. He was teaching English in a high school in Lumumbashi, in the south of the country when the First Congo War broke out in November 1996.

The Congolese armed conflict and its collateral damage, such as the collapse of the academic system and the fear of being targeted as partisan to the opposite camp were the main factors explaining the departure of Laurent D. from his hometown and his country. Two of his cousins joined the rebellion factions formed against the regime of President Mobutu and grouped under the tutelage of the AFDL, the *Alliance des Forces pour la Liberation du Congo* (the Alliance of Forces for the Liberation of Congo). The regime of President Mobutu, in power since 1965, was widely considered responsible for the political, economic and social collapse of the country. Unlike his cousins, Laurent D. did not manifest any intention to join the rebellion. His refusal to do so was interpreted as an act of betrayal and he was categorised as a partisan of the MPR, the *Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution* (Popular Movement of Revolution), the party of President Mobutu and the FAZ, the *Forces Armées du Zaïre* (Armed Forces of Zaïre), the national army. Moreover, his occupation exposed him too much and his life was at risk when rumours were spread around that some informants of the FAZ were collecting information throughout the region, which was mostly occupied by the rebels. In the regions occupied by the AFDL, the

governmental partisans were the first to be targeted and many lost their lives; others had no choice but to leave.

Laurent D. was obliged to leave his region of origin. He first thought of finding a safer place within the country, but the rebel forces were rapidly establishing their domination over region after region, and the armed conflict was quickly spreading all over the country. He therefore found himself in the large streams of Congolese escaping from their country to seek refuge elsewhere.

He first went to Zambia. The choice of Zambia was obvious because of the geographical proximity and because he could afford the trip. When he left his country, he was hoping to be far away, especially because of the pain of the war. He could not find anything interesting in Zambia and he was obliged to move on. He wanted to go to Malawi, with firstly the intention to get a position in a high school to teach either French or English if possible on a temporary basis. His second intention for going to Malawi was to earn money for himself and to further his journey to Australia, Canada or the United States of America, like many Congolese or Africans have done. And he was rating his chances highly because of his academic background and his professional experience. For him, it was a unique occasion to restart his life in a safer economic and political environment, with always the hope of returning one day to a safe and peaceful Congo.

However, he could not go to Malawi and ended up in Mozambique. During his migration process, it was a question of making the most of the offered opportunity. With a visitor visa received at the Mozambican embassy in Lusaka, he arrived in Mozambique four months after his departure from Lumumbashi. In Mozambique he wanted to be granted the status of refugee. At the UNHCR's office he was informed about a refugee camp outside Maputo, the Mozambican capital. Unfortunately, the information was false because he did not find any refugee camp. Unexpectedly, he was then confronted by two dilemmas: he was broke and he was unable to speak the local languages or Portuguese, the official language used in the country. He had to find some way to survive in an alien environment, particularly with few job opportunities available. He was also looking for ways to move out of Mozambique, as his living condition became worse daily.



Fortunately, like many migrants in these kinds of situations, social capital plays a fundamental role in providing assistance and guidance. He met some of his countrymen, who brought him to a religious organisation. He became deeply involved in church activities, but he asserts that he did not engage himself in religious activities with the intention to receive any help to continue his “journey”. It was only later on he was informed through the church that there was a possibility to go to South Africa as a refugee. The religious organisation helped him get the required documents for entering South Africa. However, the documents he received did not guarantee him legal permanent status in South Africa.

The role played by the religious organisation in helping Laurent D. is an illustration of the institutional theory. The organisation has over the years offered help and assistance to many potential migrants, particularly those with no legal status, with social services in Mozambique and proper guidance to enter South Africa lawfully. The choice of South Africa was not Laurent D.’s because he had no other option but to accept the offer of going to South Africa. Besides, he believed that South Africa, because of the economic standard of the country, could offer him better living conditions than Mozambique could. He was convinced that in South Africa he would be able to get a job and make enough money to migrate to Europe, Australia or the United States of America.

Laurent D. travelled by bus and arrived in Johannesburg with the status of asylum seeker, with no clear idea where to go. It was far from the situation he had imagined when he left his hometown of Lumumbashi, but the bottom line was that he did not have any option other than accepting his situation and looking for some ways and means to get out of it. Moreover, at that time, with the ongoing conflict in the DRC, it was out of question for him to go back to his country. Overall, leaving Mozambique was just a matter of going to South Africa and seeing what he could do, with the strong belief that he had left the worst situation behind in the DRC, Zambia and Mozambique.

Once in Johannesburg, he started calling up the telephone numbers of people he knew in the city, hoping that they could come to his rescue in one way or another, but he could not reach any of the people he called. Then he called all the people he knew or

had some contacts with anywhere in the country. Laurent D. then succeeded in getting one of his countrymen in Cape Town, who asked him to go down for a couple of days to see what he could do or if he could go elsewhere, depending on the opportunities available. He stayed only one day in Johannesburg. Although it was only for few hours, Johannesburg also played the role of stopover and was fundamental in Laurent D.'s decision to move down to Cape Town because he could not succeed in getting any assistance. He therefore failed to settle in Johannesburg and like many other Francophone Africans, Laurent D. was obliged to look for opportunities in Cape Town.

His friend was a student and welcomed him to Cape Town. During his first days in the city, he depended entirely on his friend, who offered him the opportunity to share his room, provided food for him and did not hesitate to give money from time to time, especially for transportation to move from one place to another while he was looking for a job. His friend also introduced him to the Cape Town Refugee Forum, which had helped many Congolese before Laurent D, including his friend. Laurent D. had to find a way of surviving. He then started looking for jobs, particularly in restaurants and shops. After two weeks of searching, he succeeded in getting a position in a restaurant. Obviously it was not an enviable position, but for him it was something to rely on for the time being, before looking for something better. He considers himself lucky that after only two weeks in the country he was able to find a job, especially because he met many of his countrymen and other foreigners who spent, more than a year in some cases looking unsuccessfully for a job.

In Cape Town, Laurent D. also became more involved in religious activities and received support from his fellow religious members, especially from a moral point of view. The support from the religious community was fundamental because, during his period of searching for a job, Laurent D. claims he was not depressed at all, he was not alone, but surrounded by the church community and assured that with the guidance of God everything would be alright.

Laurent D. also received some help from the Cape Town Refugee Forum. In the beginning, it was basically counselling and money from some individuals. However, the most significant help from the Cape Town Refugee Forum came a couple of

months after his arrival in Cape Town. From the forum, Laurent D. received a recommendation when his situation was dragging at Home Affairs offices. This helped him considerably to get the documents allowing him to work and study. Lastly, he received help from his boss at the restaurant where he was working. In the beginning, he did not have any of the required documents allowing him to work, but his boss did not bother at all about his legal status. In reality, for the owner of the restaurant it was an opportunity to employ a foreigner with no legal status whom he could pay less than a legal migrant or a South Africa national. His boss even encouraged him to apply for temporary documents. When his boss became aware of his academic and professional background, he also advised Laurent D. to look for some ways to empower himself by getting a South African degree, which could make it easier for him to look for better living conditions and to fulfil his dreams of having a decent career and to migrate overseas.

Laurent D. proudly speaks philosophically about the importance of getting his first job in Cape Town in that restaurant. That work in the restaurant was very important for the settlement and the integration of Laurent D. in Cape Town. Although wages were not much from that work, Laurent D.'s dignity had been restored. His dignity was lost since his departure from Lumumbashi., He had not been independent since he left his country. Even though Laurent D.'s situation did not stabilise, work was for him a way of trying to grow, to make an effort to move forward. It was an encouraging result of trying and believing, whatever the circumstances. The job, through the stabilisation of income, represents three important steps in the life of Laurent D. in Cape Town. Firstly, he got a place to stay and he went to rent on his own. Secondly, he could afford to provide food for himself. Lastly, he felt free to move around, as far as transportation is concerned. For him it was important that he could satisfy his basic needs by himself.

After ensuring the satisfaction of his first needs, Laurent D. started to look for more and better opportunities. During his search for better jobs, he found himself at UCT. After talking to a woman at the international office who became aware of his academic training, he was informed that he could further his studies with the assistance of the UCT Legal Clinic as a refugee and a citizen of a country member of SADC. He then applied to do a Master's degree in the Department of English.

Overall, Laurent D. acknowledges that his situation in Cape Town has improved in comparison with the one in Zambia or Mozambique, where he did not have any shelter at all. In Cape Town he has a support structure. However, he admits that compared to Lumumbashi, his situation has really worsened, because from being a professional, he has become a full-time student. Moreover, he still has not achieved his objective of getting a decent job and saving enough money to move to Australia, Europe or North America.

#### **6.4 A Student**

The Senegalese Souleymane C. is a student at one the campuses of CPUT in Cape Town. He also sells clothes outside the Cape Town train station. His case is an example of the desire to pursue his studies because of the opportunities offered by the academic conditions of the host city, despite the fact that studying was not the principal reason he left his country. Describing his case illustrates the importance of social networks between host countries for Senegalese immigrants.

The reasons behind the departure of Souleymane C. from Senegal are complex because they range from the disappointment in the Senegalese labour market, as it was unable to entirely satisfy job seekers, to the migrant's desire to emulate countrymen. Souleymane C. completed high school in Saint-Louis, a city in the north of the country. He also obtained his baccalaureate B, with a specialisation in Economics and Social Sciences, in Saint Louis. He then moved to Dakar, the Senegalese capital, with the intention to be registered at the famous University Cheikh Anta Diop. But he rather opted to look for a job, as he became aware of the degree of unemployment in the country and he realised that many graduates from the tertiary institutions were unable to find a decent job. He then concluded that the best option would be to try to get a job after completing high school rather than "spending many years of sacrifice and a lot of money" to end up unemployed. He believed that he could use those years efficiently by starting his own business. However, he did not escape unemployment. Indeed, after almost a year of unsuccessfully searching for a decent job, he found himself assisting someone else selling clothes in the Sandaga market, one of the biggest commercial places in Dakar.

Almost a year after stopping his studies, and without significant changes in his situation, he was determined that going abroad was the best and only option to give a new orientation to his life. He was encouraged by the fact that many of his countrymen, even those less educated than him, were making a reasonable living abroad and they were sending money and goods back home to open businesses, build houses and help their families. He initially contacted two or three of the innumerable international migration networks in the Sandaga market. But he did not accept the idea of refunding those who were supposed to organise his departure with a high interest rate because he was not sure that he could succeed rapidly enough to make a decent wage to refund his lenders. He therefore decided to organise his departure by himself. He wanted to go to Europe, to France particularly, because of the importance of the Senegalese in that country, and also because he knew some people in French cities who could help him to settle down rapidly. However, the lack of sufficient financial resources to pay for the visa and the transport ticket obliged him to reconsider his wish. Besides, the unfortunate episodes of repatriation of thousands of Africans from France worried him. He received a letter from one of his cousins in France, who was ready to help him to migrate to France, but at that time, Souleymane C. did not have enough financial resources to satisfy the requirements. He then decided to migrate first to another African country in order to save enough money before migrating to Europe or America later on.

Souleymane C. prepared his departure for almost a year, but he decided to leave after March 1992, because he was hoping to witness the victory of the Senegalese national team in football at the African Cup of Nations, organised in the country that year. Unfortunately, the Senegalese failed to win the trophy. When he left his country, Souleymane C. wanted to go to Brazzaville to join his older brother, who had been in the Congolese capital for more than five years. He received 300 000 CFA francs from his parents to finance his journey. He added that amount to his savings. Even though his own money was insignificant in comparison to the amount given by his parents, he was glad he could contribute to his own departure. Souleymane C. succeeded in acquiring the ECOWAS visa, which allowed him to travel around the member countries of the Western African organisation. He decided to travel from one country to another, where he could meet people he was in touch with. He wanted to self-finance his trip by doing odd jobs on his way to Brazzaville, because he spent a part

of the initial money preparing his departure. By traveling from one country to another, he also wanted to look for interesting opportunities, so that his departure to Brazzaville could be unnecessary.

Souleymane C. travelled from Dakar by plane to Abidjan in Cote d'Ivoire, with a stopover at Bamako, the capital of Mali. In Abidjan he met some Senegalese he knew. They advised him to stay for a while to see if an opportunity would come along. He found himself in the same situation as in Dakar, working for another Senegalese immigrant in a market. After approximately four months in Abidjan without real improvement to his situation, he decided to move on. He received another amount of money from his parents. He then went to Ghana by car. He did not arrive in Accra, the capital, but passed by and spent three days in Foulao, near the Togolese border. He did not stay long because he could not speak any language used in that country, including English, the official language. He did not have much time to stay in Ghana to learn English and look for a job. Souleymane C. then went to Lomé in Togo, but at his arrival, the country was in political turmoil, between President Gnassingbe Eyadema and his principal opponent Gilchrist Olympio. The political crisis obliged him to spend only a few days in Togo. He pursued his journey and transited in Benin for a couple of hours before arriving in Nigeria. However, his misfortunes continued when he was robbed, just after passing the Nigerian border. Unable to speak English and without money Souleymane C. preferred to return to Benin. He hoped that in a French-speaking country his chances of survival would be higher than in Nigeria. From his first passage in Benin, he was accompanied by a Malian, who was also looking for better economic opportunities. They came back to Benin together. Once in Cotonou, the Benin capital, he was determined to join his brother in Brazzaville as soon as possible. With his Malian companion, he did "small jobs" for a couple of months. This allowed them to save some money. Souleymane C. once again asked for help from his parents who sent him money. He then bought a plane ticket from Cotonou to Brazzaville.

When Souleymane C. arrived in Brazzaville his brother advised him to become a photographer. He helped him to buy the necessary material for photography. Basically, the bulk of the material was a camera. Souleymane C. did not have a photographer's studio. He was taking pictures all over the city and having the film

developed at a professional studio. His earnings were not high, but he could manage to make a living in Brazzaville through photography. Once again he was forced to look for another opportunity when the Congolese civil war broke out in 1997. One of their countrymen was killed at the beginning of the conflict and he and his older brother decided to leave Congo. His older brother went to Angola, but Souleymane C. did not follow him, because Angola was also involved in a civil war. He instead preferred to move to Gabon, which was presented as better than Congo as far as economic opportunities are concerned.

Souleymane C. managed to get a visa from the Gabonese embassy before the structure closed due to the armed conflict. He reached the border of the two countries by car. However, at the control post on the Gabonese side, he was asked to pay additional money in order to enter the country although he had a visa. He arrived in Franceville, the biggest Gabonese city in the eastern part of the country, where the Senegalese community welcomed him. Before leaving Brazzaville, he was already in contact with them via the Senegalese association in Brazzaville, as many Senegalese had used the same connection to enter Gabon. In Franceville, he spent less than a week because his ultimate point of arrival in Gabon was Libreville, the capital of the country. He was convinced that in Libreville he could get help from a cousin, who had been established in the city for years. The Senegalese community in Franceville helped him to pay the train ticket to Libreville.

During his first year, he was living with his cousin and selling cigarettes every night. After a couple of months, he managed to save enough money to buy a camera and he then restarted his activity of photography like in Brazzaville. He attended a special training course on photography and became “professional”. He even regularised his status and he was continuously sending money back home through the “Senegalese bank.”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> It is a financial network with representatives worldwide, especially where there are big Senegalese communities. Western Union, a representative of the network in a specific city receives money from someone who would like to send it. The sender also gives details of a person who must receive it at home. The representative of the network then calls his colleague where money must be received, and gives all relevant details. The network retains 10 per cent of the amount transferred. The network has the advantage of reaching rural areas in Senegal in particular. Many nationalities have developed these kinds of financial networks worldwide. Apart from reaching rural areas, for instance, transfer fees retained by these networks are less significant than those of international companies such as Western

According to Souleymane C., although his financial situation was far better in Libreville in Gabon than in Brazzaville in Congo, things were not quite fine. Confronted by the economic crisis, Gabon nationals considered foreigners to be scapegoats and blamed them for economic scarcity. He however points out that he could not imagine it being worse in South Africa. He made his choice for coming to South Africa also because he believed that, as the most advanced economy on the continent, it would be better for him to migrate to South Africa, and later on to further his journey to Europe or North America. Moreover, he had a former classmate who kept him informed about South Africa. He decided then to come to continue his studies in South Africa, as his former classmate told him that he was a student in a big university in Johannesburg.

Souleymane C. arrived in Johannesburg in June 2000 and the only person he knew at that time was his former classmate. He stayed with him for about a week and he had to look for another place because his friend was living in a university residence. He finally got a Congolese roommate for about six months. Without enough financial resources, he could not register to any tertiary institution. The Congolese was studying part time at a college and was also a security officer. His former classmate introduced him to a member of the Mouride community in Johannesburg. The representative of the religious organisation was concerned when Souleymane C. told him his story and let him know that he also sold at the Sandaga market in Dakar. Souleymane C. was helped by the man to sell fruit and vegetables for about two months. With the help from the Mouride community, he opened his own small store and a year later he registered with the University of South Africa. He was studying part time.

He then had an opportunity to visit Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. In Cape Town he met other Senegalese who encouraged him to move down because the situation was better than in Johannesburg. When he arrived in Cape Town, another Senegalese was on his way to Italy. Souleymane C. then bought his stand at the train station, where he has been selling clothes since 2002. At the same time, he has been able to pursue his

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Union or Money Gramm. Besides, trust put in these network is also important because people see financial networks are part of the entire migrants' networks.



studies part time. But in the near future he would like to go back to Johannesburg because he believes that business opportunities are better there.

### **6.5 An extra-legal**

Cecile A. is a woman from Pointe Noire, the second largest city of Congo and it is also considered the economic capital of the country. She makes her living by plaiting hair at the Cape Town train station, with two other women from the same country. The case study of Cecile A. reveals an example of a failed migration.

Cecile A. was living with her companion and their two children in the economic capital of Congo before coming to South Africa. Unfortunately, she could not go further in her study than the second year of high school because of the lack of financial resources. Before meeting her boyfriend, she was living at the family house with other siblings and her mother. She was selling fruit and traditional Congolese food at the main market place in Pointe Noire. She did not stop her activity when she moved in with her boyfriend because it was her only way to make money, and her boyfriend's salary from a company at the city harbour was not enough to satisfy all their needs. She even increased her selling products when she gave birth in order to earn more money to support her children's demands.

In the beginning, leaving Congo was not her dream because of her children. She did not want to leave them. Unfortunately, her thoughts drastically changed after the Congolese civil war which took the lives of two of her brothers. The armed conflict added more painful living conditions to those the economic crisis had already brought to the country. Many families were surviving from the important remittances received from members of their families living in Europe, France in particular, as well as some African countries such as Gabon and South Africa. Going to South Africa was fashionable at that time because it was a new destination, and because of the difficulties encountered in reaching Europe and Gabon no longer offered the same financial advantages. In her area in Pointe Noire, two families were living from the rent money of houses built in less than two years by the members of their families living in Johannesburg.

Living conditions in her house worsened when her boyfriend lost his job. A couple of months later, he chased her and the children away from his house. It was painful for her to be unable to provide a proper home for her children and to be unable to send them to school. Because she could not find a decent job, she opted to migrate to look for any job in another country which could allow her to help her children and her family as a whole, because she was determined to earn more money.

Her choice of South Africa was influenced by a letter she received from her cousin who had moved to South Africa nine months before. She asked Cecile A. to join her in Cape Town and together they could look for something to make a living. Cecile A. received \$200 from her cousin in Cape Town and managed to get \$100 from different people in Pointe Noire to make the trip down to South Africa. Her cousin gave her the contacts of people in charge of organising her trip to Cape Town. Her cousin even paid half the amount of the trip money. She therefore did not encounter so many problems to reach Cape Town. She knew that she was going to a city in South Africa called Cape Town, but she did not have any idea where it was, apart from an indication on the map.

Cecile A. arrived in Cape Town in September 2001. Soon after her arrival things did not go the way she expected. Two months after she arrived while she was still looking for a job, as well as trying to learn how to communicate in English, her cousin decided to go to France. She was disappointed about not finding a decent job in Cape Town. Fortunately for her, she met a Frenchman who became her boyfriend and decided to go to France with her. Cecile A. found herself in an embarrassing situation because she was not able to speak English properly, she had no money, no decent job, and above all of that she was alone in an unknown city.

What follows is a typical example of the dark side of the feminisation of migration in particular. Cecile A. reveals with shame and reserve that the first people she was introduced to after the departure of her cousin did not give any option other than being involved in the networks of prostitution. She mentions that the choice was difficult to make but she had to find a way to survive in Cape Town. Cecile A. did not want to say too much about her sexual activities.

Cecile A.'s status in the meantime has not been clarified. She has declared herself as an asylum seeker, but her application has not yet been approved. She considers herself lucky because in Cape Town there is less police harassment compared to Johannesburg, according to what she has been hearing from people. She remains confident that her situation will get better sooner or later. But she has been shocked by the xenophobic attitudes of South African nationals towards foreigners. She does not understand such behaviour because many foreigners are suffering in Cape Town and the general belief that foreigners take jobs is not true. She is also disappointed that xenophobic attacks are directed specifically to black foreign Africans. However, she acknowledges that all South Africans are not xenophobes.

Cecile A. also makes money by plaiting and braiding women hair. She has a small stand at the train station and from time to time she sends money home to her family. She proudly affirm that the money she sends home comes from plaiting activities, and she uses the money from the other activities to try to satisfy all her needs in Cape Town. She also tries to accumulate some savings as she plans to open a bigger business as soon as her status is regularised.

## **6.6 Conclusion**

The crossovers from one category to another by migrants depend on the success of the settlement in Cape Town. Economic success in Cape Town dictates the overlapping from one category to another after the arrival in the city. The settlement of migrants often occurs beyond the expectations they had when they decided to come to Cape Town, with the settlement being either successful or unsuccessful. Whatever the circumstances of arrival of Francophone Africans in Cape Town, their settlement and the evolution of their status depends on their ability to be integrated into the local society and help they can receive from their fellow countrymen.

## Chapter Seven

### CONCLUSION

In this study, an investigation has been made in order to explain increases in the arrival of French-speaking Africans in Cape Town, particularly since the demise of the apartheid regime. The official figures drawn from the 1996 and 2001 censuses show an increase of 632% of documented Francophone Africans residing in Cape Town in this period. If one considers that the censuses do not take into account all categories of migrants, extra-legals in particular, it would be fair to say that no one needs official figures to notice a growing number of people speaking French or other African languages, such as Lingala, Swahili, Bambara and Wolof, in areas like Mowbray, Sea Point, the Central Railway station or Muizenberg to be convinced that there is a large number of people coming from Francophone African countries to Cape Town. The guesstimate made in this study suggests that the number of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town in 2005 may be between 39 000 and 55 000 people.

The study centers on three main questions:

1. Why do Francophone Africans leave their countries of origin?
2. Why do they choose to come to South Africa?
3. Why, within South Africa, do they decide to come to Cape Town?

In order to give explicit answers to these three questions, four categories (legal migrants, students, refugees, and extra-legals) were considered. With regard to the first question, the reasons for departure are various and complex. It appears that a certain number can be applied to all four categories. These include the continuation of studies, the search for job and economic opportunities, the escape of political and the deterioration of economic conditions and the effects of social capital. Indeed, the collapse of the academic system due to many years of mismanagement, internal shortcomings of the Francophone African University, the political, economic and social impact of the implementation of both democracy, and the devaluation of CFA Franc have impacted on the quality of higher education. For both students and academics, migrating has become synonymous with studying and working in better

conditions. The search for better working conditions is not limited to academics. Francophone Africans also leave their countries because they wish to work in better conditions and for better wages, with a desire to have better offers as far as career prospects are concerned. These two conditions are the consequences of political and economic paralysis. After more than three decades of domination by military and one-party regimes, the inauguration of democratic changes, implemented at the beginning of the 1990s, has not realised expectations. Likewise, an economy mainly based on the exportation of raw materials and agricultural products, has been unable to deliver genuine development. This is illustrated by indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI), which lists some of Francophone African countries as the worst performers worldwide. Lastly, social capital is among the common reasons underlying the departure of migrants in all four categories. Through well-established networks or by the exchange of information with migrants, people back in their countries of origin are motivated to leave and seek other opportunities. Other reasons (which do not necessarily apply to all four categories) are armed conflicts, environmental catastrophes and the perception of migration as the last resort to make a living. Indeed, natural catastrophes, such as the advance of the Sahara Desert, particularly in the Sahel, or floods in the tropical region or armed conflicts have forced millions of refugees to flee from their countries of origin.

Accordingly, the departure of categories of migrants depends on specific reasons. For most of legal migrants and students, the reasons for departures are influenced by political, economic, academic and social paralysis, the continuation of studies and the search for career prospects, economic and job opportunities. For refugees and extra-legals however, the reasons for leaving are based on political crisis, economic deterioration, social capital, armed conflicts, environmental catastrophes and sometimes basic survival.

These reasons, coupled with others such as the search for fertile lands or the need for manpower during the pre-colonial or colonial era, have sustained the flows of people in Francophone Africa for years. As shown in various sources (GCIM, 2005: 1; Castels & Miller, 1998: 125), large numbers of regional movements have occurred between countries. Nevertheless, Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire have been regarded as important destinations in Francophone Africa, because of their relative economic

success up to the end of the 1980s. The flows of Francophone Africans have also been directed to France and to a lesser extent to Belgium, the former colonial rulers. In Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire, the arrivals of Francophone Africans have been mainly guided by the search for job opportunities. In Europe, the patterns of the Francophone African migration to these countries were determined, in the first place, by economic demands, especially with the implementation of the "migration of recruitment" after World War II. Later, the departure of French-speaking Africans took other forms such as families' reunification, seasonal workers' migration and illegal flows.

The choice of South Africa as country of destination is based on multiple factors. The decision underlying this choice is based on perceptions of potential migrants about South Africa while they are still in their countries. South Africa is regarded as a country with a rich and painful history, made by great men. The country nowadays is labeled the economic locomotive of the continent, and it is perceived as a good tourist destination and could be a potential stopover to reach other destinations. However, some Francophone Africans also regard South Africa as a racist and xenophobic country, with a high proportion of violence and HIV/AIDS.

Yet, many Francophone Africans are willing to come to South Africa. Before 1994, there were two migration streams from Francophone Africa: white flows from Mauritius and the settlement of Zairians, in particular in the former homelands. Even before the arrival of the ANC into power, millions of "aliens" were flowing over the South Africa's borders and were confirming the predictions made by the former South African president F. W. De Klerk in 1990.<sup>17</sup>

South African political and economic achievements during the first post-apartheid decade are illustrated by the organisation of free and fair elections, the freedom of the press and the respect of the separation of powers of the legislative, the executive and

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<sup>17</sup> At the dawn of the inauguration of democracy in South Africa, F. W. De Klerk predicted, during a speech, that:

All the evidence suggests that the ending of apartheid will deepen, not weaken, South Africa's attractiveness to the people of the region. This means that when southern Africa's own Berlin Wall – apartheid – finally comes down, a tide of humanity will cross over into this country. To avoid the resulting long-term social dislocation, planning for these migrants needs to commence as soon as possible (Vale, 2003: 93).

the judiciary. The country is an economic giant on the continent. South Africa represents 40% of the GDP of the whole of Africa and of the 50 first companies on the continent, 40 are South Africans. *Jeune Afrique* (2005: 232) points out that the economic future of the country is promising. Furthermore, the academic institutions are better structured than those in other African countries. The prominence of South Africa has also been demonstrated by the country's capacity for resolving conflicts (with Burundi, the DRC and Cote d'Ivoire the most famous examples in Francophone Africa), as well as its determination to guide the continent towards a new orientation of development through structures such as NEPAD or AU.

South Africa has become, because of these aspects, a magnet for millions of Francophone Africans in their quest for better economic opportunities, studying conditions or a safer place. In order to distinguish the flows of people entering South Africa during the apartheid era and those that have been happening since the democratic elections, especially from Francophone Africa, it argues that "For the immigrants who have arrived from the Congo and other parts of French-speaking Africa, the major reason for migrating has been to escape civil war in their own countries and to seek a better life, not to serve a limited time as migrant workers" (Sichone, 2003: 131).

However, these South African political and economic aspects do not have the same effect in attracting other categories of migrants. For legal migrants and students, the major reasons for choosing South Africa as a country of destination are economic opportunities, political achievements, academic infrastructure, social capital and the language factor (being able to master English). For refugees and extra-legals, social capital, geographical proximity and South African immigration law are the principal reasons for coming. Finally, the country is also viewed as an alternative destination to some traditional ones. But, many migrants, or potential migrants, to South Africa have a limited knowledge of the country upon arrival. A large number of those migrants have received information about the country from the media or from previous migrants in South Africa or from those currently residing there.

With regard to the last question of this study, the reasons for the arrivals of Francophone migrants also depend on the categories of migrants. Six main reasons

emerged from the research explaining the choice of Cape Town. First, Cape Town is viewed as a first choice, especially by some legal migrants and students. By applying for work and study permits from their countries of origin, migrants know, at their arrival, that Cape Town is their destination in South Africa. The second reason is the use of social capital networks. Cape Town has been included into well-organised international networks within which migrants arrive in or leave from Cape Town to other destinations when necessary. The last four reasons are related to Johannesburg, which for many Francophone Africans is the first choice. Those reasons are the failure to settle economically and academically in Johannesburg, safety, police harassment and the fact that Johannesburg is perceived to be overpopulated by migrants, which affects chances of settlement and economic success. Those reasons explain the arrival of most extra-legals, refugees, some legal migrants and few students.

Four hypotheses were selected when the three main questions were posed:

1. French-speaking Africans leave their countries of origin due to political disturbance, economic difficulties and the collapse of social and academic systems.
2. Their departure for South Africa is viewed as a second choice due to their inability to reach or live in some traditional destinations, France, Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon. This is because these countries had strengthened their migration policies.
3. The choice of South Africa lies in the pull factors presented by the country, which are similar to those of European countries.
4. Finally, the arrival of French-speaking African migrants in Cape Town is the consequence of failure of earlier settlements elsewhere within South Africa.

This study has shown that the departure of Francophone Africans from their countries of origin is the result of the political disturbance, economic difficulties and the collapse of social and academic systems. However, if this hypothesis is true, it appears that additional reasons are behind the departure of Francophone Africans. More importantly, this study suggests that the motives for leaving depend on the categories of migrants.



It has been shown in this study that during the course of their history, due in particular to economic stringency, some traditional countries of destination have strengthened their migration policies to curb the flows of migrants. Various laws and measures in France, the policies of *Ivoirité* in Cote d'Ivoire and *Gabonisation* in Gabon are some examples. The implementation of such laws and measures has made it difficult for migrants to enter these countries and has played a pivotal role in the repatriation of thousands of others already established in the host nations. For many migrants, it is important to look for other destinations, including South Africa. The search for new destinations has been enhanced by the challenges presented by globalisation such as the ability to adapt to a global labour market.

To some extent, the choice of South Africa as country of destination is dictated by the pull factors comparable to those in European, American and some Asian countries. If one considers students for instance, their choice of South Africa is made because the country can offer academic infrastructure better than those in the sending ones and similar to those in Europe. However, for some refugees, the choice of South Africa responds to the geographical proximity.

With regard to the choice of city as destination in South Africa, Johannesburg appears to be the first choice because it is the best-known South African city in Francophone Africa. This study has also demonstrated that some migrants are unable to settle in Johannesburg economically or for safety and academic reasons. Therefore, Cape Town is among the other cities that migrants consider as second or third choice. But, this does not apply to all migrants, especially some legal migrants and students, who regard Cape Town as their first destination at their arrival in the country.

In the introduction, the question regarding the continuation of a Francophone identity among migrants in Cape Town was posed. Upon arrival, migrants find their common knowledge of French a significant bond. As migrants settle and attempt to integrate, knowledge of French remains an important shared asset among legal migrants and students. For most other migrants, its importance diminishes as they learn and use other languages such as English and isiXhosa.

This thesis illustrates the dualism of the integration of Francophone Africans into the Cape Town's society. On the one hand, some attempts to integrate are made by migrants through marriages to South Africa nationals, the incorporation into religious organisations and the learning of local languages, particularly isiXhosa. The study demonstrated that the current arrivals and attempts at integration of migrants in general, including from Francophone Africa, participate in the changing dynamics of the city. On the other hand, migrants keep strong links with their countries of origin. The sending of remittances and the activities of networks such as the transfer of goods or information to potential migrants in Francophone Africa illustrate their transnationalism.

The process of Francophone African migration to Cape Town may be thought to end with the integration of migrants into the society. Yet, that integration is hampered by xenophobia (which migrants themselves explain as a lack of knowledge about the rest of the continent among South Africans and by the spread of poverty). Integration is also influenced by the gender of migrants. Since there are numerous women among Congolese migrants, new female migrants are provided with accommodation as well as casual work upon their arrival. There are other such examples. The success of the Francophone African migration to Cape Town determines the future of the respondents. There are some who still consider Cape Town as a stopover, although they have already extended their sojourn in the city several times. Another group of respondents admit to being satisfied with the city.

In conclusion, migration of Francophone Africans to Cape Town can be viewed as part of new patterns of movement of people taking place worldwide. Indeed, the arrival of French-speaking Africans in South Africa is determined by the advantages and complexities of globalization. These processes are likely to continue to push people from various regions and to attract people to new regions, despite different language backgrounds.

## **Appendix: Estimating the numbers of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town**

### **1.1 Aim**

“Determining recent trends in the migrant stock in African countries is often a matter of guesswork” (The United Nations, 2004: 55). Although relevant figures are often contradictory and always open to debate, especially with the current flows of thousands of Zimbabweans arriving in South Africa, I felt it necessary to develop guesstimates of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town, at the end of the first decade following the demise of the apartheid. This will be done in three steps.

### **1.2 Method**

Since the categories used in research done within the body of this thesis are (i) legal migrants, (ii) refugees, (iii) students, and (iv) extra-legal migrants, the methods used for developing a guesstimate in each of these four categories will be first spelled out separately. I will also identify the method then used for developing a guesstimate of the number of Francophone migrants in Cape Town, some ten years after the demise of apartheid. The second step is the application of these methods to each of the four migrant categories. Thirdly, the calculation of a guesstimate of the number of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town will bring the appendix to close.

#### **1.2.1 Legal migrants**

I scanned and found data from academic and the South African Department of Home Affairs sources on Francophone legal Africans in South Africa and in Cape Town. Since data is available for both South Africa and in Cape Town in 2001, the proportion of Francophone Africans in Cape Town in 2001 is used to calculate Francophone African migrants in Cape Town in 2005.

#### **1.2.2 Refugees**

I scanned and collected data on refugees in South Africa and on African refugees in Cape Town, from various sources. Personal communication from Home Affairs provided the figure of 22% of all legal African migrants in Cape Town for the year

2001 were Francophone. I have applied this 22% to the African refugee community in Cape Town in the same year.

### **1.2.3 Students**

The four universities in the Greater Cape Town were approached and after a series of referrals between universities administrative departments, figures of Francophone African students were obtained.

### **1.2.4 Extra-legals**

I scanned sources on data of extra-legal African migration to South Africa. I used most reliable sources drawn from the work of established specialists on migration, such as Hough and Minaar (1996), Reitz (1997) Crush and McDonald (1999) or Crush and Williams (2001). However, results remain unreliable with major differences between high and low estimates. For this reason this data have not been used.

For Cape Town, the following method has been applied:

(i) An academic estimate for the total foreign African population of the Western Cape in 2002 was taken as the point of departure<sup>18</sup>. (ii) Using data assembled for the other three categories, namely legal migrants, refugees and students; an estimate of the other category (that is, extra-legal foreign Africans) was calculated for 2002. (iii) Subsequently, 22% of this figure was calculated to generate an estimate of the number of extra-legal Francophone African migrants in the Western Cape in 2002. (iv) The rate of increase of legal migrants to Cape Town from 2002 to 2005 was then applied to extra-legal Francophone Africans in Cape Town to obtain a 2005 estimate. (v) The resulting range was taken to reflect the size of this population in Cape Town.

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<sup>18</sup> Dorrington, quoted by Boaden, B. 2002. *Migration Study in the Western Cape: Foreign African Migrants in the Western Cape*. Cape Town: UCT. p 8.

### 1.3 Guesstimates by categories

#### 1.3.1 Francophone African legal migrants

**Table A.1 Legal Francophone African migrants**

	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>Cape Town</b>
<b>1996</b>		<b>364<sup>19</sup></b>
<b>2001</b>	<b>20 000<sup>20</sup></b>	<b>2 452<sup>21</sup></b>
<b>2004</b>	<b>250 000<sup>22</sup></b>	<b>30 650</b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>110 000<sup>23</sup></b>	<b>13 486</b>

- Data for Francophone African migrants in South Africa for the years 2001, 2004 and 2005 were obtained from academic sources.

- Data for Francophone African migrants in Cape Town for the years 1996 and 2001 were obtained through personal communication with Home Affairs.

- The proportion of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town was 12. 26% in 2001. When this proportion is applied to the national figure in 2005, a guesstimate of 13 486 Francophone African migrants in Cape Town is obtained.

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<sup>19</sup> Personal communication with Home Affairs, 26 March 2005.

<sup>20</sup> Bouillon, A. and Morris, A. (eds). 2001. *African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone Migration of the 1990s*. Pretoria: Protea. p. 32.

<sup>21</sup> Personal communication with Home Affairs

<sup>22</sup> Fall, P. D. 2004. *Les Sénégalais au KwaZulu-Natal (Afrique du Sud) ou les Naufragés de la Migration Internationale*. Paper presented at the International Congress of African Studies. Barcelona, 12-15 January.

<sup>23</sup> Colette, E. 2005. «Francophonie à la Hausse» *Jeune Afrique l'Intelligent*. N° 2314, 15 May. p. 36.

### 1.3.2 Refugees

**Table A.2 Refugees in South Africa**

<b>Selected years</b>	<b>Numbers</b>
<b>1996</b>	<b>3 000<sup>24</sup></b>
<b>1997</b>	<b>4 000<sup>25</sup></b>
<b>1998</b>	<b>8 000<sup>26</sup></b>
<b>1999</b>	<b>14 530<sup>27</sup></b>
	<b>14 904<sup>28</sup></b>
	<b>11 734<sup>29</sup></b>
<b>2002</b>	<b>25 000<sup>30</sup></b>
	<b>69 000<sup>31</sup></b>
	<b>27 000<sup>32</sup></b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>28 500<sup>33</sup></b>

Figures developed in this table represent all refugees in South Africa.

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<sup>24</sup> [www.refugees.org](http://www.refugees.org)

<sup>25</sup> *idem*

<sup>26</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Joseph, G. B. 2001. "Asylum or Abuse? The Refugee Regime in South Africa", in Majodina, Z. (ed.). *The Challenge of Forced Migration in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. p. 141.

<sup>29</sup> Matlou, P. 2001. "The Creation of Refugee Law: The South African Experience", in Majodina, Z. (ed.). *The Challenge of Forced Migration in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. p. 127.

<sup>30</sup> [www.refugees.org](http://www.refugees.org)

<sup>31</sup> Cape Town Refugee Centre, quoted by Boaden, B. 2002. *Migration Study in the Western Cape: Foreign African Migrants in the Western Cape*. Cape Town: UCT. p.17.

<sup>32</sup> Gotz, G. and Landau, L. B. 2004. "Introduction", in Landau, L. B. (ed.). *Forced Migrants in the New Johannesburg: Towards a Local Government Response*. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand. p.18.

<sup>33</sup> [www.refugees.org](http://www.refugees.org)

**Table A.3 Refugees in Cape Town**

<b>Years</b>	<b>African refugees</b>	<b>Francophone refugees</b>
<b>1999</b>	<b>11 900<sup>34</sup></b>	<b>2 618</b>
<b>2002</b>	<b>19 000<sup>35</sup></b>	<b>4 180</b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>15 685<sup>36</sup></b>	<b>3 451</b>

-Data for refugees in South Africa come from many sources and are less than reliable.

-For Cape Town, one academic source for 1999 and 2002 and one state source for 2005 appear reasonable, as it is clear from the different figures since other figures appear to contradict national data.

The 22% proportion is applied to calculate Francophone African refugees. This is clearly a guesstimate. The figure obtained for 2005 is 3 451 Francophone African refugees in Cape Town.

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<sup>34</sup> Boaden, B. 2002. *Migration Study in the Western Cape: Foreign African Migrants in the Western Cape*. Cape Town: UCT. p. 9.

<sup>35</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>36</sup> Personal communication with Home Affairs, 26 March 2005.

### 1.3.3 Registered Francophone African Students

**Table A.4 Registered Francophone African students**

	1994	1996	1998	2001	2002	2004
CPUT <sup>37</sup>	1	1	3	58	115	236
US <sup>38</sup>	4	3	11	67	96	154
UCT <sup>39</sup>	179	17	193	227	268	285
UWC <sup>40</sup>		2	10	34	35	83

The figure obtained for 2004 is 758 Francophone African students.

### 1.3.4 Francophone Extra-legal migrants

A guesstimate of Francophone extra-legal migrants in Cape Town is obtained following these steps:

(i) By obtaining the number of extra-legal African migrants:

Dorrington estimate of foreign African migrants in the Western Cape<sup>41</sup> (2002):

60 000 – 80 000

Estimated number of legal migrants (2001):

11 145<sup>42</sup>

refugees (2002):

19 000<sup>43</sup>

students (2001):

1 754<sup>44</sup>

Total: 31 899

Estimate (2001/2002) of extra-legal African migrants in Western Cape:

28 101 – 48 101<sup>45</sup>

Estimate (2001/2002) of Francophone extra-legal African migrants in Western Cape (22% of the extra legal African migrants): 6 182 – 10 582

<sup>37</sup> Planning Department, CPUT, 31 January 2007

<sup>38</sup> International Office, University of Stellenbosch, 2 August 2005

<sup>39</sup> Planning Department, UCT, 14 July 2005

<sup>40</sup> Planning Department, UWC, 25 February 2007

<sup>41</sup> Boaden, B. *op. cit.*, p.9.

<sup>42</sup> 11 145 is obtained from 2 452 (the number of Francophone legal African migrants in Cape Town in 2001, who represent 22% of the African population in Cape Town according to Home Affairs).

<sup>43</sup> The number of African refugees in Cape Town, according to Boaden, *op.cit.*

<sup>44</sup> 1 754 is obtained from 386 by assuming that the proportion of Francophone African students in the foreign african students population is the same as the proportion (22 %) of Francophone africans among all Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town. (see Table B. 4)

<sup>45</sup> This number was obtained by subtracting 31 899 (the sum of the other three categories) from the estimate given by Dorrington.



- (ii) By obtaining the number the annual increase of Francophone legal migrants 2001 and 2005

Number of Francophone African legal migrants in Cape Town in 2001 = 2 452

in 2005 = 13 486

That is, an increase of 11 034 over four years, which translates into an annual increase of 450 % for these four years period.

When this annual increase is applied to the estimates above, over a three year period (2002-2005), the following range is obtained:

Francophone African extra-legal migrants in the Western Cape (2005):

27 819 – 47 619

As pointed by Boaden (2002: ii), most of these migrants live in Cape Town. One therefore can apply these numbers to Cape Town.

#### **1.4 Estimation of the numbers of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town (2004/2005)**

**Table A.5 Estimation of the numbers of Francophone African migrants in Cape Town (2004/2005)**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Categories of migrants</b>	<b>Numbers</b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>Legals migrants</b>	<b>13 486</b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>Refugees</b>	<b>3 451</b>
<b>2004</b>	<b>Students</b>	<b>758</b>
<b>2004/2005</b>	<b>Extra-legals</b>	<b>20 940 – 37 714</b>
<b>2004/2005</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>38 635 – 55 409</b>

In conclusion, it would appear that there were between 39 000 and 55 000 Francophone African migrants in Cape Town in 2005. This guesstimate however

should be used with extreme caution since it is based on a number of assumptions that may be questioned.

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